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"Too much thought has been given to the matter of getting less quali-
fied judges off the bench. The real remedy is not to put them on."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Merit selection of judges provides one such remedy. It is a process
by which a nominating commission, consisting of lawyers, non-lawyers,
and sometimes judges, recruits, investigates, interviews, and evaluates
applicants for judicial office. The nominating commission sends a short
list of those deemed most qualified to an appointing authority, usually
the governor, who is then required to make his or her selection from that
list.
Long advocated by the American Judicature Society ("AJS"), merit
selection began in earnest with its adoption in 1940 by the State of Mis-
souri. The "Missouri Plan," as it has also come to be known,2 has been
surrounded by controversy since it was first proposed. Controversy con-
tinues over the advantages, disadvantages, and effects, if any, of merit
plans on the quality of the judiciary. The passage of time has not
resolved the debate. Rather, additional issues have arisen in response to
legal, political, and operational factors.
Proponents of merit selection offer it as a preferable alternative to
the politics and fund raising inherent in judicial elections, but opponents
maintain that the appointive process itself is political, and that, further-
more, people have a right to elect their judges. Despite lingering doubts
by some about merit selection's effectiveness in eliminating politics
from judicial selection, and the lack of "hard" evidence that it results in
the selection of better judges, the merit plan has gained widespread
acceptance. At this writing, thirty-four states and the District of Colum-
I. Roscoe Pound, Introduction to EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES
ix, xiv (1944).
2. The process of merit selection is variously referred to as the "merit plan," the "non-
partisan merit plan," or the "Missouri Plan." These terms are interchangeable, despite the fact that
the concept takes many forms. Cf. Patrick W. Dunn, Note, Judicial Selection in the States: A
Critical Study with Proposals for Reform, 4 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 267, 285 n.71 (1976) ("The use of
the term 'merit' in this context tends to be ambiguous and conclusive, implying that the Missouri
system of judicial selection is based only on merit while alternative methods of selecting judges
are not. The use of such prejudicial terminology is not conducive to an objective analysis of
judicial selection systems."). The term "merit selection" is used here because, despite the warning
above, it is commonly accepted. Moreover, at the time the above statement was published
relatively little was known about the effects of merit selection.
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bia use the merit plan for the selection of some or all of their judges.
Furthermore, U.S. Senators have used at least seven nominating com-
missions in the recent past to assist them in deciding upon their recom-
mendations to the President for federal judgeships.3
This Article provides a comprehensive review of the status of merit
selection in the United States, and addresses a variety of current merit
selection issues. Part II of the Article summarizes the history of judicial
selection in the United States from colonial times to the present. Next, a
history of merit selection is provided, followed by a description of the
American Judicature Society's Model Judicial Selection Provisions.
Part III describes the structural features of existing merit plans:
their scope, authority, and composition. A wide range of merit plans
exists, and it is hoped that this overview of the status of merit selection
will assist policy makers considering adoption or modification of merit
plans.
An examination of the rules of procedure adopted by judicial nomi-
nating commissions is contained in Part IV. The information is drawn
from a recently completed national survey by AJS that collected and
reviewed the rules of procedure and application forms from 31 cooperat-
ing nominating commissions. These rules are described in the order in
which they would become applicable in a typical case of judicial selec-
tion, from the commission's organizational meeting to ethical considera-
tions for commission members.
References will be made in Parts III and IV to tables in Appendix A
that summarize the data collected regarding nominating commission
operations. The tables provide an overview of the scope of merit selec-
tion plans (Table 1), the composition of their membership (Table 2), the
3. California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See
infra Appendix A, Table I. See Larry Berkson, Judicial Selection, Compensation, Discipline and
Mandatory Retirement, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION DIVsIoN HANDBOOK 61, 65 (Fannie J. Klein, ed., 6th ed. 1981) ("Since 1975,
forty-eight U.S. senators in thirty states have established voluntary advisory committees to aid
them in selecting federal district judges."). See also Sheldon Goldman, Carter's Judicial
Appointments: A Lasting Legacy, 64 JUDICATURE 344, 352-53 (1981) (describing former
President Carter's extensive use of nominating commissions).
Likewise, merit selection panels are required by federal law to screen applicants for federal
magistrate positions. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(5) (1993); Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts, Reg. of
the Jud. Conf. of the U.S. Establishing Standards and Procedures for the Appointment and
Reappointment of U.S. Magistrate Judges, § 3.01, in The Selection and Appointment of U.S.
Magistrate Judges (1993). See. e.g., Press Release of Bruce Barton, District Executive for the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (April 26, 1994) (on file with the
author); Public Notice on Appointment of Magistrate Judge by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York (April 20, 1994) ("A Merit Selection Panel composed of
attorneys and other residents of the district will review all applications and recommend in
confidence to the judges of the district court the five persons whom it considers best qualified.")
(on file with the author).
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rules governing the submission of the list of nominees (Table 3), the
rules of confidentiality (Table 4), and the other rules of procedure (Table
5). The AJS Model Judicial Selection Provisions are then presented in
Appendix B.
Part V is a review of the empirical research on merit selection. The
obvious problem of establishing the criteria for such subjective terms as
a "good" judge or a "better" quality of justice has not deterred research-
ers from attempting to measure the effects of merit selection. This part
of the Article describes the principal findings of these studies and sug-
gests directions for future research.
Part VI explores a number of current merit selection issues that
have arisen from recent legal developments, such as the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the application of the
Voting Rights Act ("VRA") to judicial elections. Other issues arising
from the natural evolution of merit plans-such as the movement
toward diversity provisions for commission membership and judicial
nominations, and linkages between merit plans and judicial performance
evaluations-are also discussed.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the merit plan, while not a pan-
acea that would completely eliminate politics from judicial selection, is
a far preferable system for enhancing public confidence in the courts
than the electoral process. The arguments made by minority critics who
do not share this view are also addressed. Merit selection can be harmo-
nized with their concerns about establishing a more diverse bench with-
out returning to judicial elections.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
A. Judicial Selection in the United States
In 17th century England, the chancellor, acting for the king,
appointed judges to dispense justice on the king's behalf. The judges
could, however, be arbitrarily removed at the pleasure of the king.
Later, after the English revolution of 1688, statutes gave judges life ten-
ure "during good behavior."4
In the colonies, the king also had absolute control over the appoint-
ment and removal of judges. Commentators on judicial selection have
often cited the reference to the king's treatment of colonial judges that
appears in the list of grievances in the Declaration of Independence:
"He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
4. MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION, COMPENSATION,
ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 3 (1987).
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offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. '
Following the American Revolution, the thirteen original states
retained-but diffused-the appointive power. Eight of the thirteen
original states adopted the appointive process, but placed it in the hands
of one or both houses of the legislature; three states provided for joint
appointment by the governor and a council; and two states provided for
gubernatorial appointment subject to confirmation by a council.6  For
federal judges, the framers of the Constitution also retained the appoin-
tive power in the President, but diffused the power by the requiring Sen-
ate confirmation.7
In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to establish a partisan
electoral process for statewide judicial selection.8 This marked the
beginning of a trend in many states prompted by the emergence of Jack-
sonian Democracy. The shift to judicial elections from the 1830s until
the 1850s:
was one phase of the general swing toward broadened suffrage and
broader popular control of public office which Jacksonian Democ-
racy built on the foundations laid by Jefferson. As such, the move-
ment was based on emotion rather than on a deliberate evaluation of
experience under the appointive system....
.. [It] was the result of... imitation and sentiment.9
By the Civil War, twenty-two of 34 states elected their judges,
while the older Atlantic seaboard states retained the appointive method
subject to legislative approval.10 It was not long before widespread dis-
5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
6. COMISKY & PArTERSON, supra note 4, at 4-5; Berkson, supra note 3, at 61. Cf. Glenn R.
Winters, Selection of Judges-An Historical Introduction, 44 TEx. L. Rav. 1081, 1082 (1966)
(writing that seven states provided for appointment by the legislature, five by the governor and a
council, and one by the governor and legislature jointly). The differences in these accounts
regarding the states' post-Colonial judicial selection systems is attributable to the fact that in the
1700s Delaware switched from legislative to gubernatorial appointments.
7. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
8. Georgia, however, was the first to adopt the elective system for its lower court judges in
1812. Winters, supra note 6, at 1082.
9. JA~ms W. HRmsT, THE GROWTH OF AmCAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 140 (1950). See
also Winters, supra note 6, at 1082 ("[T]here is some indication that it was inspired in part by a
feeling that judges were being appointed too frequently from the ranks of the wealthy and
privileged.").
10. George E. Brand, Selection of Judges-The Fiction of Majority Election, 34 J. AM.
JUDICATURE Soc'y 136, 136 (1951). After Mississippi, New York, in 1846, and all states entering
the Union thereafter until the entrance of Alaska in 1958 adopted the elective system. Winters,
supra note 6, at 1082 (citing EvAN HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 101 (1944)). As
to the fact that the eastern seaboard states utilize the gubernatorial appointive process with
legislative confirmation, this was the beginning of a pattern; there is a correlation between the
region of the country and the method ofjudicial selection. Of the eight gubernatorial appointment
systems, seven are in the Northeast; of the twenty states with partisan elections, twelve are in the
South and four are in the Midwest; and of the fourteen states with non-partisan elections, eight are
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satisfaction over political abuses in connection with partisan elections
arose. Those abuses stemmed from the emerging power of political par-
ties during the period from 1870 to 1930 to control judicial candidates,
the elected judiciary, and the retention of judges in subsequent partisan
elections." As one historian put it, the history of early judicial elections
"worked out as a defacto system of appointment."
12
Roscoe Pound, in his famous August 29, 1906 speech, The Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, at the
annual meeting of the American Bar Association ("ABA"), noted that
"[p]utting courts into politics and compelling judges to become politi-
cians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect
for the bench."' 3 By this time, the tradition of voters always "returning
a sitting judge"' 4 was well established. By 1880, the ABA, the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, and other bar associations were
formed in an effort to restore public confidence in the courts which was
lost, in part, due to the political nature of partisan judicial elections.
15
After the turn of the century, alternatives to partisan elections were
suggested. Nonpartisan elections, direct judicial primaries, shortened
ballots, and nominating committees were proposed and adopted in many
states during the Progressive era (1900-1917). Progressivism was a
reform movement that advocated greater efficiency and economy in
in the West and six in the Midwest. All but one of the latter fourteen regions are contiguous.
Bradley C. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of Judges-
Reconsidered, 6 LAW & Soc'y REv. 579, 581 (1972).
11. This phenomenon continues today in Chicago, New York City, and other places where
partisan elections are still used and one political party is dominant.
12. HURST, supra note 9, at 133. Also see Albert M. Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring
Judges, 11 J. Am. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 133, 134-35 (1928):
It is one of our most absurd bits of political hypocrisy that we actually talk and act
as if our judges were elected whenever the method of selection is, in form, by
popular election.
In a great metropolitan district like Chicago, where we have a typical long
ballot and the party machines are well organized and powerful, our judges, while
they go through the form of election, are not selected by the people at all. They are
appointed. The appointing power is lodged with the leaders of the party machines.
These men appoint the nominees. They did it openly and with a certain degree of
responsibility under the convention system.... In almost every case the story is one
of preliminary service to the organization, recognition by the local organization
chief and through him recognition and appointment of a nomination by the
governing board of the party organization. Those who do not go by this road do not
get in. The voter only selects which of two or three appointing powers he prefers.
Whichever way he votes he merely approves an appointment by party organization
leaders.
13. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
40 AM. L. Rv. 729, 748 (1906).
14. HURST, supra note 9, at 134.
15. See Dunn, supra note 2, at 279-80.
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government, prompted by Frederick W. Taylor's theory of scientific
industrial management.1 6 The Progressive movement took the form of a
number of separate, reform-minded groups that proposed a variety of
programs designed to inject "efficiency" into government, in order that
it "run like a well-tuned engine."17
B. The History of Merit Selection
The founders of the American Judicature Society were products of
the Progressive movement.18 Roscoe Pound's 1906 speech was a major
inspiration to them as well as other court reform-minded people. 9
Pound argued that the "most efficient causes of present disaffection with
the present administration of justice '20 included the disorganized and
antiquated court system that caused "[u]ncertainty, delay and expense,
and above all the injustice of deciding cases upon points of practice,
which are the mere etiquette of justice."
21
While today AJS conducts a wide variety of programs, the advo-
cacy of and education about the merit selection of judges as an alterna-
tive to the elective system has, since its formation, been the cornerstone
of its activities. AJS was formed in 1913 with the general progressive
mission of improving the "efficiency" 22  of the administration of
16. See generally FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911);
Lewis Gould, Introduction: The Progressive Era, in THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Lewis L. Gould, ed.,
1974).
17. See ROBERT M. CRUNDEN, MINISTERS OF REFORM ix (1982).
18. They include, among others, Herbert Harley, Jr., a Michigan law-trained journalist and a
founder of AJS and secretary-treasurer from 1913 to 1945, Dean John H. Wigmore of
Northwestern University School of Law, Albert M. Kales, a colleague of Wigmore at
Northwestern, Harry Olson, Chief Justice of the Municipal Court of Chicago, Dean James Parker
Hall of the University of Chicago, Governor Woodbridge Ferris of Michigan, and Dean Roscoe
Pound, Jr. of Harvard Law School. MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, To IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 1-28 (1992).
19. See Pound, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
20. Note Pound's somewhat inapposite use of the progressive term "efficient" to describe the
negative effects of the American judicial system.
21. See Pound, supra note 13, at 742.
22. The legal name of AJS at its date of incorporation (July 15, 1913) was the American
Judicature Society to Promote the Efficient Administration of Justice. BELKNAP, supra note 18, at
24. The word Efficient was changed on August 12, 1974 to "Effective."
In the administration ofjustice the difference becomes meaningful. When we speak
of efficiency in the courts we think of rapidly moving court calendars, no waste of
time for judges, attorneys, jurors, witnesses or anybody; of court records that are
complete, accurate and up to date; of adequate and convenient court facilities, and
of typewriters and computers that work. When we say "effective" our attention
turns from the operation to the result. If the administration ofjustice is effective, the
right parties win, the innocent are vindicated, the guilty punished, court calendars
are cleared, the laws are respected and obeyed and the people live in security and
harmony.
It will, indeed, take more than judicial administration to accomplish all that,
1994]
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justice.23
The founders of AJS shared the commonplace Progressive belief that
the solution to most of the country's problems lay in more efficient
public administration. The Society's negative attitude toward the
election of judges, for example, was part of a widespread denigration
of partisan politics. Progressives tended to view partisanship as pro-
ductive of inefficiency in governance and to believe that government
should be run like a business corporation.24
The Progressive court reformers of the day, therefore, focused on
the negative effects (i.e., inefficiencies) of, among other things,25 judi-
cial elections, an area that was greatly in need of reform. It is ironic that
reformers of one era (the Progressives) opposed a reform (i.e., elections)
that was put in place by reformers of a different era (Jacksonian Democ-
racy) as a substitute for gubernatorial appointment. But abuses of the
political process and other weaknesses of electoral systems required the
return to an appointive system of judicial selection, this time based upon
merit.
In 1914, Albert M. Kales, law professor at Northwestern University
and the AJS director of research, proposed a system to replace judicial
elections. Judges would first be nominated for office by a nonpolitical
commission that would affirmatively seek out the best qualified candi-
dates. Under his plan, a popularly-elected chief justice would then make
an appointment from the list of the commission's nominees. After a
specified initial term of office, and for subsequent terms, judges would
run in an unopposed retention election.26
The August 1919 issue of the Journal of the American Judicature
Society announced that the question of judicial selection, which had
but the more efficiently and effectively justice is administered, the nearer we will
come to that ideal. Efficiency includes effectiveness. whirring machines are
useless if they turn out a defective product. Perhaps in changing our name we are
not really changing much of anything. And shouldn't.
Editorial, Efficient Effective Justice, 57 JUDICATURE 437 (1974).
23. See generally BELKNAP, supra note 18; Herbert Harley, The American Judicature Society,
An Interpretation, 62 U. PA. L. REv. 340 (1914); Herbert Harley, Concerning the American
Judicature Society: An Attempt to Give a Brief History of a Unique Organization and to Explain
Its Objectives, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 9 (1936).
24. BELKNAP, supra note 18, at 26.
25. See generally Herbert Harley, The American Judicature Society, An Interpretation, 62 U.
PA. L. REv. 340 (1914); BELKNAP, supra note 18, Chapters 1-2, at 1-67. See also American
Judicature Society, Suggested Causes for Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice in
Metropolitan Districts, BULLETIN No. I (American Judicature Soc'y), Jan. 1914 (criticisms and
proposals offered in six areas: 1) selection, retirement, and discipline ofjudges; 2) organization of
judges; 3) selection and use of juries; 4) methods of developing procedural rules; 5) selection of
court officials; and 6) organization of the bar, including admission to practice and discipline).
26. Kales, supra note 12, at 142; Albert M. Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring Judges
in a Metropolitan District, 52 ANNALs 1 (1914).
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been deferred since the organization's birth in 1913 in favor of other
court reform issues, would be addressed in the coming year.27 Subse-
quent editorials spoke in opposition to elections, arguing that the popu-
lace can never have sufficient knowledge of judicial candidates to select
the most qualified individuals.2" The elective system, it was argued,
should be seen for what it really was: a system of judicial selection by
party leaders.29 The role of the electorate, accordingly, should be lim-
ited to retention "at stated intervals.1
30
In 1926, Harold Laski, a British political scientist, proposed that the
executive, not the chief justice as in Kales's proposal, be given the
appointment power.3' Two years later, AJS endorsed Kales's proposal
as modified by Laski.32  The nominations presented to the governor
under the AJS proposal would come from a committee of the bar. 3
In 1931, the Grand Jury Association of New York became the first
to suggest that lay citizens be included in nonpartisan judicial nominat-
ing commissions.34 Then, in 1937, the ABA adopted the merit plan.35 It
proposed:
(a) The filling of vacancies by appointment by the executive or
other elective official or officials, but from a list named by another
agency, composed in part of high judicial officers and in part of other
citizens, selected for the purpose, who hold no other public office.
(b) If further check upon appointment be desired, such check may
27. Editorial, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 35, 35 (1919).
28. See Selecting and Retiring Judges, 3 J. A. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 165, 165 (1920).
29. Id. at 171.
30. Id. at 175.
31. See Harold J. Laski, The Technique of Judicial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. Rv. 529, 533
(1926).
32. See The Eligible List of Judicial Candidates, I 1 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 131, 131-32
(1928).
33. See id.
The idea is that a governor empowered to appoint judges might be required to
choose from a public list of eligible lawyers .... Such a list of eligibles should
contain always two or three times as many names as there are positions to be filled,
thus affording the governor considerable latitude, for he should carry a large share
of the power and responsibility.
An eligible list could be created and maintained in various ways but it would
seem that the best way would be through a bar plebiscite. That would seem to be
the way to prevent a wild scramble for such a desireable position....
[T]he plebiscite would winnow out the deserving from the merely self-
seeking.
Id.
34. See Glenn R. Winters, Judicial Selection and Tenure, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIA .
SELECTION AND TENURE 36 (Glenn R. Winters, ed. 1973).
35. See John Perry Wood, Basic Propositions Relating to Judicial Selection, in Fourth
Session, 23 A.B.A. J. 102, 105 (1937).
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be supplied by the requirement of confirmation by the State Senate or
other legislative body of appointments made through the dual agency
suggested.36
(c) The appointee shall after a period of service be eligible for reap-
pointment periodically thereafter or go before the people upon his
record with no opposing candidate, the people voting upon the ques-
tion, Shall Judge Blank be retained in office? 7
In 1940, Missouri voters adopted the Kales-Laski plan for its appel-
late courts, the circuit and probate courts of St. Louis City and Jackson
County (Kansas City), and the St. Louis courts of criminal correction.38
The first state to adopt a statewide merit plan was Alaska, which
adopted the system when it entered the Union in 1959. 31 Iowa and
Nebraska followed suit in 1962 by adopting merit selection for their
major trial and appellate judges.40 In 1964, limited jurisdiction judges
also came under merit plans in Colorado (the Denver County Court) and
in Florida (the Dade County Metropolitan Court).4'
A constitutional amendment or a statute is usually the source of
authority for merit plans. Some jurisdictions, however, adopted merit
selection through an executive order entered by the governor or mayor.42
36. Id.
37. Fourth Session, 23 A.B.A. J. 102, 108 (1937). In 1962, the ABA adopted its Model State
Judicial Article, which recommended a number of court reform measures, such as a merit
selection system (i.e., the Missouri Plan for Judicial Selection, named after the first state to adopt
a merit plan for some of its state judges), an expanded judicial department with the power to
determine the number of judges needed, the establishment of jurisdiction by court rule rather than
by statute, and a single, unified court system. BELKNAP, supra note 18, at 181-82.
38. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 29(a); see also RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE
POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 11-12 (1969); see generally Jack W. Peltason, The Missouri
Plan for the Selection of Judges, 20 U. Mo. STUDIES 1 (1945).
39. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5-9; see also WATSON & DOwNING, supra note 38, at 12. An
exception existed for limited jurisdiction judges, who were appointed by judges of the superior
court.
40. IOWA CONST. art. 5, §§ 15-18; NEa. CONST. art. IV, § 11, art. V, §§ 4-5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 21.
41. See DENVER, COLO., HOME RULE CHARTER, §§ A13.8 to -3 (1964); Bipartisan
Commission to Select Denver Judges, 48 J. Am. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 117 (1964); DADE COUNTY,
FLA., HOME RULE CHARTER, § 6.01 (1964); Dade County Voters Approve Plan, 47 J. Am.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 117 (1963).
42. See Donna Vandenberg, Voluntary Merit Selection: Its History and Current Status, 66
JUDICATURE 265, 265-66, 268 (1983):
Proponents of merit selection have found the road to its adoption a rocky one.
Proposed constitutional amendments have often failed in the legislature, or, once
passed the legislators, fallen at the polls. Passage of a statutory plan is nearly as
difficult. Merit selection supporters in the legislature have discovered their
colleagues often reluctant to support even a limited plan.
However, in states where the power to appoint judges to initial or interim
vacancies is vested in the governor, and where constitutional or statutory attempts at
merit selection have failed, executives have chosen an easier means of instituting a
plan-the executive order. These orders have commonly created a nominating
[Vol. 49:1
MERIT SELECTION
In New York City, for example, Mayor Robert Wagner established a
nominating commission in 1961 to recommend nominees for mayoral
appointments of city judges, a plan later extended by Mayors John Lind-
say, Abraham D. Beame, Edward I. Koch, David Dinkins, and by the
current Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.43 Initial and midterm vacancies on the
New York Court of Appeals (the court of last resort) are filled through
merit selection. Midterm vacancies on the general jurisdiction supreme
(trial) courts and initial and midterm vacancies on the Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court and the Court of Claims are also filled
thorough merit selection under the executive order enacted by former
Governor Mario Cuomo. 44 All other judgeships in New York are filled
through the elective process.
The following observation, made by former AJS executive director
Glenn Winters in 1966, still holds true today:
In most of the elective states the governor is empowered to fill judi-
cial and other vacancies by appointment, with tenure of these
appointed judges extending until the next election or for a specified
minimum time. Since forty to ninety percent of the judicial vacancies
that occur are filled by the governor, even in the states that are nomi-
nally elective, a very substantial percentage, usually a majority, of the
judges actually are appointed, and for these judges the subsequent
election is significant only with respect to tenure. When the judges
selected in those jurisdictions that have an appointive system are
added to those appointed in the rest of the states under the governor's
power to fill vacancies, it becomes clear that the judges initially
selected by election are in the minority. This minority is bound to
diminish as merit selection gains new adherents in the years ahead. 5
The history of merit selection also reflects the tension between the
values of judicial independence and judicial accountability. On the one
hand, the rule of law is bottomed on the existence of an independent
judiciary that is not subject to shifting political winds and interests. On
the other hand, the populist nature of American culture, from the Ameri-
commission to screen applicants for initial or interim vacancies to the courts over
which the executive has appointing power
.... Unfortunately, not only is the ease of implementation the voluntary plan
major benefit-it is also its major weakness. When the governor leaves office, the
succeeding executive is not bound to extend the life of the executive order.
Id. at 265-66 (citation omitted). See also Winters, supra note 6, at 1086-87; infra Appendix A,
Table 1.
43. See Winters, supra note 6, at 1086; infra Appendix A, Table 1.
44. See Exec. Order No. 134.2 of Gov. Mario Cuomo (September 10, 1992). As of this
writing, New York's Governor George Pataki is reviewing all existing executive orders to
determine whether to extend, modify, or rescind them.
45. See Winters, supra note 6, at 1087.
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can Revolution through the Jacksonian and Progressive eras, reflects
strong and continuing notions of governmental accountability. Oppo-
nents of merit selection believe that the people should select and remove
their judiciary. This populist argument is most commonly advocated in
non-urban areas, which traditionally have opposed merit selection."
"Legislators, judges, lawyers and residents in non-urban areas often fear
the loss of local control and autonomy that accompanies a statewide
solution proposed to solve organizational, administrative, financial and
procedural problems that they associate with overcrowded and delay-
burdened urban courts. 47
Often, the leadership of the legal community spearheads the move-
ment toward adoption of merit selection.4 8 Because they are usually the
leaders of the statewide or the urban bar association, their efforts have a
greater impact in urban areas.49  This urban/rural tension can result in
states having counties with widely divergent opinions regarding judicial
selection. 0
Further balkanization of attitudes toward merit selection may be
attributable to the existence of different "political cultures"151 in each
46. See Philip L. Dubois, Voter Responses to Court Reform: Merit Judicial Selection on the
Ballot, 73 JUDICATURE 238, 244 (1990); see generally Henry R. Glick, Innovation in State
Judicial Administration: Effects on Court Management and Organization, 9 AM. POL. Q. 49
(1981); Marsha Puro et al., An Analysis of Judicial Diffsion: Adoption of the Missouri Plan in
the American States, 15 PUBLIUS 85, 89 (1985); Judith Ann Haydel, Explaining Adoption of
Judicial Merit.Selection in the States, 1950-1980: A Multivariate Test 102 (1987) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Orleans).
47. Dubois, supra note 46, at 244.
48. See Haydel, supra note 46, at I 11.
49. Dubois, supra note 46, at 244.
50. See Glenn R. Winters, The New Mexico Judicial Selection Campaign-A Case History,
35 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 166, 169 (1952); see also Dubois, supra note 46, at 239 (Table 1
provides the voter response to proposed merit plans in 28 state elections for the period 1941-1980.
The data show that voter support for merit selection within each state studied varies from county
to county.).
51. The concept was first articulated by DANIEL A. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A
Vmw FROM THE STATE (1972). Elazar described three American political cultures that reflect
citizens' attitudes toward their role in government and the role of government in society. These
three cultures, shaped by migration and immigration patterns, urbanization, industrialization, and
other factors, are: 1) the "individualistic" (in which the political system is considered a
marketplace, where private interests compete for governmental outcomes, a place that "is the
province of professionals" and that is "no place for amateurs"); 2) the "moralistic" (where people
believe public servants should devote themselves to the public good and the public interest, where
influence-peddling is unacceptable as a normal part of government); and 3) the "traditionalist"
(where the status quo is valued by citizens who are both ambivalent about the government
marketplace and maintain a highly elitist and paternalistic attitude about the commonwealth). Id.
at 95. See also Dubois, supra note 46, at 247 ("[T]he major metropolitan areas which contain the
vast majority of the voting public and which have been shown earlier to have been decisive in
determining court reform elections are, almost without exception, dominated by the individualistic
or moralistic cultures."); John Kincaid, Political Culture and the Quality of Urban Life, 10
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state. Thus, some states, such as Kansas and Colorado, 2 are literally a
"patchwork quilt" of areas with different judicial selection methods in
each county or court district.
As of this writing, six methods of judicial selection are prevalent in
the United States. Merit selection is the method of both initial and
interim selection of some or all judges in twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia.5 3 In fourteen states, interim vacancies for some or
all judgeships are filled using merit selection.54 Twelve states 55 use
nonpartisan elections, while partisan elections are used in nine states.56
A gubernatorial appointment system with legislative (Senate) confirma-
tion is used in three states, 57 and only two states continue to use direct
legislative appointments.58 California is unique in its use of a guberna-
torial appointment system by having a Commission on Judicial Appoint-
ments that has veto power over the selections. 9
There are several arguments raised in favor of merit selection. The
first addresses the weaknesses of both partisan and nonpartisan elective
systems. These methods do not allow for rational judicial selection:
"Elections ... are premised on a dubious assumption: that the public is
attentive and well informed about the candidates."6 In fact, it is corn-
PUBLIus 89, 92 (1980); Samuel C. Patterson, The Political Culture of the American States, 30 J.
POL. 187 (1968).
52. See infra Appendix A, Table 1.
53. Alaska; Arizona (supreme, appellate, and superior court in counties with populations
greater than 250,000); Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; D.C.; Florida (supreme and appellate
court; midterm vacancies on circuit and county courts); Hawaii; Indiana (supreme, appellate, Lake
and St. Joseph and Allen County Superior Courts, and Marion County Municipal Court); Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland; Massachusetts; Missouri (supreme, appellate, St. Louis, Kansas City and
surrounding counties); Nebraska; New Mexico, New York (all appellate courts and some New
York City courts); Oklahoma (supreme, and court of criminal appeals); Rhode island (all trial
courts currently, and supreme--if voters adopt constitutional amendment at November 8, 1994
election); South Dakota (supreme); Tennessee (all appellate); Utah; Vermont; Wyoming. Infra
Appendix A, Table 1.
54. Alabama (circuit and/or district courts in Jefferson, Madison, Mobile, and Tuscaloosa
Counties); Florida (circuit and county courts only); Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky; Minnesota (district
courts only); Montana, Nevada, North Dakota; Oklahoma (courts of appeals and district court
only); Pennsylvania, South Dakota (circuit court); West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Infra Appendix
A, Table 1.
55. Georgia; Idaho; Kentucky; Michigan; Minnesota; Montana; Nevada; North Dakota; Ohio;
Oregon; Washington; and Wisconsin. Infra Appendix A, Table 1. See Judicial Selection in the
States Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts Summary of Initial Selection Methods (1994)
(on file with AJS).
56. Alabama; Arkansas; llinois; Louisiana; Mississippi; North Carolina; Pennsylvania;
Texas; West Virginia. Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
57. Maine; New Hampshire (confirmation by an Executive Council); and New Jersey. Infra
Appendix A, Table 1.
58. South Carolina and Virginia. Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
59. Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
60. See Berkson, supra note 3, at 64.
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mon knowledge that the public is uninformed about judicial candidates,
and, worse still, some believe that ethnic name recognition is the basis
for many voting decisions. Election contests are usually issueless and
have low voter turnout. Most incumbents are easily reelected and often
run unopposed.61
Elections also discourage many well-qualified people from seeking
judicial office. "Many attorneys ... have a philosophical distaste for
politics and political campaigning, and thus refrain from seeking
office."62 Elections also compromise the independence of the judiciary;
"judicial officers, unlike other elected officials, should not be governed
by the transient whims of the public which is likely to vote an unpopu-
lar, although competent, judge out of office for rendering correct but
controversial decisions. 63 No less significant are the problems associ-
ated with judges who must campaign and seek campaign contributions
and with getting court business accomplished during reelection time.
C. The AJS Model Judicial Selection Provisions
In 1984, AJS developed a model statute for the establishment of a
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 65.
64. Id. Arguments against merit selection are: (1) it deprives citizens of their right of
franchise; (2) it does not take politics out of judicial selection; (3) nominating commissioners are
not representative of the population, and thus candidates will not be drawn from all segments of
society; (4) it results in life-tenure for judges, who are rarely removed in retention elections; and
(5) that elections serve to educate the public, whereas merit selection does not. Id. at 66. In
response, (1) the history of judicial selection in this country as described in part II(A), supra, of
this article does not support the notion of a "right of franchise" for judicial selection, the method
of selection historically being a function of what the people in any given states, through their
elected representatives, choose as their preferred system. Also, popular control and accountability
is retained under merit selection by the retention election component of almost all merit plans; (2)
merit selection may not eliminate politics, but it serves to reduce the "improper" politics inherent
in the electoral system, as I point out in part V(F), infra; (3) diversity rules and statutory
provisions are addressing the lack of representativeness in nominating commission membership,
as I explain in part VI(B), infra; (4) judges, in general, whether they be elected or appointed, are
rarely removed through contested elections or retention elections. A vigilant and adequately
funded judicial conduct mechanism, however, is an integral part of any method of judicial
selection, broadly defined, and provides a more effective means of removal of those judges that
should be removed than the electoral system; and (5) a process by which a nominating
commission recruits, screens, investigates, interviews, and selects a short list of the most qualified
applicants for judicial office probably serves to educate the commission members, as
representatives of the public, more about the candidates than a judicial election can educate the
general public. Judicial ethics requirements being what they are, there is very little about which
judges can publicly campaign. My purposes here, however, are not to debate all issues
surrounding merit selection, but to (1) provide as objective a review of the status and empirical
research about merit selection as is possible to inform policymakers, and (2) show how certain
procedural recommendations of the AJS Model Provisions and the variety of rules of nominating
commissions, as reflected in the tables in Appendix A, address emerging merit selection issues.
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merit plan.65 Under the Model Judicial Selection Provisions ("Model
Provisions"), the gubernatorial appointment power is restricted to a list
of two to five nominees selected by a seven member judicial nominating
commission.66 This model of judicial selection is a means of diffusing
the gubernatorial appointment power. As explained in the Model Provi-
sions, "[t]he separation of functions allows for independent and nonpar-
tisan evaluations and nominations by a responsible commission and final
appointment by a governor who is politically accountable."67
The Model Provisions recommend a nominating commission com-
posed of seven members: either three lawyers and four non-lawyers, or
vice versa. 68 An alternative model is a seven member commission, with
a chief justice or presiding judge serving as chair ex-officio.6 9 Commis-
sioners should be residents of the same state or judicial district in which
the vacancy arose.70 The lawyer members are appointed or elected by
the state bar and the non-lawyers are appointed by the governor.7 1
Appointments are made with "due consideration to geographic represen-
tation and without regard to political affiliation. '72 Commissioners may
not hold any other political office for which monetary compensation is
received, nor may they hold such an office for three (or four) years after
serving as a nominating commissioner.73
The recommendation that the appointing authority be presented
with not less than two, nor more than five nominees' names is explained
in this way:
Although the number of names submitted to the governor need not be
fixed at five, the number should be sufficiently low so that the com-
mission nominates only the most qualified candidates. Five names
appears to be the optimum because it gives the governor a real choice
while limiting the governor's appointing power. [Commissions in
rural areas] ... may have difficulty finding five qualified nominees
and should therefore be allowed the flexibility to submit fewer
65. MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS (American Judicature Soc'y, 1984, revised
1994) [hereinafter MODEL PROVISIONS]; infra Appendix B. The Model Provisions contain a
model executive order for states in which a governor, or cities in which a mayor, decide to
establish a merit plan as part of their appointment powers, whether it be applicable to initial or
interim judicial appointments. Id. at part 3.
66. Id. § 2.
67. Id. § I, commentary.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 2, alternative B.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The new diversity provisions for commissioners are discussed in infra notes 457-63
and accompanying text.
73. MODEL PROVISIONS § 2, alternative B.
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names.
74
After receiving the nominees list, the governor has thirty days
within which to make the appointment; if no appointment is made within
that time, the chief justice (or presiding judge, where applicable) makes
the appointment." This provision is intended to ensure that the final
appointment is made within a reasonable time. 76
The recommended terms for the initial commissioners are staggered
among the lawyer and non-lawyer commission members and each group
has a maximum of either four or six year terms." The commentary to
the Model Provisions states that "[m]embers should serve for a period
long enough to enable them to develop selection skills," 78 and that terms
"should be staggered to encourage an independent commission and to
provide some continuity.
'79
Commissions should be provided with staff and equipment and
empowered to adopt their own rules of procedure.80 Part 2 of the Model
Provisions consists of model rules for implementing a merit plan. These
include rules that require submission of a list of "no more than five nor
less than two persons qualified for the judicial office to the governor
within 60 days of the occurrence of a vacancy."8" The chairman of the
commission publicizes the vacancy and solicits the names of qualified
applicants through press releases and public announcements.8 2
Organizational meetings of the commission to discuss "the com-
mission's procedures and requirements for the vacancy" are open to the
public;8 3 "final deliberations," however, are "secret and confidential"84
in order to "encourage free and open discussion of the candidates' quali-
fications."8 5 Additional rules of confidentiality shall be determined by
each commission,8 6 with the admonition that commission proceedings
should be "as open as possible. 8 7
Names are submitted to the governor in alphabetical order, and an
optional confidential memorandum may accompany the list of nominees
74. Id. § 1, commentary.
75. Id. § 1.
76. Id. § 1, commentary.
77. Id. § 3.
78. Id. § 2, commentary.
79. Id. § 3, commentary.
80. Id. § 5; see infra Appendix A, Tables 3 and 4.
81. Id. at Rule 1.
82. Id. at Rule 4.
83. Id. at Rule 5(a).
84. Id. at Rule 5(b).
85. Id. at Rule 5, commentary.
86. Id. at Rule 5(c).
87. Id. at Rule 5, commentary.
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to "state facts concerning each of the nominees listed."'88 The governor
then makes the names of the nominees public and encourages public
comment about them.8 9 "This is the point at which public preferences
are appropriately voiced. By providing the opportunity for public partic-
ipation, the governor also fosters public confidence in the final appoint-
ment." 90 Should the governor request additional information about a
nominee, the commission may provide it in the form of a memorandum
without indicating any commission preference. 91
The Model Provisions recommend that candidates for membership
on the nominating commission be a resident of the state for three
years.92 This is included to ensure that commissioners "have knowledge
of the state and of the community," an important quality since commis-
sioners "sit in place of the electorate when selecting public officials.
'9 3
For those states that follow the process of retention by the electo-
rate, the Model Provisions recommend an uncontested retention elec-
tion.94 In addition, retention election ballots are separate from ballots
for other public offices, and divided by sections corresponding to the
different courts for which there are retention candidates.95 The sole
issue on the ballot is whether or not the candidate (sitting judge) should
be retained.96
In 1994, the AJS Executive Committee approved an amendment to
the Model Provisions regarding the composition of nominating commis-
sions. The amendment provides, "All appointing authorities shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the commission substantially reflects
the gender, ethnic and racial diversity of the jurisdiction."97
Another new part was added to the Model Provisions in 1994.98
Part 4 now recommends that merit plans establish two Commissions on
Judicial Performance Evaluation, one for appellate judges and another
for trial judges.99 The purposes underlying the creation of these com-
missions are to:
(1) provide persons voting on the retention of justices and judges
88. Id. at Rule 6(a), (b).
89. Id. at Rule 6(c).
90. Id. at Rule 6, commentary.
91. Id. at Rule 5, commentary.
92. Id. at Rule 7(a).
93. Id. at Rule 7, commentary.
94. Id. at Rule 8.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 2, alternative A, B.
98. MODEL PROVISIONS, Part 4, Implementing a Retention Evaluation Program: Model
Legislation (or Court Rules) (American Judicature Society, 1994).
99. Id. §§ 2, 3.
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with fair, responsible and constructive information about judicial per-
formance; (2) facilitate self-improvement of all such justices and
judges; (3) promote appropriate judicial assignments; (4) identify the
need for an improvement of the content of judicial education pro-
grams; and (5) increase public awareness of the work of the
judiciary." 0
Under the Model Provisions, the judicial performance commissions may
also conduct midterm performance evaluations for judges not standing
for retention.00
The judicial performance commissions are to develop techniques
for judicial evaluations "on relevant criteria," including "integrity,
impartiality, judicial temperament, knowledge and understanding of sub-
stantive and procedural law, communication skills, preparation, atten-
tiveness and control over judicial proceedings, docket management and
prompt case disposition, administrative skills, punctuality, and effective-
ness in working with other participants in the judicial process."'0 2 Addi-
tional duties include developing performance evaluation surveys by
lawyers, jurors, peers, chief judges, court personnel and "others who
have direct and continuing contact with justices and judges."'1 3 The cri-
teria, forms, and procedures to be used in these evaluations are to be
applied statewide."
Additional powers and duties of the judicial performance evalua-
tion commissions include consulting with other performance evaluation
commissions in the state, 05 subpoenaing witnesses, 0 6 requesting pubic
comment and holding public hearings, 7 producing and publicizing no
later than sixty (or ninety) days before a retention election "pertinent
information concerning each appellate justice or judge subject to reten-
tion," 108 and promulgating their own rules subject to supreme court or
state judicial council approval.'09 Trial court commissions have addi-
tional power under these provisions to solicit information from judges
through questionnaires and interviews." 0
The recommended composition of judicial performance evaluation
commissions is as follows (with optional alternatives indicated
100. Id. § 1.
101. Id. § 1.
102. Id. § 2(d).
103. Id. § 1 (d)(2).
104. Id. § l(d)(3).
105. Id. § l(d)(4).
106. Id. § l(d)(5).
107. Id. § I(d)(6).
108. Id. § 1 (d)(7).
109. Id. § l(d)(8).
110. Id. § 3(d)(1).
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parenthetically): eleven members for each of the two commissions,
comprised of six (five) lay members appointed by the governor; three
(four) attorney members (in states with integrated bars, appointed by the
supreme court; in states with voluntary bars, elected or appointed by
members of the bar); and two judge members. 11  On appellate commis-
sions, the members selected from the judiciary should include the chief
justice or a designee and one court of appeals judge appointed by the
chief justice.1 2  On trial court commissions, the judge member shall be
the chief judge of the appropriate court of appeals. 1 3 As with nominat-
ing commissions, the appointing authorities for each commission "shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the commission substantially
reflects the gender, ethnic and racial diversity of the jurisdiction."' 14
These commissions, after completing their evaluations, prepare a
"narrative profile" to be presented to the judge being evaluated no later
than thirty days prior to the last day on which a justice or judge may
declare an intent to stand for retention."15
Additional recommendations regarding nominating commission
operations are contained in the AJS Handbook for Judicial Nominating
Commissioners.' 16 This book was published as a companion to the
Nominating Commissioner Institutes, which have been conducted by
AJS at least once in nearly every merit plan jurisdiction. Relevant por-
tions of the Handbook will be referred to in the discussion of rules of
procedure for nominating commissions.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF MERIT SELECTION
A. Sources of Authority
Table 1 in Appendix A provides information about the scope of
merit selection plans as gleaned from state constitutions and legislation.
The table reflects the wide variation of existing plan structures. Cur-
rently, merit plans are in place by virtue of constitutional provisions in
111. Id. § 2(a), alternative A. Section 2(a), Alternative B provides for legislative appointment
power and establishes the same number of commission members, but provides that the state's
legislative leaders appoint two of the five (or six) lay members, one each by the leader of each
house where there are two houses, two appointed by the chief justice, and two appointed by the
governor, the remaining members being the same as Alternative A.
112. Id. § 2(a), alternative A, B.
113. Id. § 3(a), alternative A, B. Alternative B contains language authorizing legislative
appointments to the commission in the same manner as for the appellate commission Alternative
B, as described in supra note I11.
114. Id. §§ 2, 3.
115. Id. §4.
116. MARLA N. GREENSTEIN, HANDBOOK FOR JuDicIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONER (1985)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK].
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
seventeen states, 1 7 by statutory provisions in three states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia,"' by executive orders in seven states, 119 and by a
combination of these in seven states.' 20
B. Scope of Merit Selection
The merit plan, as noted earlier,12 1 was first implemented in Mis-
souri and has since also come to be known as the "Missouri Plan." The
most recent adoption of merit selection occurred in Rhode Island in
1994, when merit selection was adopted by statute for trial judges.'22
AJS continues to receive numerous inquiries about merit selection from
court reformers in a number of states, including Pennsylvania, West Vir-
ginia, Louisiana, Texas, and Florida.
Four states-Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Nebraska-
currently use merit selection for judicial appointments for every level of
court in the state. 123 In twenty-three states, supreme court justices are
initially appointed under a merit plan.' 24 In nine states, merit plans are
only used to fill interim vacancies for the supreme court. 2
5
In sixteen states, intermediate appellate judges are appointed under
a merit plan.'26 In six states, these judges are appointed under a merit
plan for interim vacancies only. 27 As for trial judges, Table 1 shows
the range of general and limited jurisdiction trial judgeships that are fil-
led through the merit selection process, both for initial and interim
appointments.
States may establish more than one nominating commission,
117. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. Infra
Appendix A, Table 1.
118. Idaho, Minnesota, Tennessee, and District of Columbia. Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
119. Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
120. Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, New York, and North Dakota, and Rhode Island (pending
approval of constitutional amendment). Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
121. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
122. See 1994 R.I. Pub. Laws; 2346sb, 2348sb.
123. See infra Appendix A, Table 1.
124. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
125. Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin,
and West Virginia. Id. See generally LYLE WARIUCK, JUDICIAL SELECTION Hma UNITED
STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 9, 11 (2d ed. 1993).
126. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, and Utah. Infra Appendix
A, Table 1.
127. Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. See infra
Appendix A, Table 1.
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depending on the level of court for which merit selection has been
adopted. The number of commissions in a given state ranges from a low
of one, such as in Hawaii, to a high of ninety-nine, one for every county
in the State of Iowa. 2 '
C. Composition of Nominating Commissions
The size of nominating commissions also varies widely nationwide.
The smallest commissions identified have five members, while the larg-
est is the Massachusetts commission with twenty-three members.129
Nominating commissions in most states include non-lawyers, in num-
bers that may be less than, 30 equal to,' or more than 32 the number of
attorneys on the commission. Some states merely prescribe the number
of commissioners without specifying the required composition of the
panel with respect to the lawyer versus lay membership ratio.'
33
The terms of office for commissioners range from a low of one
year 1 34 to a high of six years. 35 Some states, usually those with an
executive order merit plan, provide that commissioners shall serve "at
the pleasure of the Governor," without stating a specific term of
office. 1
36
Nominating commission meetings are usually conducted by a
chairperson. The chair may be a voting member of the commission,1
37
or may be a non-voting chair ex officio.131 Often, the chief justice of the
state's supreme court or another justice is designated as the commission
chair ex officio, 13 9 while one state specifies a law school dean for this
position." Chairs may also be appointed by the mayor' 4' or gover-
nor, 142 or elected from among the commission's membership.
143
The attorney members of nominating commissions are either







134. E.g., Pennsylvania trial and appellate commissions.
135. E.g., Tennessee.




140. E.g., New Mexico.
141. E.g., New York City.
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local bars.145 The non-lawyer members are usually appointed by the
governor,' 6 but may be appointed by the legislature, 47 the governor
with the consent of the Senate, 48 legislative leaders, 149 or the county
board of supervisors.' Judicial members of a nominating commission
may be appointed by the governor,1 5 1 the chief justice,152 or the state's
judicial conference. 53 Alternatively, they may be elected by members
of the supreme court, 154 other judges, 55 or the state bar, with the con-
sent of the senate.'
56
D. The Nomination Process
A nominating commission takes many steps before formulating a
short list of the most qualified applicants for judicial office. 57 Different
interests are at stake depending upon the length of the nomination list. If
the list is too short, the governor's discretion may be too restricted. If
the list is too long, there is an increased potential that the list will
include nominees who are not highly qualified or that a "pure" political
appointment may be made.
AJS recommends that "no more than five nor less than two" quali-
fied persons be nominated for each vacancy. 58 "[T)he number should
be sufficiently low so that the commission nominates only the most
qualified candidates,"' 59 but high enough to give the governor "a real
choice while limiting the governor's appointing power."' 60 Recently,
following the 1993 Citizens' Conference on Merit Selection, the Hawaii
legislature enacted a law authorizing a vote to amend the state's consti-
tution by changing the number of names requirement from "not less than
six nominees"1 61 to "not less than four nor more than six." 1 62 The




148. E.g., Iowa appellate commission.
149. E.g., Hawaii.
150. E.g., Iowa and Kansas.
151. E.g., Nebraska.
152. E.g., Nevada.
153. E.g., South Dakota.
154. E.g., Missouri appellate commission.
155. E.g., Montana.
156. E.g., Idaho.
157. See supra part IV of this Article.
158. MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 65, § 1.
159. Id. § 1, commentary.
160. Id.
161. HAw. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
162. S.B. 2294, H.D. 1, list of nominees.
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the governor and/or Chief Justice [who makes appointments if not
done so by the governor within thirty days of presentation of the list
of nominees, or within ten days of the senate's rejection of a previous
appointment] is given an opportunity to select the most political and
not necessarily the best qualified nominee. The people who favored
reducing the number felt that a reduction in the number should be
made in order to put more power of selection into the Commission
rather than into the appointing authority .... In addition, there was a
feeling that particularly in some of the less popular positions, it was
difficult to get six equally qualified nominees. According, it would
enable the Commission to list all qualified nominees and not have to
stretch to make it six.... At least it will make the public perception
better in that the Commission will need to submit a lower number and
therefore eliminate a substantial amount of the politicking.
163
The number of names required to be submitted by a commission is
sometimes stated as a fixed figure, such as three, 1" or as a range, such
as three to five,165 two to four,166 or five to seven. 67 Other commission
rules require a minimum of names, for example, three, 168 or, alterna-
tively, limit the number of names to a maximum of, for example, not
more than seven.'
69
The submission of the commission's list of nominees to the gover-
nor should be expeditious, so that the administration of justice is not
adversely affected by a judicial vacancy, but long enough to allow nomi-
nating commissions time to perform their duty of selecting nominees on
the basis of merit. Commissions, therefore, submit their list of nominees
within times that range from as short a period as four to five days,170 to
as long a period as 120 days. 17' Sixty days 72 is frequently the time
period specified as it strikes the necessary balance between speed and
thorough review and investigation of applicants. Some rules allow a
commission to seek an extension for submission of its nominees list if
additional time is necessary, 173 while others operate without any time
limit at all.' 
74
Many commission rules provide that the list of nominees shall be
163. Report of the Citizen's Conference on Judicial Selection, Summary of Issues, at 9 (1993).
164. E.g., Indiana.
165. E.g., Tuscaloosa County, Alabama.
166. E.g., Idaho.
167. E.g., Maryland appellate court commission.
168. E.g., Nebraska.
169. E.g., Maryland trial court commission.
170. E.g., Tuscaloosa County, Alabama.
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submitted in alphabetical order.1 75 A minority of commissions submit
names based upon rank order, 176 or by alphabetical order with ratings,177
while some commission rules make no reference to the subject.1
7
Nominating commissions sometimes send supplemental informa-
tion to the governor in addition to the nominees list. This additional
information variously includes bar survey results, 79 the applicant ques-
tionnaires, 80 the applicants' rtsumts and questionnaires,1 ' letters of
recommendation and non-recommendation, 82 written evaluations'8 3 or
reports, 8 4 the entire file on each applicant,8 5 or some combination of
the above. 1
8 6
Additional nominating commission activities are also regulated. In
Part IV of this article, other rules regulating commission activities, from
the organizational meeting to ethics and discipline of commissioners, are
described.
IV. RULES OF PROCEDURE
This part of the Article focuses on the rules of procedure" 7
obtained through the AJS national survey of nominating commissions.
In February 1994, AJS surveyed thirty-seven commissions and received
rules of procedure from thirty-one of them. These rules were the source
of the data used to prepare Tables 4 (Rules of Confidentiality) and 5
(Nominating Commission Procedures) of Appendix A.
Not all of the responses received were the rules and application
forms that had been requested. Surprisingly, commissions in six
states 8 8 responded that they had no rules of procedure. 89 AJS believes
175. E.g., Alaska, Indiana, and Maryland.








184. E.g., New York Court of Appeals commission.
185. E.g., Nebraska.
186. E.g., Idaho.
187. Occasionally I refer to constitutional or statutory provisions, if that is the source of the
applicable "rule" under discussion.
188. Alabama, Kansas, New Mexico, South Dakota, West Virginia, and the commission for
New York City.
189. Ashman and Alfini, in their 1974 study, note that sixty percent of the responding
commission indicated that their rules were neither written nor codified in any manner. ALLAN
ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO MERIT SELECTION: Tim NOMINATING PROCESS 42
(1974). The researchers opined that the reasons for this might be that the rules were not circulated
to all commissioners, especially new commissioners who received their survey, or because there
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that nominating commissions should establish rules of procedure, not
only to be fair to judicial applicants but to maintain public trust and
confidence in the courts and the judicial selection process. 9°
An examination of the rules collected as a part of this study exhibits
efforts by many commissions to address a number of issues never con-
templated by the founders of merit selection. Problems arising in one
jurisdiction during the selection process often give rise to rule making
on the subject. Then, as word of the adoption of certain rules becomes
known through vehicles such as the AJS Institute for Judicial Nominat-
ing Commissioners,19' other commissions enact similar rules. AJS sees
this as a positive, natural evolution and refinement of the merit selection
process through the rule-making process.
A. Organization
Most nominating commissions are required to have an organiza-
tional meeting after they are formed. These organizational meetings
serve multiple purposes.
First, the meeting can educate commissioners as to their responsibili-
ties in the selection process. Second, commissioners can be informed
of the type of vacancy they must fill. Third, the meeting can promote
uniform judicial selection procedures. Fourth, background informa-
tion on the commission and its role can be provided for each commis-
sion member and may prove especially helpful as an orientation for
new commissioners. Finally, the organizational meeting can be used
to anticipate problems that may arise during the selection process. '
92
Some commission rules stress the importance of the organizational
meeting:
The importance of this initial meeting cannot be overstated. If the
may be disagreement regarding what constitutes "Rules of Procedure." Id. at 42-43. "Some
commissions have prepared written policy statements or manuals for new commission members
which contain guidelines as to the objective and subjective criteria which should be applied in
evaluating the candidates for judicial office." Id. at 43.
190. See ASHMAN & ALFIuN, supra note 189, at 41 ("If the commission conducts its business in
a careless, disorganized fashion it is almost certain that the plan will not exhibit the attributes of a
good selection process.").
Further research is needed to examine how a commission without rules carries out its
responsibilities in the judicial selection process, and whether that process is sufficiently consistent
and fair both to applicants for judicial office and to the public.
191. AJS conducts a Nominating Commissioner Institute for nominating commissions who
request this training program for their new commissioners. During these institutes, which cover
all phases of the judicial selection process, AJS provides information about the rules of procedure
of other commissions on various subjects. AJS also provides this information when testifying at
the request of legislative committees considering merit selection, or when making other
presentations on the subject
192. See HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 22.
19941
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commission is not well organized, it is likely to face problems later.
The least of these problems is the inefficient use of limited time.
More serious problems such as breaches of ethics and confidentiality
or disputes over voting procedures may develop. The organizational
meeting is used to anticipate these problems before they occur.
The commission should accomplish four things during the public por-
tion of the organizational meeting. First, the commission should dis-
cuss issues of ethics and legal obligations. Second, the commission
should consider any administrative or procedural questions. Third,
the commission must develop a realistic time table in which to
accomplish its many tasks. Fourth, the commission should receive
oral and written testimony from the public. After the public portion
of the meeting, the commission may go into executive session to dis-
cuss the qualifications of applicants.'
93
Usually, the various commissions' rules for organizational meet-
ings require a minimum number of meetings per year. Some rules
require that such meetings take place in or after a given month of the
year. 194" Other rules require that subsequent meetings of the commission
occur as frequently as is necessary to conduct its business, and that such
meetings may be called either by the chair or a specified minimum
number of commissioners.' 95 Still other rules provide for commission
meetings at any time or place, subject to a waiver of the right of notice
of such meetings by all commissioners.' 96
B. Applications
All commissions require that an application form be submitted by
those seeking judicial office. Those applications typically delve deeply
into the background of the applicant, inquiring about one's personal,
educational, and professional history and experiences.
Additional waiver forms that must be signed and submitted with
the application are usually attached. Those waivers grant the commis-
sions access to otherwise confidential data, such as criminal records,
credit history, or records regarding payment of taxes or bankruptcy fil-
193. See UTAH MANUAL P. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM'N Rule 8 (revised 1991).
194. See, e.g., FLA. UNIFORm R.P. DIST. CT. APP. NOMINATING COMM'N sec. 4 (requiring
annual meetings after July I st of every year to elect a chair).
195. See, e.g., TENN. APP. CT. NOMINATING COMM'N, BYLAWS & R.P. Rule 3 ("The
Commission shall meet as frequently as required for the purpose of electing officers and
conducting other appropriate business. Meetings may be called by the Chairperson or three (3)
members of the Commission on three days' notice.").
196. See, e.g., NEV. COMM'N JUDICIAL SELECTION Rule 5(b) ("Meetings of the Commission
may be held without notice at any time or place whenever: (1) The meeting is one to which notice
is waived by all members, or (2) The Commission, at a meeting, designates the time and place for
a subsequent meeting and the secretary so informs any absent member.").
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ings. A typical, completed application packet includes an application
form, rdsumd, two copies of a recent photograph, a check to pay the cost
of securing a credit report, and a waiver of the confidentiality of certain
records.197 Because many attorneys now combine their law practice
with a mediation or arbitration practice, some applications specifically
elicit information about such experiences in addition to traditional ques-
tions about law practice experience.
In many states, judges are required to file financial disclosure forms
pursuant to either the state's code of judicial conduct or by statute.
Commissions in states where this is a requirement, such as Colorado,
specifically inquire about the applicant's familiarity with the duty to
make such disclosures upon taking office. 198
Some commissions also ask applicants to provide a personal state-
ment of some kind. The question may ask applicants to provide reasons
for seeking the judicial position,199 to describe what "potential contribu-
tion" the applicant believes he or she may make to the position,200 or to
state why he or she is interested in the position.20
Certain issues in particular stand out among the wide array of infor-
mation solicited. For example, some application forms contain ques-
tions that could be considered discriminatory.202 For example, questions
that inquire about military experience may be inapplicable to women
applicants, who generally have not had such experience. The presence
of these questions may be interpreted by female applicants to mean that
the nominating commission will give some weight to that experience,
resulting in an unfair advantage for men over women who do not usually
go into military service. Application forms should be drafted to elimi-
nate questions that give an unfair advantage to one sex.
197. See, e.g., UTAH MANUAL P. JUDIcIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS Rule IV. An additional
and less common requirement in the aforementioned rule is that the applicant submit a signed
waiver of the right to review the records of the commission. Id.
198. See Colorado Application for District Court Judgeship in the Second Judicial District 6
(revised July 23, 1990), which asks: "Do you understand a judge is required to file reports of
compensation for quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities in conformance with the Code of
Judicial Conduct? ...Do you understand that a judge must comply with the Public Official
Disclosure Law (Section 24-6-202, C.R.S. 1988)?"
199. See, e.g., Idaho Judicial Council Application for Appointment to Judicial Office 14
(revised 1992) ("What are your reasons for seeking this position?").
200. See, e.g., Florida Application for Nomination to the Supreme Court 14 (undated)
("Explain the particular potential contribution you believe your selection would bring to this
position.").
201. See, e.g., Kentucky Questionnaire to be Submitted to the Judicial Nominating
Commission 6 (undated) ("Please elaborate on why you are interested in this judgeship.").
202. The questions inquiring about the applicants' mental or physical health are discussed at
part VI(A) infra.
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C. Notices of Vacancy and Recruitment
When a judicial vacancy arises, commissions customarily announce
the vacancy in a variety of ways. Typically, they place announcements
with the media within a certain time period after the vacancy arises.20 3
Often, the notice of vacancy takes the form of a press release. 2°
Additional efforts are made to notify members of the bar through
bar associations.2 °5 Some commissions go beyond notifying the media
or bar associations of a vacancy through methods such as sending letters
to chief judges of the state and federal courts.20 6
Most commissions are proactive and operate under rules encourag-
ing external recruitment of qualified applicants by the commissioners.20 7
In Hawaii, commissioners are required to actively seek out people they
believe would be qualified applicants. The rationale for this rule is that
the most qualified candidates may not seek appointment and must be
encouraged to apply.208
The Handbook for Judicial Nominating Commissioners makes note
of an important caveat for recruiting commissioners:
[P]ersonal recruitment may place the recruiting commissioner in an
awkward position by suggesting to the applicant that appointment is
assured. It is imperative that commissioners indicate to recruited
applicants that the mere solicitation of their application is not a prom-
ise of the commissioner's endorsement throughout the nominating
process. Commissioners should solicit applicants on behalf of the
commission as a whole and with the clear understanding that the
recruited applicant will be subject to the same evaluative scrutiny as
other applicants.20 9
203. See, e.g., MONT. JUDICIAL NOMINATION COMM'N Rule II (upon a vacancy, the secretary. of
the chief justice must provide notice to the media within ten days).
204. See, e.g., UTAH MANUAL P. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM'N Rule IV (notice of a vacancy
is to be made in the form of a press release containing the jurisdiction of the court where a
vacancy has arisen, the eligibility requirements for the judgeship, and additional information
pertaining to the position and application procedures).
205. See, e.g., Wis. Gov. ADvIsoRY COUNCIL JUDICIAL SELECTION sec. 2, statement of
procedures (providing that the chair, with the assistance of the governor's office, contact the state
bar and/or the Milwaukee Bar Association who have agreed to notify their members of the
vacancy).
206. See, e.g., D.C. JUDICIAL NOMINATION COMM'N P. Rule 8(a)(2) (providing for, inter alia,
letters to the chief judges of the local and federal court, with the same solicitation to various
publications and broadcast media).
207. See infra Appendix A, Table 5, col. five (External Recruitment Provision).
208. See R. HAw. JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM'N Rule 8. See also Section 2(a), Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania Governor's Office, Exec. Order No. 1987-17 (1987) (providing that the
commission shall "actively seek out and recruit highly qualified candidates to be recommended
for appointment").




Nominating commissions usually list in their rules the criteria for
evaluating applicants for judicial office. Typically, these criteria include
the following attributes: integrity and moral courage, legal ability and
experience, intelligence and wisdom, and a determination of whether the
candidate would be deliberate and fair-minded in reaching decisions,
whether the candidate would be prompt and industrious in performing
judicial duties, whether the candidate's personal habits and outside
activities are compatible with judicial office, and whether the candidate
would be courteous and considerate on the bench.21°
Another formulation of these criteria is: (a) personal attributes-
personal integrity, standing in the community, sobriety, moral conduct,
ethics, and commitment to equal justice under the law; (b) competency
and experience-general mental and physical health,2 1  intelligence,
knowledge of the law, professional reputation, and knowledge of and
experience in the relevant court; and (c) judicial capabilities-patience,
decisiveness, impartiality, courtesy, civility, industriousness, prompt-
ness, administrative ability, possible reaction to judicial power, tempera-
ment, and independence.212 One commission considers the criterion of
ability to "live and carry out family obligations on the judicial salary."2 13
Commissions often distinguish between evaluative criteria for trial
and appellate judgeships. The AJS Handbook for Judicial Nominating
Commissioners identifies decisiveness, speaking ability, and judicial
temperament as particularly important characteristics for trial judges,
while writing ability and collegiality2"4 are designated as important qual-
ities for appellate judges.21 5 Similarly, organizational and interpersonal
210. See, e.g., CoLo. R.P. FIRST JUDICIAL DIsT. NOMINATING COMM'N Rule 11(g).
211. Provisions requiring mental and physical health data are now prohibited under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). See infra part VI(B).
212. See FLA. UNIFORM R.P. Cutcurr JuDICI. NOMINATING COMM'N sec. IV(a)-(c).
213. See CoNN. JuDIciAL SELECTION COMM'N, STANDARDS & CRITERIA 1(20).
214. See, e.g., COMMISSIONER'S MANUAL: NEBRASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS,
app. 4 (August, 1992):
Collegiality. Because of the collective nature of an appellate decision, the candidate
must be able to understand and respect the differing views of colleagues and to
compromise. The candidate must also be able to give and receive criticism with
grace.
Does this person tend to monopolize conversations?
Can this person respond well to criticism?
Is this person perceived as unreasonably rigid in his/her views?
Can this person constructively criticize others?
How long has this person been employed at his/her current place of business?
How long was he/she employed at his/her previous place of business?
Does this person indicate loyalty to his/her current or former employer?
215. See HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 61-62.
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skills are deemed important qualities for administrative judges.2 16
The ABA addressed the qualities of a judge in its Standards Relat-
ing to Court Organization, which states:
All persons selected as judges should be of good moral character,
emotionally stable and mature, physically able to discharge the duties
of office, patient, courteous, and capable of deliberation and decisive-
ness when required to act on their own reasoned judgment. They
should have a broad general and legal education and should have
been admitted to the bar.
2 17
In 1983, the ABA Judicial Administration Division recognized that
as "an increasing number of states have adopted plans calling for the use
of nominating commissions and as many bar associations have commit-
tees screening judicial candidates, it is apparent that a need exists for a
set of criteria to guide them in selecting the most qualified candi-
dates."2 ' Additional purposes cited for developing the guidelines are to
"more fully delineate the qualities to be sought in judicial candidates"2 9
and to "enhance the understanding and respect to which the judiciary is
entitled in the community being served."22
The eight criteria suggested by the ABA "present minimum criteria
for appointment,"22 ' and "are not mutually exclusive, and cannot be
wholly separated one from another." '222 The criteria are: integrity,22
legal knowledge and ability,224 professional experience,225 judicial tem-
216. Id.
217. See STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION § 1.21(a) (Judicial Admin. Div.
ABA 1990).
218. See James D. Cameron, Preface to GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING QUALIFICATIONS OF
CANDIDATES FOR STATE JUDICIAL OFFICE (Judicial Admin. Div., ABA 1983).
219. Id. Cameron cautions that "the guidelines are not to be used in evaluating the
performance of sitting judges. While certainly many of the traits sought for in judicial candidates
ought also to be found in sitting judges, criteria to evaluate experienced judges need to be
separately addressed." Id.
220. Id. at Introduction.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. 1. This includes: the ability "to speak the truth without exaggeration, admit
responsibility for mistakes and put aside self-aggrandizement." Integrity also includes
"intellectual honesty, fairness, impartiality, ability to disregard prejudices, obedience to the law
and moral courage." Candidates should have demonstrated "consistent adherence to high ethical
standards.. . .The reputation of the candidate for truthfulness and fair dealing in extra-legal
contexts should also be considered." Id.
224. Id. 2. This includes: "a high degree of knowledge of established legal principles ... a
high degree of ability to interpret and apply them to specific factual situations." It also includes
"the ability to reach concise decisions rapidly ... the ability to respond to issues in a reasonably
unequivocal manner and quickly to grasp the essence of questions presented." Knowledge is a
"continual learning process involved in keeping abreast of changing concepts through education
and study." Id.
225. Id. 3. This includes experience as a lawyer "long enough to provide a basis for the
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perament,z26 diligence,227 health,228 financial responsibility,229 and pub-
lic service.230
E. Screening and Investigation
The screening and investigation function of nominating commis-
sions varies widely in scope, depth, and method. In urban areas where
there are a large number of applicants, some committees conduct initial
evaluation of the candidate's demonstrated performance and long enough to ensure that the
candidate has had substantial exposure to legal problems and to the judicial process" as well as
"substantial trial experience which "should be considered in light of the nature of the judicial
vacancy that is being filled." For the appellate bench, especially desirable is "professional
experience involving scholarly research and the development and expression of legal concepts."
Id.
226. Id. 4. This includes "common sense, compassion, decisiveness, firmness, humility,
opennindedness, patience, tact and understanding" as well as the "ability to deal with counsel,
jurors, witnesses and parties calmly and courteously, and the willingness to hear and consider the
views of all sides." The candidate should be "even-tempered, yet firm ... confident, yet not
egocentric." Also required is "a willingness and ability to assimilate data outside the judge's own
experience" along with "a mature sense of proportion; reverence for the law, but appreciation that
the role of law is not static and unchanging." Factors that indicate a lack of judicial temperament
include "arrogance, impatience, pomposity, loquacity, irascibility, arbitrariness or tyranny." Id.
227. Id. 5. This includes "a constant and earnest effort to accomplish that which has been
undertaken." The elements of diligence are "constancy, attentiveness, perseverance,
painstakingness and assiduousness ... the possession of good work habits and the ability to set
priorities." Also important is "[p]unctuality . . . [as a] candidate should be known to meet
procedural deadlines... and to keep appointments and commitments." Id.
228. Id. 6. This includes:
a condition of being sound in body and mind and with relative freedom from
physical disease or pain... Any history of a past disabling condition or suggestion
of a current disabling condition should require further inquiry as to the degree of
impairment. Physical handicaps and diseases which do not prevent a person from
fully performing judicial duties should not be a cause for rejection of a candidate.
However, any serious condition must be considered carefully as to the possible
effect it would have on the candidate's ability to perform the duties of a judge.
Good health includes the absence of erratic or bizarre behavior which would
significantly affect the candidate's functioning as a fair and impartial judge."...
... A candidate should have developed the ability to refresh himself or herself
occasionally with non-work-related activities and recreations.
Id.
229. Id. 7. Pertinent factors include the existence of "unsatisfied judgment or bankruptcy
proceedings.., whether the candidate has promptly and properly filed all required tax returns.
Being financially responsible "demonstrates self-discipline and the ability to withstand pressures
which might compromise independence and impartiality." Id.
230. Id. at 8. This includes: "public service and pro bono activities .... [which] may
indicate social consciousness and consideration for others." Those include "[s]ignificant and
effective bar association work." Equally important is a "broad, nonlegal academic background,
supported by varied and extensive non-academic achievements" such as "involvement in
community affairs and participation in political activities, including election to public office....
There should be no issue-oriented litmus test for selection of a candidate. No candidate should be
precluded from consideration because of his or her opinions or activities in regard to controversial
public issues ... [nor] excluded from consideration because of race, creed, sex or marital status."
Id.
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screening so that the number of interviewees is manageable. The
method of screening, however, is not usually expressly described in
nominating commission rules of procedure.
The Handbook for Judicial Nominating Commissioners recom-
mends that the commission establish preliminary screening criteria in
advance. Then, when the applications are reviewed, "the chairman or
designated committee may quickly sort through the applications, weed-
ing out those who clearly will not survive the rigors of the nominating
process. ' 23' For example, the commission can quickly eliminate from
consideration an applicant who does not meet the minimum legal quali-
fications for judicial office.232
A commission's investigation usually involves an inquiry into the
applicants' history, including education, employment, medical, 233 crimi-
nal, civil, credit, and professional discipline. 234  Additional inquiries
may be made into an applicant's age, citizenship, residency, taxes, law
enforcement investigations and charges, service in the armed forces, and
disciplinary action taken by the judicial conduct or state bar disciplinary
agencies of other states.2" In at least one state, "[b]ecause the results of
the investigation are confidential, the candidate has no opportunity to
rebut claims made during the investigation. 236
Commissions use a variety of means for conducting their investiga-
tions of applicants' backgrounds. In commissions that operate without a
staff, commissioners themselves conduct the investigation, usually by
dividing the investigation of different applicants among subcommittees,
which present their findings to the commission. In other cases, commis-
sion rules provide for the state police, a law enforcement agency, or the
state administrative office of the courts237 to conduct the investigations
for the commission.
The Handbook for Judicial Nominating Commissioners recom-
mends that commissions should develop a standard set of investigative
231. See HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 86.
232. Id.
233. Provisions requiring mental and physical health data are now prohibited under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). See infra part VI(B).
234. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL SELECTION P. sec. B(3) ("Supreme Court Order 489,
effective January 4, 1982, authorizes the Council to review bar applications and bar discipline
records. During the course of its investigation, the Judicial Council may also seek information on
candidate qualifications from such other public or private groups or individuals as may be deemed
appropriate.").
235. See, e.g., NEB. SUMMARY NOMINATION PROCESS sec. B (authorizing the Administrative
Office of Courts/Probation to investigate "disciplinary action by any judicial conduct commission
or state bar association of any jurisdiction").
236. UTAH MANUAL P. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM'N Rule V.
237. See Section B, Nebraska Summary of the Nomination Process (probation department of
administrative office of the courts to conduct background investigations).
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procedures and questions to be asked of various agencies and personal
and professional references. 238 The commission also should set time
limits for the investigative process.239 Standard procedures and ques-
tions and a prescribed time schedule are designed to ensure "a fair and
through screening of each applicant."
240 -
F. Confidentiality
The issue of confidentiality arises often in the nomination pro-
cess.241 The commissions whose rules were collected by AJS are
divided almost equally between those that consider the applicants' iden-
tities confidential,24 2 those that specifically made them public,243 and
those that have no rule on the subject.
24 4
Confidentiality may also extend to the records collected and gener-
ated by the nominating commission. Most commissions with rules on
the subject expressly maintain the confidentiality of their records. 245 An
equal number have no rule governing the subject of confidentiality of
records.246 A minority of commissions open their records to the
public.247
The interview process itself is traditionally confidential, but most
states have no specific rules governing the subject.248 Presumably, rules
governing the confidentiality of commission records are interpreted to
include the interview process itself. A minority of commissions hold
interviews that are open to the public.249
Individuals who know commissioners often provide them with
unsolicited information about judicial candidates under consideration, or
believed by informants to be under consideration. Also, after a commis-
sion submits its nominee list, the governor who receives it may wish to
contact the commission or an individual commissioner to request addi-
238. See HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 87.
239. Id.
240. Id.




245. See infra Appendix A, Table 4, col. 2. For example, under Rule 4(5) of the Iowa Rules of
Procedure of the State Judicial Nominating Commission, the minutes of the meeting are kept
confidential for the duration of the nomination process and are sent to the clerk of the supreme
court after the selections have been submitted to the governor, where they remain for five years
after which they are destroyed.
246. E.g., Wyoming.
247. E.g., Alaska, Florida, Montana (except if a majority of the commissioners vote to keep the
identity of the nominees confidential), and Tennessee.
248. See infra Appendix A, Table 4, col. 3.
249. E.g., Arizona, Florida, Kansas, and Montana.
1994)
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tional information. Questions arise regarding the confidentiality of such
communications. Should unsolicited, external communications from a
private citizen to a single commissioner, or the commission itself, be
kept confidential? If received by an individual commissioner, should
those communications be confidential as between the individual com-
missioner and the rest of the nominating commission? Some commis-
sions have rules to address these specific issues.
z50
Eleven commissions regulate external communications from pri-
vate citizens.2"' In one state, even oral communications between a com-
missioner and any person or organization are required to be summarized
in writing by the commissioner, who is then required to provide a copy
of the summary to the other commissioners.25 2
While most commissions have no rule on the subject, seven com-
missions do address the issue of the confidentiality of communications
from the governor to the commission or an individual commissioner.5 3
Rules on this subject are deemed necessary by commissions that wish to
minimize politics in the appointment process insofar as communications
between the governor and his or her appointees to the commission.
Some commissions require that any communication from the governor
be made only through a majority of the commission.254
Voting is another process in which issues of confidentiality arise.
Sixteen of the commissions surveyed have rules establishing the confi-
dentiality of the deliberations leading to the voting process 255 and of the
voting process itself.256 Only three commissions specifically permit the
voting process itself to be made public.257
Commissions also regulate the confidentiality of the identity of
those whose names appear on the list of nominees submitted to the gov-
ernor.258 The majority of commissions publicize the names of the nomi-
250. See infra Appendix A, Table 4, col. 4.
251. See id.
252. See R. GOVERNrN Mo. BAR & JUDICIARY Rule 10.32(c).
253. See infra Appendix A, Table 4, col. 6.
254. See, e.g., COLO. R.P. FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. NOMINATING COMM'N Rule III(c) ("The
Commission through a majority of its voting members may be consulted about any nominee by
the Governor at his request .... ").
255. See, e.g., R. IDAHO JUDICIAL CoUNcIL, GEN. R.P. Rule 12 ("The deliberations of the
Council relating to candidates, their names and their deemed qualifications shall be considered
confidential and shall not be disclosed to anyone except the Governor.").
256. See, e.g., NEv. COMM'N JUDICIAL SELECTION Rule 9(A), (c) (providing that "[n]o persons
other than Commission members and the Commission Secretary may attend" voting meetings and
that "[v]oting shall be conducted by secret ballot").
257. E.g., Arizona, Florida, and Montana.
258. See infra Appendix A, Table 4, col. 7.
(Vol. 49:1
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nees, 259 while a minority require that they be kept confidential. 2"
G. Ethics and Discipline
The subject of ethics and discipline of nominating commissioners is
a rapidly growing area of rule making because "[e]thical problems can
arise at any stage of the selection process. '261 While AJS is unaware of
any commission that has a "code of ethics" '262 per se, the Nebraska com-
mission established "ethical considerations, 263 and the Florida commis-
sions established "ethical responsibilities. ' '2 61 The latter apply to a
number of situations that typically raise conflict of interest questions
259. E.g., Alabama, Arizona, Alaska, and Kentucky.
260. E.g., Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont.
261. See HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 127.
262. At the time of this writing, the Hawaii Judicial Selection Commission is considering rule
changes, including the adoption of an ethics code for commissioners.
263. See R. NEB. JUDICIML NOMINATING COMM'R, exhibit A, statement of understanding of
ethical considerations:
In the performance of their duties, the judicial nominating commission members
shall be ever mindful that they hold positions of public trust. No commission
member shall conduct himself or herself in a manner which reflects discredit upon
the judicial selection process or discloses partisanship or partiality in the
consideration of applicants. Consideration of applicants shall be made impartially,
discreetly, and objectively. A commission member shall disclose to the commission
all personal and business relationships with a prospective applicant that may directly
or indirectly influence his or her decision. After certification of a list of sufficiently
qualified applicants to the Governor, no commission member shall attempt, directly
or indirectly, to further influence the ultimate decision of the Governor. No attempt
shall be made to rank such nominees whose names are made public or to otherwise
disclose a preference of the commission.
In accordance with the above considerations, I will accept the following
responsibilities:
1. I will disclose any conflict of interest that I may have with any of the
applicants.
2. I will avoid preselection of nominees, "hidden agenda," or consideration of
factors other than the merit of the applicants.
3. I agree not to discriminate against any applicant because of the applicant's race,
religion, gender, political affiliation, age, or national origin.
4. I will not divulge any of the applicant's confidential information or the
commission's deliberations except as provided by the Judicial Nominating
Commission rules.
264. See Section 7, FLA. UNIFORM R.P. Cm. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM'N Rule VII:
Judicial nominating commissioners hold positions of public trust. No
commissioners shall conduct themselves in a manner which reflects discredit upon
the judicial selection process.
Consideration of applicants shall be made impartially, discreetly, and
objectively.
A commissioner shall disclose to other commissioners all personal and
business relationships with an applicant for judicial vacancy that may directly or
indirectly influence the commissioner's decision. If a substantial conflict of interest
is apparent, the commissioner shall disqualify himself from voting on further
consideration of any affected applicants.
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and, therefore, require the disqualification of a commission member
from deliberation over and voting for a given applicant. One such rule
states:
If a relationship between a commission member ... and an applicant
falls into one of the following four categories, the commission mem-
ber ... shall recuse himself or herself from the commission:
Any relationship to an applicant by blood or by marriage...
[A]n employment relationship... within the last five years.
Any relationship in which the commission member and appli-
cant are actively engaged in managing a common profitmaking busi-
ness or venture.
Any instance in which the member of the commission would
cast his or her vote on a basis other than an applicant's qualification
for the office.
2 65
Disqualification provisions are contained in the rules of eleven
nominating cormissions2 66 and substantially follow the aforementioned
Nebraska rule, except that Nebraska provides for a procedure in which
applicants may challenge the impartiality of a commission chair or
commissioner.
267
Another means of regulating commissioner ethics is to require
commissioners to take an oath of office.268 While most commissions do
not require one, five of the commissions whose rules we studied require
commissioners to take an oath of office.269 Idaho's oath rule states:
"Before entering upon the duties of the Judicial Council, each member
shall take and subscribe to an oath or affirmation to support the Consti-
tution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the State of
Idaho, and to faithfully discharge all the duties of such office."27 °
Specific prohibitions upon political activities by commissioners
The commission shall not rank nominees or otherwise disclose a preference of
the commission.
Each commissioner shall read and maintain working knowledge of these rules.
205. R. NEB. JUDICIAL NOMINATiNa COMM'R Rule B(l).
266. E.g., Arizona, Hawaii, Missouri, and Utah.
267. See R. NEB. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM'R Rule B(3):
Any person may challenge the impartiality of a member or the chairperson of a
judicial nominating commission. The challenge shall be in writing and directed to
the Supreme Court member chairing such commission. If a challenge is raised
regarding the impartiality of a member or the chairperson and the person so
challenged declines to disqualify himself or herself, the unchallenged members of
the commission shall rule on the challenge by a majority vote. Any such decision
shall be attached to the information forwarded to the Governor and attached to the
report submitted to the State Court Administrator.
268. See infra Appendix A, Table 5, col. 3.
269. E.g., Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
270. See R. IDAHO JUDICIAL COUNCIL, (EN. R.P. Rule 1.
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exist in the rules of fifteen of the studied commissions. 271 Some com-
missions specifically prohibit activities such as campaign fund raising272
or holding public office.273
Requirements that commissioners act objectively and impartially
are other means of minimizing political considerations in the nomination
process. Indiana commissioners are required to "consider each candi-
date for a judicial office in an impartial, objective manner." 274 Florida's
"ethical responsibilities" of commissioners require that they "not
become an advocate for any applicant. Consideration of applicants shall
be made impartially and objectively. 275 In addition to promising not to
discriminate against applicants based on race, religion, gender, political
affiliation, age, or national origin, the Nebraska commissioners take an
oath that states, "I will avoid preselection of nominees, 'hidden agenda,'
or consideration of factors other than the merit of the applicants. 276
Despite these requirements regarding commissioner conduct, very
few commissions have their own disciplinary mechanism. In Florida,
commissioner misconduct is addressed by an elaborate procedure
including a hearing which takes into account the possibility of (1) indi-
vidual commissioner misconduct, (2) misconduct of the chair of the
commission, and (3) misconduct by a chair and one or more
commissioners.277
271. See infra Appendix A, Table 5, col. 4.
272. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 355 of Governor William F. Weld of Mass., Judicial
Nominating Council, at § 12 (May 24, 1993): "All members of the Executive Committee and of
the Regional Committees shall be prohibited from soliciting or receiving campaign contributions
on behalf of any candidate for federal, state or local office to the same extent as the law prohibits
public employees from soliciting or receiving such contributions."
273. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. 7-B, § 3(f): "No Commissioner, while a member of the
Commission, shall hold any other public office by election or appointment or any official position
in a political party and he shall not be eligible, while a member of the Commission and for five (5)
years thereafter, for nomination as a Judicial Officer."
274. See IND. JuDIciAL NOMINATING COMM'N Rule 9.
275. FLA. UNIFORM R.P. DIsT. CT. APP. JuDiciAL NOMINATING COMM'N sec. VII.
276. See R. NEaB. JuDicLAL NOMINATING COMM'N exhibit A.
277. See FLA. UNtFoRM R.P. Cut. JuDlciAL NOMINATING COMM'N sec. VIII (amended January
29, 1993):
Each commissioner shall be accountable to the Governor, their appointing authority
and the chair of their commission for compliance with these rules and the proper
performance of their duties as a member of a judicial nominating commission. Each
commissioner affirms that under these rules the Governor, their appointing authority
and/or the chair of their commission may dispose of any legally sufficient written
complaint alleging the misconduct of one or more commissioners or commissions,
limited only by Article IV, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Florida.
Each commissioner further acknowledges that pursuant to Article V, Section 7 the
Governor may suspend from office any commission member for malfeasance,
misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent disability to
perform their official duties, or commission of a felony.
A complaint alleging the misconduct of one or more commissioners (other than
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All too often commission rules specify various forms of miscon-
duct and potential breaches of disqualification (or ethics) rules, without
providing a remedy or sanctions for such misconduct. More commis-
sions should develop such procedures as a means of enhancing public
confidence in the selection process.
V. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF MERIT SELECTION
In a review of the scholarly literature on merit selection, Victor E.
Flango and Craig R. Ducat point out the following: "The sheer quantity
of writing on the topic of judicial selection may mislead the casual
reader into believing that this topic is one of the most over-researched
subjects in the study of American government. This is not the case. 27 8
They go on to explain that many of the published articles about merit
selection are not empirical studies. Rather, they are "advocacy" studies
based on anecdotal evidence that "more closely resemble a lawyer-like
attempt to build a case than a dispassionate evaluation of the strengths
and weaknesses of each method of judicial selection. '279 The few
empirical studies are primarily case studies that "do not provide a stan-
dard for comparison," and thus "it is impossible to ascribe either the
the chair) within a single judicial nominating commission shall be reported in
writing to the chair of the affected commission for action. Upon the chair's receipt
of any such charges, the subject commissioner(s) and the appointing authority of the
subject commissioner(s) shall be immediately notified thereof and thereafter kept
continuously apprised of their status through final disposition. The chair shall
investigate any complaint if the allegations are in writing, signed by the
complainant, and legally sufficient. A complaint is legally sufficient if the chair
determines that it contains ultimate facts which show a violation of these roles or
reflects discredit on the judicial selection process. Prior to determining legal
sufficiency the chair may require supporting information or documentation as
necessary for that determination. Upon determination of legal sufficiency each
charge may be disposed of by the chair solely, or may be referred by the chair for
disposition by the appointing authority of the subject commissioner, exclusively or
with the concurrence of the chair, but in consultation with the Governor, the
appointing authority of the subject commissioner, and all other members of the
affected JNC who are not otherwise involved in the disposition. Disposition of a
complaint shall include a hearing which affords the opportunity for the presentation
of evidence to be evaluated by a clear and convincing standard of proof. Action
shall be taken within 60 days of receipt of any written complaint and its final
disposition shall be immediately reported.
Disciplinary action against the chair is undertaken using the same procedure, but the investigation
and hearing is conducted by the appointing authority of the chair. Likewise, misconduct on the
part of a commission chair and one or more commissioners is addressed using the same procedure,
with the governor conducting the investigation and hearing. Id.
278. Victor E. Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection
Make? Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JusT. Sys. J. 25, 29 (1979).
279. Id. Some of these studies focus narrowly on a campaign to adopt merit selection in a
single state, while "[o]thers are objective to the extent that they eschew exhortation in favor of
describing a selection procedure used within a particular state either historically or currently." Id.
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positive or negative characteristics of judges or courts to method of
selection, rather than to the economic, political or social conditions
peculiar to any given state. 28 °
Flango and Ducat developed a taxonomy for classifying the stud-
ies 281 that are both "empirically-based" and "genuinely comparative.
'282
They classified such studies into those that examined (1) characteristics
of judges, (2) education, (3) localism (e.g., whether the candidate
attended a local or out-of-state law school), (4) prior experience, (5)
characteristics of judicial decisions, (6) characteristics of courts, and (7)
courts in their political context. 283 In addition to reviewing the literature
on these topics, some of which are combined for discussion, Flango and
Ducat also report the findings of their own study. They examined state-
level socio-economic and court data and looked for patterns in the
spread of merit selection across the states. The following is a summary
of the conclusions they reached after reviewing the studies published
through late 1979.284 AJS added to these findings the results of addi-
tional research on merit selection conducted since the Flango and Ducat
280. Id. at 30. Most of the small number of empirical studies drawing comparisons across
states use a "historical or institutional, rather than a behavoral [sic] perspective." Id.
281. For a later but less comprehensive review of studies on judicial selection, see Mary L.
Volcansek, The Effects of Judicial-Selection Reform: What We Know and What We Do Not, in
THE ANALYsis OF JuDiciA. REFORM 79, 86 (Philip L. Dubois ed., 1982) ("comparison of the
actual quality of judges selected under various systems is a tricky task that has not been very
successfully pursued").
282. Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 30.
283. Id. at 30-39. Steven Berlin presents another useful classification for a review of merit
selection studies. He uses "pre-ascent" (i.e., before assuming judicial office) factors and "post-
ascent" factors. Examples of the former are race, sex, age, prior experience, educational
background, and other qualifications; examples of the latter are records of cases on appeal,
disciplinary record, attorney and law professors' assessments, and frequency of citation by other
courts. Steven Berlin, Background Paper on Proposed Empirical Study of Judges' Performance
Under Merit Selection 1 (Aug. 27, 1991) (unpublished paper on file with American Judicature
Society).
284. Flango and Ducat also point out two methodological problems confronting those
conducting comparative research in judicial selection. Classifying states as "merit selection
states" itself is difficult due to the multiplicity of models extant across the United States, some of
which do not have all of the required elements of a merit plan (i.e., nomination by commission,
gubernatorial appointment, and retention election). For example, California, which uses a
commission to exercise veto power over gubernatorial appointments, and Illinois, which uses a
partisan elective system coupled with non-partisan, unopposed rete)tion elections, do not have the
three basic elements of a merit plan. Accordingly, neither was included in Flango and Ducat's
definition of a merit selection state. Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 26.
The second problem confronting merit selection researchers is the fact that even in states that
use the elective system of judicial selection, up to sixty-six percent of the judges might have been
appointed to an interim vacancy occurring between elections, thus making comparative analysis
difficult. Id. at 27. See Burton M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and
State Supreme Court Decisions, 2 Am. POL. Q. 427, 446 (1974) (finding that 40% of judges in
states using partisan election and 66% of judges in states using non-partisan elections were
initially appointed). See also Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Elections: What the Evidence Shows, 50
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A. Characteristics of Judges
Flango and Ducat's review of the literature subdivided studies of
the characteristics 2 6 of judges into those that examined diversity from
the standpoint of race, sex, and "role orientations. 28 7 After pointing out
the dearth of research on the subject of racial diversity, they cited two
studies published in 1973288 and 1977289 that provided data regarding
the number of African-American state judges and supreme court jus-
tices, respectively. No conclusions, however, could be drawn from this
scant evidence regarding racial diversity. The few studies 290 of women
judges then available were "equally inconclusive. '"291
Studies not cited by Flango and Ducat questioned whether merit
FLA. B.J. 152, 154 (1976) (finding that 57% of surveyed Florida judges who have served on the
bench for over ten years, were initially appointed).
Flango and Ducat refer to another, perhaps more fundamental problem. Even if it is true that
proponents of different selection systems have not" 'come up with hard data about just what kinds
of differences do in fact result from the adoption of alternative systems' ... this incisive question
begs a prior question. Even if 'hard data' were readily available or easily obtainable, what type of
data should be collected?" Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 29 (citing Bradley C. Canon, The
Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of Judges-Reconsidered, 6 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 579, 580 (1972)).
285. My purpose is merely to describe the results of the studies cited. A critical review of
those studies is beyond the scope of this Article.
286. Early studies of the "social backgrounds" of state judges in four states revealed few
differences associated with merit selection. See, e.g., Canon, supra note 284, at 588 ("It seems
clear that institutional mechanisms surrounding recruitment... do not have the impact on [judges]
personal characteristics which advocates of competing selection systems often imply they have.
. . ."); see also Burton M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State
Supreme Court Decisions, 2 AM. POL. Q. 427 (1974); and Philip L. Dubois, The Influence of
Selection System and Region on the Characteristics of a Trial Court Bench: The Case of
California, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 59 (1983); cf Herbert Jacob, The Effect ofInstitutional Differences in
the Recruitment Process: The Case of State Judges, 13 J. Pun. L. 104, 104-14 (1964).
287. See Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 30-31. Examples of role orientations include a
conservative reliance upon precedent versus a "law making" orientation, and whether judges
assumed "leadership roles" upon taking the bench in contrast to those not taking such a role. Id. at
31.
288. See The Black Judge in America: A Statistical Profile, 57 JUDicArU.E 18, 19 (1973)
(finding that 37.5% of the 167 respondents were elected, 32.7% were appointed, and 29.8% were
initially appointed to fill an interim vacancy and were later retained in subsequent elections).
289. George W. Crokett, Jr., National Roster of Black Judicial Officers (March, 1977)
(unpublished paper) (finding that of the eighteen judges sitting on appellate benches, only three
were appointed in merit plan states). Additional data is provided in this study reflecting the
number of black trial judges, but Flango and Ducat point out that "[H]ow many of these judges,
whether trial or appellate, were actually elected and how many were initially appointed to fill an
unexpired term of office is unknown." Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 30.
290. See Beverly B. Cook, Women Judges: The End of Tokenism, in WOMEN IN THE COURTS
84, 102-03 (Winifred L. Hepperle & Laum Crites eds., 1978).
291. See Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 30.
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systems promote diversity on the bench.292 Subsequent studies, how-
ever, found little evidence to support fears that merit selection excludes
minorities from judicial office.293 Studies in 1985 by the Fund for Mod-
em Courts2 94 and in 1986 by Karen L. Tokarz 29 5 found that women and
minorities rank higher as a percentage of total judges in merit states than
in partisan election states. Justice Ben F. Overton of the Florida
Supreme Court wrote in 1988 that nineteen of twenty-three African-
American judges and forty-one of seventy-one women judges in Florida
were merit selected.296 A recent study by the Fund for Modem Courts
found that in New York City, where some judges are elected and others
are appointed under a merit plan, the merit plan produced more minority
and women judges than the electoral process.297
While the number of studies and available data regarding minority
judges on the bench continues to increase, it may still be too early to
reach a definitive conclusion regarding which selection method
enhances diversity. The signs are, however, that merit selection is at
least not an obstacle to diversity. In fact, when coupled with the trend to
require that nominating commissions take diversity on the bench into
account when making their nominations, 298 it is likely that far greater
numbers of minority and women judges will take the bench under a
merit plan than ever before.
B. Education and Localism
299
After analyzing the findings of three studies300 that examined the
292. See Kenyon N. Griffin & Michael J. Horan, Merit Retention Elections: What Influences
the Voters?, 63 JUDICATURE 78 (1979); William Jenkins, Jr., Retention Elections: Who Wins
When No One Loses?, 61 JUDICATURE 79 (1977). See also William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin,
What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340 (1987), an
article published after Flango and Ducat's article.
293. See Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics:
The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228 (1987) (women and
minorities are still underrepresented on state supreme courts, but it is not due to merit selection).
294. FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, INC., THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN
ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS (1985).
295. Karen L. Tokarz, Women Judges and Merit Selection Under the Missouri Plan, 64 WASH.
U. L.Q. 903, 918 (1986).
296. See Justice Ben F. Overton, Trial Judges and Political Elections: A Time for Re-
Examination, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 20 (1988-89).
297. See M. L. Henry, Jr., Characteristics of Elected Versus Merit-Selected New York City
Judges, 1977-1992, at 9-16 (April, 1992) (on file with American Judicature Society).
298. See infra and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix A, Table 5, col. 6.
299. Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 31-32, use separate classifications for "education," by
which they refer to the law school education received by judges, and "localism," by which they
refer to the judges' "local ties." The studies cited in the discussion of localism, Jacob, supra note
286, and Canon, supra note 284, examine the undergraduate college attended by judges. We
chose to combine these two factors into a single discussion.
300. See Canon, supra note 284, at 585 (finding that supreme court justices appointed by
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law school education of judges under different selection methods,
Flango and Ducat concluded that, "[a]lthough judges selected by state
legislatures do have slightly more formal education than judges selected
by other methods, no method of selection consistently selects vastly
more qualified judges where quality is measured by formal
education.
'30 1
The Watson and Downing study of the Missouri plan reached the
following conclusions:
A summary assessment of the impact of the Plan on the Missouri
judiciary indicates that it has pushed the age at which lawyers go to
the bench upward, and it has also made prior judicial service a more
important feature of an appellate judge's experience. Moreover, it
has not affected the essentially parochial character of the Missouri
bench; judges appointed under the Plan are even more likely than the
former elective ones to have been born in the state and to have
received their legal education there-many of them in local night law
schools.30
2
In addition, the Watson and Downing study found general bar
agreement that one consequence of the Missouri Plan "is that it results in
putting 'better' judges on the bench than are usually chosen under an
elective system .... [The] Plan has tended to eliminate highly incompe-
tent persons from the state judiciary.
30 3
In 1987, Glick and Emmert's study found that a few more merit-
selected supreme court justices attended prestigious law schools than
those selected by other methods .3 0° In addition, merit-selected judges
are less likely to have attended college in-state and are less likely to
have been born in-state.305 Further, the politics and demographics of the
state in which a judge sits is more important than the type of selection
governors or legislators possessed more formal education than judges selected by other methods);
Jacob, supra note 286, at 109 (finding that "[a]lmost no judges elected on a non-partisan ballot or
selected by a legislature attended a proprietary or night law school; 28% of the gubernatorially
appointed judges and 33% of the Missouri-Plan judges received such substandard education");
and STUART NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUDICIAL SYSTEMS II (sage
Professional Paper in American Politics, No. 04-001, 1973) (arguing that, to be successful in
elections, judges must have good vote-getting images, which translates in practice to 1) attending
a prestigious law school, 2) having prior judicial experience, and 3) achieving recognition as a
scholar, through publications or membership in honorary associations). In a study not cited by
Flango and Ducat, Missouri judges recruited through legislative appointment and non-partisan
elections were found more likely to have attended prestigious law schools. Burton M. Atkins,
Merit Selection of State Judges, 50 FLA. B.J. 203, 208 (1976).
301. See Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 32.
302. WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 38, at 219.
303. Id. at 345.




system in determining whether judges are born or educated in-state. 306
The 1992 study of New York City judges also found that eighty-
eight percent of elected judges graduated from in-state law schools, as
compared to seventy-nine percent of those recruited through merit selec-
tion.30 7 In addition, only twenty-nine percent of elected judges attended
a prestigious 30 8 law school, compared to forty-one percent of judges
recruited through merit selection.30 9
As for whether some selection systems tend to result in the recruit-
ment of more "local" candidates (including in that definition the fact that
a judge completed his or her undergraduate education in-state or out-of-
state) the research findings are inconsistent. One study found that varia-
tions in localism are "the result of regional migration patterns and higher
education structures," and not the method of selection.310 Another found
that those judges chosen through merit selection or partisan elections
tended to be born and educated in the district where they presided.
3 1
Yet another found that more "local" judges were chosen in states using
the merit plan or partisan elections than those selected by other
means.
3 12
While the evidence is not dispositive, it appears that merit selection
tends to produce more judges with a prestigious law background and
more local ties than judges recruited through other methods. In light of
the dearth of research on this factor and the somewhat disparate findings
of early studies on these questions, any conclusions drawn must cer-
tainly be tentative.
C. Characteristics of Judicial Decisions and Courts
3 13
If judges selected through different methods do, in fact, differ in
their personal characteristics, the question becomes whether those char-
306. Id.
307. See Henry, supra note 297, at 16-18.
308. Henry notes that the term "prestigious" is based upon a classification employed in prior
research that was based upon a survey of law school quality. Id. at 17-18. See Peter M. Blau &
Rebecca Z. Margulies, The Reputation of American Professional Schools, 6 CHANGE 42, 44
(1974-75). For the studies in which it was employed, see Join R. SCHMIDHAUSER, JUDGES AND
JUSTICES: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY (1979), and John H. Culver, Governors and
Judicial Appointments in California, 54 STATE Gov'T 130, 133 (1981).
309. See Henry, supra note 297, at 17.
310. See Canon, supra note 284, at 588.
311. See Atkins, supra note 300, at 208.
312. See Jacob, supra note 286, at 108. Nonpartisan elections were found to have the greatest
potential for a "newcomer" to be selected as a judge. Id.
313. Again, I combine two of the classifications Flango and Ducat used to present their
literature review for purposes of this Article. "Characteristics of judicial decisions" refers to
studies of individual behavior and "characteristics of courts" refers to the dissent rates of appellate
courts. See Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 33-34.
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acteristics affect judicial decision making. There is a strand of judicial
selection research, which Flango and Ducat reviewed, that focuses on
this question.314  After considering the findings of fourteen studies,
315
Flango and Ducat point out that attempts to relate background character-
istics to individual judicial decision making "have not been very suc-
cessful. '3 6  They note, however, that "party affiliation has been the
variable most consistently associated with judicial decision-making." '
They conclude with this observation: "[u]ntil background characteristics
of judges are more meaningfully linked to decisional behavior, it would
seem pointless to discover that judges chosen by different methods of
selection possess marginally different attributes when these different
characteristics do not seem to affect voting behavior or policy
outcomes."1 8
Subsequent studies have also failed to provide further evidence of a
correlation between the method of selection and judicial decision
making.
319
Flango and Ducat also asked whether the expression of dissent is
more prevalent in courts whose judges are chosen by one method of
314. See Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 33-34.
315. Id. at 33-34 nn.53-59 (citing STUART S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A
BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969); GLENDON SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (1959); Atkins & Glick, supra note 284; Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the
United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 374 (1966); Joel B.
Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory, 29 J. OF POL. 334
(1967); Stuart S. Nagel, Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities, 24 J. POL. 92 (1962); Stuart
S. Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CI. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI.
333 (1962); Stuart S. Nagel, Testing Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial
Decision-Making, 15 W. POL. Q. 425 (1962)); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Political Party Variable in
the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. PUB. L. 352 (1962); Jerry K. Beatty, An Institutional and
Behavioral Analysis of the Iowa Supreme Court-1965-1969 (1963) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan); Don R. Bowen, The Explanation of Judicial Voting
Behavior from Sociological Characteristics of Judges (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University); Craig R. Ducat, Dimensions of Jurisprudence and Judicial Decision-Making in the
Law of Obscenity (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota); Sheldon
Goldman, Politics, Judges, and the Administration of Justice (1965) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University); Francis G. Lee, Judicial Selection: An Explanatory of Judicial
Behavior on Bi-Partisan State Supreme Courts (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Pennsylvania)).
316. Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 34. Cf WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 38
(observing that a review of appellate decisions is not an appropriate measure of judicial behavior
because the fate of a case on appeal could result from similar or disparate leanings of the court or
other extraneous variables).
317. Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 34.
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., Jerome O'Callaghan, Another Test for the Merit Plan, 14 JUST. Sys. J. 477, 484
(1991) (finding no difference between merit-selected and elected judges in their responsiveness to
public opinion, as measured by sanctions imposed by judges on DWI offenders).
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selection or another.320 This result might be hypothesized because "pub-
lic criticism or unwillingness to accept judicial decisions may be related
to dissent rates, regardless of which individual justices are responsible
for the dissents.I32' After reviewing six studies,322 they conclude:
there is little variation in the characteristics of judges or courts,
regardless of the selection procedure which brought them to office.
The marginal differences in background characteristics which do
exist do not appear to have much influence on the voting behavior of
individual justices or on the dissent rate of the court as a whole.323
There appears to be no further research that would change the latter
conclusion.
D. Courts in Their Political Context
Social, economic, and political variables may be the real causes of
different judicial selection systems and the resulting behavior of the
judges selected, in which case the study of the effects of selection meth-
ods may be "misdirected. '324  Flango and Ducat reviewed the
research325 examining the relationship between politics and judicial
320. Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 34.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 34-35 nn.60-65 (citing HENRY R. GLICK & KENNETH N. Vmms, STATE COURT
SYSTEMS (1973); NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra note
300; Kenneth N. Vines, Political Functions of a State Supreme Court, in TULANE STUDIES IN
PoLrrTCAL SCIENCE: STUDIES IN JUDICIAL POLTICS (Kenneth N. Vines & Herbert Jacob eds.,
1962); Kenneth N. Vines & Herbert Jacob, State Courts, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES
299 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines eds., 1965); Bradley C. Canon & Dean Jaros, External
Variables, Institutional Structure and Dissent on State Supreme Courts, 3 POLITY 175 (1970);
Robert J. Sickels, The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of
Appeals, 59 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 100 (1965); Lee, supra note 315).
323. Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 35.
324. Id. See also Sheldon Goldman, American Judges: Their Selection, Tenure, Variety, and
Quality, 61 CURRENT HIsT. 1, 51 (1971) (arguing that it may be more fruitful to assess the quality
of justice dispensed rather than the quality of judges, per se, since it is "more directly related to
the central concerns of understanding, evaluating, and reforming a judicial system").
325. Id. at 36-37 nn.67-73 (citing CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE
LEGISLATURES: AN EVALUATION OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS (1972); THOMAS R. DYE, POLITICS,
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC: POLICY OUTCOMES IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1966); ELAZAR,
supra note 51; MALCOLM E. JEWELL, THE STATE LEGISLATURE: POLITICS AND PRACTICE (1969);
IRA SHARKANSKY & RICHARD HOFFERBERT, DIMENSIONS OF STATE POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1974); Austin Ranney, Parties in State Politics, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN
STATES, supra note 322; Joseph Schlesinger, The Politics of the Executive, in THE AMERICAN
GOVERNOR IN BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTrVE 141 (Thad Beyle & Oliver Williams, eds., 1972); Canon
& Jaros, supra note 322; Richard E. Dawson & James A. Robinson, Inter-Party Competition,
Economic Variables, and Welfare Politics in the American States, 25 J. POL. 265 (1963); Charles
A. Johnson, Political Culture in American States: Elazar's Formulation Examined, 20 AM. J.
POL. ScI. 491 (1976); Samuel Patterson, The Political Cultures of the American States, 30 J. POL.
187 (1968); Larry L. Berg et al., The Consequences of Judicial Reforms: A Comparative Analysis
of the California and Iowa Appellate Systems (paper presented at the annual meeting of the
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selection and reached the following conclusion:
Legislative elections are used in states where the governor is weak,
but gubernatorial appointments tend to be used in states which have a
strong legislature. Other patterns are weak, although it does appear
that states with powerful executives and legislatures tend to select
judges in non-partisan elections, whereas partisan elections are most
often used in states where both branches of government are weak.
The Missouri Plan is used most often in states with a professional,
independent legislature but a weak governor.326
One study327 cited by Flango and Ducat made the following inter-
esting observation regarding the relationship between a state's political
culture and its method of judicial selection:
Either gubernatorial appointment, the method of selection continued
from colonial experience, or legislative election, the method preferred
by some states immediately after the American Revolution, are still
used by most of the original thirteen states. Eastern and Southern
states, affected by Jacksonian pressure for popular reforms via direct
political action, favor partisan election of judges. Non-partisan elec-
tion, stimulated by reaction to partisan abuses of political office, was
generally adopted by the Western and Midwestern states which were
entering the union as the Populist and Progressive movements swept
the country in the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the
twentieth centuries. Finally, the Missouri Plan capitalized upon the
desire to "professionalize" the judiciary by developing strong law-
yers' professional associations and formal legal education
requirements.328
After reviewing the socio-economic characteristics of states, Flango
and Ducat made the following additional findings based upon the studies
then available: (1) gubernatorial appointment systems tend to be used in
states that are densely populated, rapidly growing, innovative, industrial-
ized, and affluent; (2) legislative selection methods are used in densely
populated, industrial, but poor states; (3) merit plans are adopted by
small but growing agricultural states; (4) nonpartisan elections are used
in non-manufacturing, agricultural, rural states; and (5) partisan elec-
tions are used by states that are industrialized and large, but have the
American Political Science Association, Chicago) (September, 1974); Eugene R. Declercq,
Gubernatorial Power and Legislative Independence in the Fifty States (paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago) (May, 1975); Justin J.
Green & Thomas G. Walker, Partisan and Professional Influences in the Recruitment of Judicial
Candidates (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago) (May, 1975)).
326. Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 37.




least rapid growth.3 2 9
E. Adoption of Merit Selection
What are the factors leading to the adoption of merit selection?
The involvement of the bar is believed to be a critical factor in a state's
adoption of merit selection.
330
[B]ar association activity is an important predictor of adoption of
merit selection between 1950 and 1980. The relationship between
adoption of merit selection and a less professionalized executive may
reflect the conflict between legal groups and politicians over adoption
of merit selection. Where the governor's powers are weak, bar
associations are able to lobby successfully for adoption of merit
selection. Where the governor's institutionalized powers are greater,
he may have no need for judicial merit selection, for his powers are
secure . . . .The conditions under which merit plans are adopted
highlight the conflict over control over judicial selection and the
importance of bar association activity in this endeavor. While bar
association influence is important to adoption of merit selection, so
are the political and socioeconomic characteristics of state popula-
tions. Legal groups appear to have more chance for success in influ-
encing adoption of merit selection in states in which the governor is
organizationally weak and in which the legislature is more profes-
sionalized. It appears, then, that adoption of merit selection is a more
complex process than was previously thought.33
In a recent survey 33 2 of bar leaders, it was found that attorneys gen-
erally support merit selection because they view themselves as having
some influence over the process: "[j]udicial merit selection enhances
the bar's perceived influence. . . .When the governor is compelled to
follow the dictates of the nominating commission, the lawyers' groups
are more confident of their influence over appointments. In contrast,
partisan elections and legislative elections tend to discourage the bar.9
333
Understanding of the factors affecting the adoption of merit selec-
tion improved as a result of a recent study by Dubois.334 In that study,
Dubois collected voting data from twenty-eight elections held between
1941 and 1980 in twenty-one states in which merit selection was submit-
329. See Flango & Ducat, supra note 278, at 37.
330. See Judith Ann Haydel, Explaining Adoption of Judicial Merit Selection in the States,
1950-1980: A Multivariate Test (Aug. 1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New
Orleans).
331. Id. at 99-100.
332. Charles H. Sheldon, The Role of State Bar Associations in Judicial Selection, 77
JUDICATURE 300 (1994).
333. Id. at 304-05.
334. See Philip L. Dubois, Voter Responses to Court Reform: Merit Judicial Selection on the
Ballot, 73 JUDICATURE 238 (1990).
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ted to the voters. 335 The purpose of the study was to address these ques-
tions: "How frequently, and under what conditions, have merit plan
proposals been successful before the voters? What factors seem to be
most often associated with popular rejection of the plan? Are voters
who typically support the plan distinguishable in some systematic way
from those who typically oppose the reform?"
336
Dubois found that voters in most cases have not been given the
opportunity to vote on distinct proposals. "Far more frequently than not,
the plan has gone before voters as part of either a larger package of
reforms governing judicial discipline and tenure, a proposed revision of
the entire judicial article in the state constitution, or as part of a whole-
sale revision of the entire state constitution. '337 In other words, the vot-
ers were not afforded the opportunity to vote directly on the merit plan,
"but had to accept or reject it as part of the larger package presented to
them.
338
Dubois also found that merit plans proposed in a constitutional
revision process requiring strong legislative support are more likely to
be successful than plans proposed via a constitutional convention, popu-
lar initiative, or by simple legislative majorities acting in a single ses-
sion.339 Merit plan proposals in states that require extraordinary
legislative majorities (or simple majorities in two successive legisla-
tures) were successful 85% of the time and collected on average 57.4%
of the vote in their favor.34°
The extensiveness of the selection reform is another important fac-
tor in the adoption of merit selection.34' Merit plan reforms, Dubois
found, were more successful when they applied only to the selection of
appellate judges.342 He hypothesized that this was the result of the fact
that "[a]t the appellate level ... there are fewer judgeships involved and
thus fewer interested political players threatened by a proposal to change
the method of selection than one which includes the more numerous trial
court positions. 343
335. Id. at 240.
336. Id. at 239.
337. Id. at 240.
338. Id. In just nine of twenty-eight instances were voters asked directly to accept or reject a
merit plan. Id. at 241.
339. Id. at 242.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 243.
343. Id. at 242. Dubois also found that there is an "uncertain association" between the
existence of a voluntary merit plan (gubernatorial appointments for interim vacancies established
through an executive order) and subsequent voter endorsement of a proposed merit plan. Id. at
243. Moreover, the electoral base for adoption of a merit plan "has been distinctly urban in
nature" due to the fact legislators, judges, lawyers, and residents in nonurban areas "often fear the
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F. Politics and the Nominating Process
Opponents of merit selection have pointed to some examples of
what they perceive to be "political" appointments in a merit selection
system. These, they argue, contradict what they purport to be a claim of
merit plan proponents-that politics is "eliminated" from judicial selec-
tion. Thus, they assert, it is unfair to take away from the electorate the
power to choose judges. But these opponents ignore the fact that the
original motivation for finding an alternative to the elective method of
selection was bottomed not on the elimination of politics, as such, but on
the elimination of the influence of political party leaders:
Judges are usually not really elected, but are designated by the lead-
ers of the party political machine dominant in the district. These
leaders appoint the nomination. The electorate only decides which of
two or three sets of nominees it prefers....
These leaders have too little responsibility for the due adminis-
tration of justice. They have the strongest motives for rewarding
purely political service to an organization. 34
The materials published by AJS do not contain any claim that politics
will be altogether eliminated by the adoption of merit selection, despite
the assertions of its opponents.
Watson and Downing's The Politics of the Bench and the Bar:
Judicial Selection Under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan3 41 was
the first, and is still the most comprehensive study of the merit selection
process. The researchers conducted an in-depth study of the three nomi-
nating commissions existing under the Missouri Non-Partisan Court
Plan for the three appellate courts346 and two county general jurisdiction
loss of local control and autonomy that accompanies a statewide solution proposed to solve
organizational, administrative, financial and procedural problems that they associate with
overcrowded and delay-burdened urban courts" and because bar leadership for merit selection has
been centered in statewide and urban bar associations. Id. at 244-45. According to Dubois, the
merit plans are found among states with a "political culture" that is dominated by either the
"moralistic" or "individualistic" cultures. Id. at 245-46. See ELAZAR, supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
344. See American Judicature Society, Suggested Causes for Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice in Metropolitan Districts, BULLETIN No. I (American Judicature Soc'y
3-4) (January, 1914). See also Pound, supra note 1, at xii ("A judge who is part of a political
administration or part of an administrative hierarchy, or a partisan of anything but the law, is out
of place in our constitutional regime.").
345. See WATsoN & DowwrNno, supra note 38.
346. The appellate commission nominates candidates for the state supreme court and the three
intermediate appellate courts in Kansas City, St. Louis, and Springfield. Id. at 13.
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courts.
3 4 7  Both interviews3 48  and survey questionnaires 349  were
employed in a study of all facets of the history, operations, politics, and
consequences of the Missouri Plan.
While the study generally "brings to the surface the web of Bench-
Bar relationships and forces which are present at a subterranean level in
other judicial selection systems as well, 35 ° the portion relevant here is
the discussion of the politics surrounding the nominating commission's
functions. For proponents of merit selection, the study, on the one hand,
disappointingly reports evidence of politics in the selection process from
the appointment of commission members to the eventual selection of a
nominee. At the same time, however, the reported consequences of the
Missouri merit plan are quite favorable.51
The entire "environment" in which merit selection operated at the
time of the study reflected a variety of political interests at play. While
the Missouri Plan did not eliminate politics in the selection process,
fears that the legal profession's elite would decide who would sit on the
bench were not well-founded. Instead, the study found that the selection
system was "a highly pluralistic one that reflects diverse interests. 352
These interests originated from such "external" and "internal" 35 3 factors
as the ecology of the legal community, 54 the economic and social clien-
tele of the courts,355 the influence of incumbent judges, 35 6 the partisan
347. These are the Circuit Courts for Jackson County (which includes Kansas City) and St.
Louis City.
348. Over 200 persons were interviewed, including nominees, appointees, members of the
nominating commissions; and others knowledgeable about the selection process, such as
academicians, newspaper columnists, reporters, personal acquaintances of the researchers "who
were assumed to be informed about the legal ecology, the political system, the factors relevant to
the selection of nominating commissioners, or the judicial nominating and appointing processes,"
and others who were "influential in selection, or who were particularly well informed about it."
Id. at vii, 361.
349. The survey was administered to one half of the members of the state bar 3,303 individuals
in May, 1964, and responses were received from 1,233 lawyers, yielding a response rate of 37%.
Id. at 367.
350. Id. at 3-4.
351. See infra part IV.G.
352. WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 38, at 6.
353. Id. at 75.
354. This refers to the cleavages in the bar between plaintiffs' and defense lawyers, as well as
between criminal and corporate lawyers, which were found to be a "key factor" in the polarization
of the metropolitan Missouri bars and which often results in conflicting bar recommendations to
the public. Id. at 20-22, 76.
355. This refers to the repeat players in the courts, such as insurance companies, utilities, and
railroads, which Watson and Downing term the "clientele groups," who they describe as "chary
about taking any action that might be construed as an attempt to control the courts" and, instead,
depend upon attorneys to "go to bat" for them without being asked. Id. at 77-79.
356. Incumbent judges have a "vital interest" in maintaining "an organizational system
conducive to their own professional and emotional well-being"; their interest is in the nominees'
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political setting,357 the "role orientation of the commissioners,"35 and
the nominating and appointing "games" at play in the selection
process.
3 59
Several of those unfortunate "games" which lead to "panel-stack-
ing" were observed during the selection process: (1) "panel-loading" the
list of nominees (the list consists of "the strong political candidate that
everybody knows will be selected by the governor and two others who
are just window dressing"); 360 (2) "panel-rigging" ("the selection of a
combination of nominees so that the governor will, in effect, have no
choice," e.g., "nominate one political friend of the governor, one polit-
ical enemy, and one from the other party"); 361 and (3) "panel-wiring"
(where the governor makes his preferences known to one or more com-
missioners, and the commission names a panel containing the name of
the attorney preferred by the governor plus two others "chosen on a
'what difference does it make' basis"). 362  "Rigging" and "loading"
personalities (since judges tend to socialize more with other judges than with any other groups),
their capacity for work, and the quality of their work. Id. at 80.
357. While the patronage "allocation" ofjudgeships was eliminated with merit selection, some
partisan political activity was still found to be a "virtual prerequisite for judicial office." Id. at 81-
82.
358. This refers to "both normative components (expectations of those interacting with the
occupant of a position with respect to his behavior, as well as the occupant's own expectations)
and behavioral components." Id. at 87-88 n. 12.
The lay commissioners were overwhelmingly from the business community, had close ties to
the community, and were "pillars of the local community." Id. at 44-45. They had a political
background, typified by previous work for individual candidates, especially gubernatorial, or in
fund-raising efforts, but not necessarily in "gladiatorial" politics. Id. at 45. "The governor wants
people on the commissions who know the local situation and who are able to protect his interests
in seeing that lawyers well-regarded in their own areas are nominated for the bench." Id. at 47.
The governors' "natural desire... to have persons on the commission whom they can trust" and
who "can also act as a means of intelligence concerning the attitudes of the governor towards
various candidates for the bench" results in the appointment of law commissioners who "have
little need to inquire of others about the political acceptability of various judicial candidates. They
already know." Id. at 47, 91. They are "widely viewed as spokesmen for the governor's interests
in the nominating process." Id. at 88.
The role orientation of the lawyer members of the commissions studied was dependent upon
the cleavages within the bar between the plaintiffs' and defense (or criminal and corporate)
lawyers. Members of each group sought to insure that the nominees included those sympathetic
with their interests. Id. at 170. The plaintiffs' bar, for example, concentrated its efforts on the
circuit courts, while the corporate and defense bar concentrated their efforts on appellate
appointments. Id. at 169.
The judge members of the commissioners were oriented toward the institutional interests of
the court, i.e., sitting judges. See supra note 356.
359. Id. at 101-22.
360. Id. at 101.
361. Id. at 107.
362. Id. at 108. None of the commissioners interviewed would admit to serving as an agent of
the governor. Id. at 109. Watson and Downing were "unable to obtain any reliable evidence to
prove that governors as a general practice convey their wishes in appointments to lay
commissioners either directly or through intermediaries, although there is a little question that this
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occurred with far greater frequency than "wiring" in at least one
county.
363
"Logrolling" was another "game" observed in the Missouri study,
which occurred with less frequency than the aforementioned "games."13 "
This is a bargaining technique in which nominees are selected based on
agreements between individual commissioners, or groups of commis-
sioners, for the reciprocal support of one another's candidates.365 The
bargain may even extend to subsequent panels of nominees.366 These
games, it is pointed out, do not always succeed. Sometimes the gover-
nor refuses to go along with a commission's attempt to load panels, and
sometimes the commission rebuffs gubernatorial attempts to manipulate
the list of candidates.367
Shortly after the publication of the Watson and Downing study of
the merit selection process, AJS researchers Allan Ashman and James
Alfini completed another study of the subject.3 6  Their study, based
upon interviews 369 and survey questionnaires, 370 was conducted to "lay
the foundation for the kinds of evaluative studies of the nonpartisan
merit selection plan that will permit normative judgments. 371
Political influences affecting commissioner deliberations was an
area explored by the survey. Ashman and Alfini acknowledged the con-
cern expressed by many commentators over lay members being per-
ceived as "either particularly susceptible to undue influence or ... [as]
mere ciphers who meekly defer to the political demands of the execu-
tive, the authoritative tone of the judicial member, or the glibness and
legal expertise of the lawyer members."372 The survey responses, how-
ever, revealed that "very few lay members felt dominated by the lawyers
and that equally few lawyer members felt the lay members to be super-
has occurred on certain occasions." Id. at 47. "[G]iven the general expectations and Plan protocol
that the lay members will act independently of the governor, it is seldom that these parties
themselves will admit that such a practice has occurred." Id. Panel-stacking in the Missouri plan
was, the researchers found, "a common occurrence." Id. at 101.
363. Id. at 110.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 109.
366. Id. at 110.
367. Id. at 111.
368. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 189.
369. While the total number of interviewees is not given in the study, the researchers
conducted interviews in five states with merit plans: Alabama, New York, Alaska, Colorado, and
Kansas. Id. at 2.
370. Surveys were mailed to 797 commissioners on nominating commissions in the five
aforementioned states and 371 usable responses were received, yielding a response rate of 46.5%
Id. at 23.
371. Id. at 3. The researchers also hoped that the study "will be of practical value to persons
actively involved in the implementation or operation of a judicial merit selection plan." Id.
372. Id. at 25.
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flUOUS. ' 3 7 3 Of those respondents who were members of nominating
commissions that operated without written rules, 14% felt that political
considerations were introduced into their deliberations frequently, while
only 8% of the members of commissions that had written rules of proce-
dure felt the same.374
"Of course, no judicial selection plan will ever be entirely free from
political influences," the researchers noted.375 They found that a merit
plan "can create its own brand of politics which may be a mixture of
both 'party' and 'bar' politics. '3 76 They recommended that rules be
promulgated by commissions that require the governor to make judicial
appointments without regard to political affiliation, or by expressly cre-
ating a bipartisan commission.377
The data in the Ashman and Alfini study show that 2% of all com-
missioners surveyed felt that political considerations were "always"
introduced into their deliberations, 10% said this occurred "frequently,"
37% felt they were only "infrequently" introduced, and 51% said they
were "never" a factor.378 Of those that felt that political considerations
were introduced into their deliberations, 7% said that they were of "deci-
sive" importance, 27% said they were of "some importance" but not
decisive, 42% felt the political influences were of "little importance,"
and 24% believed that they were of "no importance. 379 Thus, approxi-
mately one-third of all responding commissioners felt that political con-
siderations were introduced into their deliberative process and had some
effect-in many instances only minor-in determining the ultimate
selection.
The study suggests that a merit plan can avoid, to some extent, the
influence of partisan politics with a rule requiring governors to make
appointments without regard to political affiliation. 8 ° Such rules have,
373. Id. at 25. Ashman and Alfini also cite the findings of John A. Robertson & John B.
Gordon, Merit Screening of Judges in Massachusetts: The Experience of the Ad Hoc Committee,
58 MASs. L.Q. 131, 138 (1973) ("While the laymen had to defer to lawyer opinions about
[applicants'] legal experience, they had strong, independent views and were by no means
dominated or manipulated by the lawyers.").
374. Id. at 44. Of those members of commissions without rules, 24% said political
considerations were of "some importance" in the eventual selection made, and 6% said these
influences were of "decisive importance." Of those members of commissions with rules, 15%
said political considerations were of "some importance," and only 2% said they were of "decisive
importance." Id.
375. Id. at 71.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 75.
379. Id. at 75-76.
380. Id. at 71.
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in fact, been established for at least fifteen nominating commissions.381
The third major study of nominating commissions was recently
conducted by the American Bar Foundation for the ABA. 2 The study,
based upon written surveys3 3 to chairs384 of nominating commissions in
thirty-four states and the District of Columbia, examined "the perceived
success of existing merit selection commissions in identifying and bring-
ing qualified candidates to the bench.
38 5
In the area of political influences on commissioners, two questions
were asked. The first was: "Either on a personal or commission-wide
basis, how often were political influence or considerations introduced
into your deliberations about candidates for judicial positions?"38 6 The
data show that 1% of the commissioners felt that political considerations
"always" entered into their deliberations; 7% said "frequently"; 13%




The second question relating to politics was: "How important have
political considerations been in determining the eventual selection made
by the appointing authority? '38  The data show that 17% of the com-
missioners felt that political considerations were of "decisive impor-
tance," 34% felt they were of "some importance," 13% said they were of
"little importance," 21% said they were of "no importance," and 15%
said they were "unable to evaluate" the extent of political considerations
in the selection process. 3 s9 The study concluded as follows with regard
to the issue of politics:
While there seemed to be general agreement that political concerns
did not intrude at the commission level, they may appear when the
ultimate selection is made by the appointing authority. It should be
remembered that the commissioners were satisfied with the candidate
pool that they passed along for consideration, so the potential intru-
sion of politics at the final stage is mitigated because the pool is
deemed qualified.390
381. See infra Appendix A, Table S.
382. See JOANNE MARTIN, MERIT SELECTION COMMISSIONS: WHAT Do THEY Do? How
EFFEcTivE ARE THEY? (1993).
383. Of the ninety-one surveys that were sent, seventy-six were returned, yielding a response
rate of 84%. Id. at 4.
384. Chairs were chosen "because they were more likely than other commissioners to have a
broader view of the process and to have experienced a longer term on the commission. The
commission chairs were also likely to be the chiefjustices of their respective supreme courts." Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 34.
387. Id. at 20.
388. Id. at 34.
389, Id. at 21.
390. Id. at 23. Additional procedural concerns of respondents in the ABA study included: (1)
the need for "methods of attracting more minority and women candidates," and high quality
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The data regarding the influence of politics, as reflected in the
aforementioned studies of merit selection show a declining level of
political influences over time. Of course, it may be argued that the sur-
vey research and interview methods are inadequate measures of the level
of political influences on commissioners, as Watson and Downing
pointed out. 91 But as they also note in their study of the Missouri Plan:
[T]he Plan purports to provide representation for four general inter-
ests concerned with judicial selection: the organized Bar, the judici-
ary, the general public, and the state political system.
Viewed in this context, it is naive to suggest (as some of the
Plan's supporters do) that the Plan takes the "politics" out of judicial
selection. Instead, the Plan is designed to bring to bear on the pro-
cess of selecting judges a variety of interests that are thought to have
a legitimate concern in the matter and at the same time to discourage
other interests. It may be assumed that these interests will engage in
the "politics" of judicial selection, that is, they will maneuver to
influence who will be chosen as judges (1) because such judgeships
constitute prestigious positions for aspiring lawyers, and (2) because,
in the course of making decisions, judges inevitably affect the for-
tunes of persons and groups involved in the litigation process.
Whether the Plan eliminates politics in judicial selection is a false
issue. Instead, the key issue is whether the particular kind ofpolitics
that evolved under the Plan adequately represents the legal, judicial,
public, and political perspectives thought to be important in deter-
mining who will sit on the bench.392
Thus, politics can never be completely eliminated from the judicial
selection process under a merit plan, or any plan, for that matter.393
candidates generally, (2) the problems "in identifying the requisite number of candidates to
recommend," (3) the "lack of funds available to support commission work," (4) the "effects of
media involvement" in the selection process, (5) "the interface between lawyer and lay members
of the commission," (6) the "lack of training sessions," and (7) politics at the selection stage. Id.
at 22-23.
See also Susan Carbon et al., Women on the State Bench: Their Characteristics and Attitudes
About Judicial Selection, 65 JUDIcATuRa 294, 299-301 (1982):
The literature and our data suggest that women become actively involved in party
politics less frequently than men....
Nearly 60 per cent of the women [judges] reported that prior professional
experience was one of the most important factors in becoming a judge.
Interestingly, those appointed by a governor using a nominating commission held
this belief with greatest frequency.... These findings appear to lend credence to the
claim that nominating commissions emphasize professional experience above other
factors, such as party service.
391. See WATSON & DowNnG, supra note 38, at 359.
392. Id. at 331-32 (emphasis added).
393. See Goldman, supra note 324, at 2 ("Perhaps the most important point worthy of
emphasis is that all selection methods involve politics.").
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According to Watson and Downing, it may not even be necessary to
strive toward that goal. Some political considerations will inevitably
enter into the process and can be viewed as a necessary means of taking
interest pluralism into account in lieu of party politics under an electoral
system. The issue is how to balance the need for the articulation of
interests by a variety of segments of society, including the general pub-
lic, and minimize the "problem politics" that jeopardize the fairness of
the process.
G. Satisfaction with Merit Selection
Despite the passage of almost fifty-five years since its adoption,
surprisingly few surveys have been conducted of lawyers, judges, and
others regarding their satisfaction with the merit plan. The Watson and
Downing survey of Missouri lawyers, however, indicated "a clear pref-
erence of metropolitan lawyers in the state for using the Nonpartisan
Plan to select circuit judges. ' 394 Lawyers practicing in certain fields
were more inclined to favor the merit plan than others:
[T]hose groups of lawyers who originally favored the Plan when it
was first proposed (that is, those representing defendants in personal
injury cases and corporations in general) continue to be its major sup-
porters, while the plaintiffs' and criminal attorneys, who fought the
Plan in the 1930's, are much less enthusiastic about it. However, all
groups favor it over the method of popular election. 395
Attorneys practicing outside the metropolitan areas in Missouri
who were employed by corporations and medium-sized law firms were
more supportive of the plan than solo practitioners or those in small
firms.396 Judges were not surveyed regarding their attitudes toward the
Missouri Plan.
A 1967 study3 97 of judges and attorneys in six jurisdictions
39
found, "[i]f not overwhelming, the support for the Merit Plan in all states
considered is substantial. 3 99 The majority of judges in three jurisdic-
tions4" favored merit selection over any other selection system, while
those in the remaining three jurisdictions favored either straight guber-
natorial appointment, gubernatorial appointment with legislative
394. See WATSON & DowNINo, supra note 38, at 243.
395. Id. at 243-44.
396. Id. at 249-50.
397. Charles H. Sheldon, The Degree of Satisfaction with State Judicial Selection Systems:
Lawyers vs. Judges, 54 JUdiCATURE 331 (1971).
398. Maine, New Hampshire, Nevada, Suffolk County in New York, Utah, and Vermont. Id.
at 332.
399. Id.
400. Nevada, Utah, and Vermont. Id. at 333.
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approval, or nonpartisan elections."' "Apparently it is the partisanship
which bothers the judges as well as the lawyers. "402
A 1980 survey asked women state court judges which selection sys-
tem, in their opinion, produces the highest quality judiciary.4°3 A major-
ity believed that the merit plan produced the highest quality judiciary,
and nearly the same percentage believed that partisan elections produced
the lowest quality.4°4 When controlling for the method by which the
respondents themselves reached judicial office, appointed women were
found to believe that the merit plan produces the highest quality judici-
ary, while elected women tended to believe that nonpartisan elections
do.
Women selected by governors using nominating commissions over-
whelmingly believe that their system produces the highest quality
bench. A plurality of those selected in nonpartisan elections also
believe their system produces the best judiciary. However, a majority
of those selected by straight appointment and by partisan elections
evidently believe that their systems do not produce the highest quality
bench. °5
Another study40 6 examined the attitudes of appellate judges toward
different judicial selection methods. Of the 562 appellate judges from
49 states surveyed,4°7 56% favored the merit plan for appellate courts
and 48% favored it for trial courts, with nonpartisan elections coming in
"a distant second."" A geographic pattern was also found in the data,
indicating that merit selection was most favored in the West and Mid-
west, where merit plans have been widely adopted.
Support for the merit plan is significantly weaker in the North and
South, where judicial election is still a common phenomenon. Inter-
estingly, judges in the North and South were much more likely to
regard judicial selection as an 'urgent' problem than were judges in
the West and Midwest.... One can infer that there is greater dissatis-
faction with existing judicial selection systems in those states where
judicial elections are still employed. Conversely, merit plans appear
to produce little dissatisfaction among appellate judges.4 °9
401. New Hampshire, Maine, and Suffolk County in New York. Id.
402. Id. at 334.
403. See Carbon et al., supra note 390, at 302-03.
404. Id. at 303.
405. Id.
406. John M. Scheb, II, State Appellate Judges" Attitudes Toward Judicial Merit Selection and
Retention: Results of a National Survey, 72 JUDICATURE 170 (1988).
407. The response rate to the survey is reported to be 52.8%. Id. at 171.
408. Id. at 172.
409. Id. at 173. The researcher also found that, "while the Missouri Plan enjoys widespread
support across selection mechanisms, there is an understandable tendency for judges to prefer
those selection systems that brought them into the appellate judiciary." Id.
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As the recent American Bar Foundation study4 0 of merit commis-
sions concluded, "Reviewing the merit selection process in its entirety,
most of the commission chairs viewed it very positively .... 89 percent
were satisfied either always or in the majority of instances with the qual-
ity of the candidates whose names they passed along to the appointing
authorities."41
Thus, while only a few surveys have measured it, the available data
show a high level of general satisfaction with merit selection among
attorneys, trial and appellate judges, and women state court judges.
More research is needed to elicit such satisfaction data from the general
citizenry and, in particular, the frequent litigants in the court system.
VI. CURRENT ISSUES
In addition to the perpetually debated issues surrounding merit
selection, such as whether it produces "better" judges and whether it
reduces or eliminate politics from judicial selection, new issues continue
to arise as a consequence of several factors. These include: (1) new
legislation that impacts upon the merit system, such as changes in laws
regulating employment; (2) new developments relating to judicial
administration, such as judicial performance evaluations; (3) local con-
troversies involving unethical or highly political commissioner conduct
leading to objectionable judicial appointments and a resulting loss of
public confidence in the process; and (4) social trends resulting in new
policies, such as the movement toward equality and diversity. Some
examples of these are discussed below.
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA")412 upon its findings that society has historically discriminated
against the disabled in, among other things, "such critical areas as
employment. 4 3 The ADA protects a "qualified individual with a disa-
bility," defined as a person "with a disability who, with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires. ' 414 The
ADA further defines "disability" as: "(A) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
410. See MARTIN, supra note 382.
411. Id. at 22.
412. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988).
413. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2)-(3) (1988).
414. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1988).
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regarded as having such an impairment. 415
Under Title I of the ADA, regulating employment, any "employer"
is subject to the ADA; the United States is excepted from the act,416 but
states are not. The ADA, on its face, appears to apply to merit selection
because it is part of the process of employing state judicial officers.
The clearest application of the ADA is to a nominating commis-
sion's process of obtaining information about judicial applicants' mental
and physical condition. The ADA prohibits any employer at the "pre-
employment" stage from either conducting or requiring any medical
examination, and from making inquiries of a job applicant "as to
whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the
nature or severity of such disability. '41 7 The only acceptable inquiries
are those into "the ability of an applicant to perform job-related
functions. 4 Is
An employer may, however, require a medical examination or
inquire about a mental or physical condition "after an offer of employ-
ment has been made to a job applicant and prior to the commencement
of the employment duties of such applicant, and may condition an offer
of employment on the results of such examination" on the condition that
(1) "all entering employees are subjected to such an examination regard-
less of disability" and (2) information about the applicant's condition is
kept confidential, with certain limited exceptions.419
Immediate questions arise about the manner in which a nominating
commission should carry out its functions in compliance with ADA
requirements. A threshold question is whether appointed public officials
such as judges are "employees" within the meaning of the ADA. If so,
then the protections of the act apply to the judicial appointments process.
In that case, the mental and physical health data previously requested
and obtained by nominating commissions about judicial applicants
would now appear to be unavailable under the ADA. Moreover, this
leads to the question of whether elected public officials are "employees"
within the meaning of the ADA, and the attendant implications of that
interpretation with respect to candidates' mental and physical health
data.
415. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
416. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i) (1988).
417. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (1988).
418. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (1988). The "essential functions" of the employment
position are determined, according to the ADA, by giving consideration "to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8).
419. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3).
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There appears to be only one instance in which these issues have
been addressed in the merit selection context.420 An attorney for the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has juris-
diction over ADA compliance,4 21 recently provided technical assistance
to the legal services officer of a state supreme court who asked the
above questions422 in an effort to clarify the law as it applies to judges
and judicial nominating commissions.
The EEOC letter4 23 stated that judges are covered "employees"
under the ADA, that no exemptions apply to them, and that therefore
both appointed and elected judges "appear '424 to be covered by the
ADA, "although we are continuing to study this issue. 425
As to the issue of medical information, the letter states that the
prohibition upon a pre-offer request for or review of such information
applies to judicial nominating commissions. Requesting that medical
information be submitted in a sealed envelope, to be opened only in the
event the applicant is ultimately selected from the list of nominees,
would also violate the ADA, according to the EEOC letter.
4 26
In applying the ADA to judicial elections, the letter further states,
in somewhat of a contradiction to the earlier statement including elected
judges within the ambit of the act, that restrictions upon pre-employment
medical information "do not appear to be applicable, from a practical
perspective, in most election situations. 427 This is because "(1) there is
generally no clearly identifiable pre-offer or post-offer stage;428 (2) there
is no clearly identifiable offer and no practical mechanism for 'with-
drawing' it"; and, (3) while the press and the public may inquire, no
state usually inquires into disability-related questions in the election pro-
cess.429 If commissions were to nominate those running for elective
420. See Letter from Elizabeth M. Thornton, Acting Legal Counsel, U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to David L. Withey, Legal Services Officer, Arizona Supreme Court
(Sept. 15, 1993) (on file with the author).
421. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117.
422. See Letter from David L. Withey, Legal Services Officer, Arizona Supreme Court, to
Richard Trujillo, Regional Attorney, EEOC (Aug. 6, 1993) (on file with the author).
423. The letter specifically states that it is "not an official opinion of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.... (T]he EEOC is continuing to study some of these issues; this letter
reflects our initial impressions on these topics." Thornton, supra note 420, at 3.
424. Id. at 1.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 2.
427. Id.
428. Id. The letter notes that if an election involved a nominating committee, it could be
argued that the "offer" is the committee's nomination of the person to the ballot. Alternatively,
the "offer" can be said not to occur until the actual election to office, "since this is the point when
the individual is actually offered employment." Id. at 3 n.3.
429. Id. at 2.
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office, such commissions would be deemed to be acting as "employment
agencies," which are also covered under the act.43°
This view of the ADA's applicability to judicial nominating com-
missions may come as a surprise to those involved in the merit selection
process. Yet recent decisions upholding the ADA's applicability to bar
association character and fitness committees give early signs that the
ADA is indeed applicable to judicial selection. 31
One approach taken recenlty to the prohibition on medical inquiries
by the ADA is the development of a job description for judicial offices.
The Alaska Judicial Council recently developed a "Judicial Position
Description" for, inter alia, the District Court judgeship in Anchorage. It
contains the "essential functions"432 of the job of judging in that
court.433 Similar judicial job descriptions will enable nominating com-
430. Id. at 2-3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
431. See, e.g., In re Underwood, W.L. 649283 (Me. 1993) (holding that state bar inquiry
regarding mental treatment violates the ADA); Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F.
Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (denying defendant bar examiners' motion to dismiss complaint
alleging ADA violation based on bar inquiry regarding plaintiffs' mental health). Cf Applicants
v. Texas Bd. of Bar Examiners, No. 93 CA 740SS (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1994) (finding that "the
Boards's narrowly focused inquiries and investigation into the mental fitness of applicants to the
Texas bar who have been diagnosed or treated for bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or
any psychotic disorder do not violate the ADA").
432. See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
433. Judicial Position Description, Anchorage District Court, Third Judicial District:
The Anchorage District Court judges preside over a limited jurisdiction trial
court serving Anchorage in the Third Judicial District. In FY 1993, the Anchorage
District Court had filings of 42,192 cases of which 8,860 were misdemeanor
matters, 24,282 were traffic cases and 9,050 were civil matters (including 5,537
small claims cases). The nine Anchorage district court judges are responsible for
managing this caseload.
A district court judge must be a citizen of the United States and of the state of
Alaska, at least 21 years of age, resident of Alaska for five years immediately
preceding appointment, and (1) have been engaged in the active practice of law for
not less than three years immediately preceding appointment, and at the time of
appointment be licensed to practice law in Alaska; or (2) have served for at least
seven years as a magistrate in the state. A magistrate who seeks an appointment as
a district court judge must also be a graduate of a law school accredited or approved
by the Council of Legal Education of the American Bar Association or the
Association of American Law Schools. The active practice of law is defined in AS
22.05.070.
To perform the job of district court judge in Alaska, a person must be able to
understand written and oral communications, communicate well in writing and
orally, be capable of a high level of analytical legal reasoning, possess unimpaired
judgment and the ability to concentrate and evaluate evidence and arguments, and
render decisions in a timely and even-handed fashion. A judge must be able to treat
parties, attorneys, members of the public and employees with fairness, courtesy and
respect, and to work under pressure. A judge must be familiar with Alaska law and
procedure and trial practice. Judges in Alaska must conform their conduct to the
Code of Judicial Conduct and to the laws of the State of Alaska and of the United
States.
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missions to obtain, for example, information about the applicant's ability
to sit and concentrate for long periods of time on the bench, read exten-
sively, maintain proper judicial temperament toward people before the
court, and similar abilities, without making a medical inquiry.
Under existing law and regulations,434 nominating commissions are
prohibited from requesting or obtaining medical information about any
In addition, fulfilling the responsibilities of a district court judge in Alaska
often involves sitting (or standing) at a desk or bench for prolonged periods of time.
Travel (usually by airplane, and often by small airplane) to rural areas, sometimes in
cold or wet weather, often is required. The district court judges in Anchorage are
assisted by and are responsible for the supervision of secretarial staff and two law
clerks.
District court judges stand for retention at the first general election more than
two years after initial appointment and every four years thereafter.
(on file with the author).
The relevant portion of a newly developed job description for Iowa's district court judges,
after describing the nature of the cases heard by such judges, states:
District Judges, therefore, travel long distances and may be required to spend long
hours on the job.
It is most desirable that the person acting as a judge be kind, considerate, patient,
attentive, and thorough, as well as firm and direct when the occasion requires.
The Council on Judicial Selection, Handbook for Iowa Judicial Nominating Commissioners (May,
1990). As more states develop such judicial job descriptions, they will be further refined and
include additional physical requirements.
434. The EEOC recently issued a document entitled EXEcUTIVE SUMMARY ENFORCEMENT
GUrDANCE ON PREEMPLOYMENT DiSABILiTy-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (May 19, 1994), which is a set of
guidelines that are to be included in Volume 1I of the EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL. The
document contains, inter alia, examples of "very limited instances when an employer may be able
to show that it could not reasonably evaluate non-medical information at the pre-offer stage." Id.
at 37. In other words, an exception is created to the general rule prohibiting medical inquiries
unless a bona fide offer of employment is made first. This exception is conditioned upon a
satisfactory medical history for which examples are given. No specific reference is made in these
guidelines, or in any other EEOC regulations, to employment situations like those under a merit
selection system.
The exception is created for employers who give bona fide job offers "to fill reasonably
anticipated openings," i.e., where "an employer may be able to demonstrate that, for legitimate
purposes, it must provide a specific number of job offers to fill currently available positions or
reasonably anticipated vacancies." Id. at 38. In those circumstances, the medical inquiries or tests
would be allowed after the "offer" is made, although such employees do not in fact begin their
employment immediately. "For example, an employer may demonstrate that it needs to have a
pool of ready employees, and that a certain percentage of the offerees will likely be disqualified or
will withdraw from the pool." Id.
Three examples are given. In one, a police department may be able to demonstrate that it
needs to make offers to fifty applicants for twenty-five available positions because (1) for public
safety reasons, it needs to have police officers who are ready and able to start work when a
vacancy occurs, and (2) it is likely that approximately one-half of the offers will be revoked based
on post-offer medical tests and inquiries or other reasons. Id. The second example given is a case
in which a maritime industry employer may be able to demonstrate that it needs to make offers of
employment to one hundred applicants to fill sixty available positions because (i) ships are in dry
dock for a short period of time and the employer must have crew members who are ready and able
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to fill any vacancies on outbound ships, and (2) it is likely that some of the offers will be revoked
based on post-offer medical tests or inquiries or other reasons. Id. at 39.
The third example is most closely resembles judicial selection under a merit plan. This case
describes a law firm that may wish to use the same argument to justify "offers" that will not result
in immediate hiring followed by medical inquiries or tests. "It is unlikely that a typical law firm
can demonstrate that it needs to make offers to three applicants for one available attorney position.
The law firm probably cannot demonstrate that it must have a ready pool of lawyers to fill
vacancies, and that offers to two of the three attorneys are likely to be revoked based on post-offer
examinations or procedures." Id. Thus, given this third example, it is questionable whether the
EEOC would treat a court system differently than a law firm.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the courts could be analogized to the police department
example so as to justify the "hiring" of a pool of judicial applicants, additional problems arise.
First, there is the issue of whether an appointing authority or a nominating commission has the
legal authority to establish a pool of judicial applicants for vacancies that have not in fact yet
arisen. Second, because the appointing authority under a merit plan is the official who makes the
actual "offer" of employment, not the nominating commission, the commission would still be
precluded under the ADA from making medical inquiries of anyone in such a pool. Third, since
the appointing authority is the only official permitted to make a medical inquiry and he or she
must first make a bone fide offer of employment in order to make such an inquiry, such an offer
would first have to be made to all the nominees recommended by the nominating commission.
That places the appointing authority in the untenable position of having to offer one judicial
position to all of the nominees if all have unremarkable medical histories.
To complicate things further, the EEOC guidelines require that, in the case of pool
employment, employers must establish the bona fides of their offers of employment to members
of the pool by "preestablished, objective standards (such as the date of application)," that are "job-
related and consistent with business necessity." Id. The purpose of this requirement is to assure
that "the procedures used by the employer for taking individuals from the 'pool' in order to ensure
that these standards are followed," and do not have an adverse impact upon protected individuals.
Id.
According to the EEOC, "[s]uch pre-established objective standards are important to ensure
that the individual knows whether his/her position in the hiring priority order has changed as a
result of a post-offer medical evaluation. This furthers the ADA's objective of separating an
evaluation of an individual's qualifications from his/her disability." Id. at 39 n.56.
The guidelines state that a valid example of an "objective standard" is the date of application.
Id. at 39. An example of an invalid "objective standard" is an employer's policy that "evaluates
which applicant in the pool should get the job only when an opening occurs. In this case, [the
employer] did not make bona fide job offers for purposes of the ADA when it placed individuals
into the pool." Id. at 40. Further, if the "objective standard" of hiring from the pool includes a
policy of "re-ranking" the order of the members of the pool as a result of the post-offer medical
inquiry, the guidelines require that members of the pool be informed of their "overall ranking" (1)
"prior to any post-offer re-ranking" and (2) "after any post-offer re-ranking." Id. Finally, if an
employer lowers the rank of an individual in a pool, "the employer must demonstrate to the
investigator that the standard used to lower the rank is job-related and consistent with business
necessity." Id.
The implications of the aforementioned requirements are (1) that nominating commissions
may be able to claim an exemption from the ADA by virtue of the employment pool exception;
(2) that the exception would require a ranking of all nominees, which is not currently a common
practice among commissions; (3) that the ranking would need to be established by either the
commission, the appointing authority, or both; and (4) that nominees would be entitled to notice of
these rankings and the "objective standards" upon which they are based. In the event, therefore,
that a nominee who is protected by the ADA is not appointed to judicial office under a merit plan
and makes a claim under that statute, the nominating commission and appointing authority would
be hard-pressed to establish their compliance with ADA, absent these elaborate policies and
standards for pool hiring required by the EEOC.
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judicial applicant unless voluntarily disclosed. State supreme courts,
nominating commissions, judicial councils, and other entities that have a
role in judicial selection should, therefore, consider establishing job
descriptions that state the essential functions of the judicial position in
order to maximize the legally obtainable information about an appli-
cant's medical condition. Prudent nominating commissions and
appointing authorities435 should provide prior and adequate notice to all
applicants that an appointment to judicial office is contingent upon sub-
mission of medical information that establishes the nominee's fitness.436
The ADA will also affect the process by which nominating com-
missions conduct interviews of judicial applicants. Commentators point
out the quandary in which employers find themselves under the act:
they are prohibited from asking (at the pre-offer stage) about the exist-
ence, nature, or severity of a disability, an applicant's ability to perform
major life functions, such as walking or standing, or whether an appli-
cant needs accommodation in order to perform job-related tasks; but
they may inquire about the ability to perform either essential or marginal
job functions, and may ask the applicant to describe or demonstrate how
Clearly, this is an area that the EEOC must address, but it is doubtful that administrative
regulations can be promulgated that create an exception to the ADA for merit selection processes,
particularly in light of the difficulty of applying the employment pool exception to the case of
merit selection. It is only a matter of time before the issue is litigated. The judiciary in merit
selection states can either work towards the amendment of the ADA to exempt merit plans, or the
promulgation of new EEOC regulations that address the features of merit selection that make it
unique from other methods of employee selection.
435. Since apparently no state requires a physical fitness test for elective offices, the ADA
prohibition upon pre-employment requests or review of medical information is irrelevant for those
offices. If, however, as the aforementioned letter from the EEOC attorney suggests, a nominating
committee decides on the nominees for an elective office, the ADA may apply. The question
arises whether or not political party nominating committees, as distinguished from governmental
nominating committees such as judicial nominating commissions, would be subject to the ADA.
It would appear that they would be considered an "employment agency" under the ADA, as the
EEOC's attorney suggests, and therefore prohibited from inquiring about an applicant's medical
condition. See Thornton, supra note 420, at 2-3.
436. One possible future scenario is one in which an appointing authority makes his or her
offer of employment, after which the medical inquiry establishes some type of unfitness for
judicial office, and thus the next best nominee is selected. This raises issues under the
aforementioned EEOC rules governing hiring from pools. See supra note 434. The most relevant
rule here being the requirement that "objective standards" be established prior to hiring that
initially rank and then later, after the first hiring, re-rank members of the pool. The application of
this requirement to judicial merit plans, or any gubernatorial appointment system for that matter,
will be particularly challenging. What governor will be willing to use the date of application, for
instance, to determine rankings among the nominees recommended by a nominating commission?
What other "objective standards" might be established for such rankings in the judicial selection
setting?
Even assuming the problem of "objective standards" for ranking can be overcome, there is
always the possibility that the next-ranked nominee will also have an adverse medical history. If
all the nominees are disqualified from appointment due to adverse medical histories, the merit
selection process will have to begin anew.
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Research into the demographic composition of the judiciary began
in the 1970s. One of the earliest studies found that African-American
judges were on the bench in greater numbers in Northern states, and sat
primarily in the limited jurisdiction courts which generally did not
require bar membership.4 38 The concentration of minority judges in the
courts of limited jurisdiction has continued to recent times, according to
data reported in 1990.439 "It is likely that limited jurisdiction courts
serve as important access routes for black judgeships in the state judici-
ary and subsequently advancing through the judicial hierarchy." 40
Early efforts to determine which selection system is the most effec-
tive means of enhancing diversity on the bench reached different conclu-
sions. While most minority judges in the South have historically been
elected, in the North they have reached office through nonpartisan elec-
tions. Partisan elections were the least likely selection system for minor-
ity judges to attain office and appointment systems showed inconclusive
results."
Other early research showed that, while fifty-five percent of minor-
ity judgeships were listed as elective, seventy-seven percent of African-
American jurists surveyed were initially appointed to the bench, often to
fill a judicial vacancy.442 A minority candidate's professional standing,
political party, and friendships were more influential in attaining judicial
office than success in elections." 3
437. Kimberly L. Love & Mary L. Lohrke, New EEOC Guidelines Baffle Employers, 65
OKLA. B.J. 3301 (1994).
438. See, e.g., Beverly B. Cook, Black Representation in the Third Branch, 1 BLACK L.J. 260,
271 (1971).
439. See Barbara L. Graham, Judicial Recruitment and Racial Diversity on State Courts: An
Overview, 74 JUDICATURE 28, 30-31 (1990) ("The fact that most black judges [almost 60 percent]
in the state judiciary are located on limited jurisdiction courts also suggests that they currently
have limited opportunities to participate in judicial policymaking at the trial and appellate
levels.").
440. Id. at 30-31. See also JOHN P. RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK
STYLES AND PERFORMANCE (1980); MICHAEL D. SMITH, RACE VERSUS ROBE: THE DILEMMA OF
BLACK JUDGES (1983).
441. See Cook, supra note 438, at 264, 266.
442. See SMITH, supra note 440, at 60.
443. See also Barbara L. Graham, Do Judicial Selection Systems Matter? A Study of Black
Representation on State Courts, 18 AM. POL. Q. 316, 322-23 (1990) (finding that, based on data
from thirty-six states, formal structures made little difference in minority representation because
most "informal" routes to judicial office came via initial appointments through either a
gubernatorial or legislative appointment system).
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A 1973 AJS study found that most African-American judges, then
constituting 1.3% of the state judiciary nationwide, attained office
through some form of appointment process. The low percentage was
attributed largely to the small number of minority lawyers at the time. 4'
Thus, a prevailing view in the mid-1970s was that African-Ameri-
can judicial hopefuls were better off with the elective rather than the
appointive process. "One of the reasons for this belief is that in the
appointive process, blacks generally are not represented in sufficient
numbers to make an impact, and thus are more likely to be overlooked in
favor of their white counterparts." 44 5 Merit selection, on the other hand,
was only appropriate where "appointing bodies [are] . . . aware of and
responsive to the need for more black judges.
446
In 1985, the Fund for Modem Courts44 7 reported the results of its
national survey of minorities and women on the state bench. It con-
cluded, that "[t]he success of women and minorities in achieving judicial
office depends in large measure upon the method of selection." '  A
higher percentage of women and minorities achieved judicial office
through an appointment process, either Executive Appointment (17.9%)
or Merit Selection (17.1%), than an elective process, whether Judicial
Election (11.7%), Partisan Election (11.2%), Nonpartisan Election
(9.4%), or Legislative Election (6.9%). 44'
In its more recent 1992 study,450 the Fund for Modem Courts
examined data from New York and concluded that "merit selection pro-
duces a more younger, more representative, better-educated, highly
qualified and more politically diverse judiciary" than the elective
system.
45 1
Subsequently in 1993, two additional AJS studies 452 corroborated
444. Cf. Dubois, supra note 286, at 64-65 (finding only minor differences between elective and
appointive systems for female and non-white judges in California, but also attributing this fact to
their underrepresentation in the legal profession); Nicholas 0. Alozie, Black Representation on
State Judiciaries, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 979, 985 (1988) (finding that the percentage of minority lawyers
in a state is the most significant factor in explaining the number of minority judges in that state,
and not the formal methods of selection).
445. The Black Judge in America: A Statistical Profile, supra note 288, at 18.
446. Id. at 25. As one respondent to an early survey on the subject put it, before Voters' Rights
Act litigation began in earnest, "The practical end of it is that since there are few registered black
voters, both the elective and the assignment [appointive] processes of selecting judges is needed.,
See Coalition of Concerned Black Americans, A Preliminary Report of the Experiences of the
Minority Judiciary in the City of New York, 18 How. L.J. 495, 542 (1975).
447. See FuND FOR MODERN CouRTs, supra note 294.
448. Id. at 65-69.
449. Id.
450. See Henry, supra note 297.
451. Id. at 23.
452. African-American Judges Currently Serving on State Courts of Last Resort and
Intermediate Appellate Courts: Methods of Initial Selection 1 (Jan. 1993) (unpublished study on
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MERIT SELECTION
those findings for the appellate bench nationwide. The data revealed
that, of the five major methods of judicial selection in the United States,
the largest proportion of African-Americans (32%) and women (35%)
attained judicial office through a merit plan.453
As for the demographic composition of nominating commissions,
researchers reported in 1974 that there were only two African-Ameri-
cans among the 194 lawyers (including judges) on nominating commis-
sions nationwide. They concluded that "the goal of a representative
cross-section of the community in terms of racial make-up is not being
fulfilled."454 Only 10.4% of the commissioners were women.455
The only other national survey 456 of nominating commissioners,
published in 1990, found the following:
While there have been slight increases in the numbers of minority
commissioners, as a group, judicial nominating commissioners
remain overwhelmingly white .... A few states, however, have
greater minority representation than the general pattern would sug-
gest .... Variations across the states may be due to ... the sensitivity
of the appointing authority to placing minorities on the commissions
and the size of the minority population in a given state.457
There is a nationwide trend to address the lack of diversity on the
bench by explicitly adding racial and gender diversity as a criterion for
the selection of both nominating commissioners and judicial appointees.
AJS stated its position on the issue as follows:
Since nominating commissions are the cornerstone of the merit plan,
it is essential that citizens perceive the commissions as reflecting the
file with American Judicature Society) [hereinafter African-American Judges]; Women Judges
Currently Serving on State Courts of Last Resort and Intermediate Appellate Courts: Methods of
Initial Selection 1 (Jan. 1993) (unpublished study on file with American Judicature Society)
[hereinafter Women Judges].
453. For African-Americans, 20% were selected by gubernatorial appointment (without a
nominating commission), 15% were elected in nonpartisan elections, 11% were elected in partisan
elections, 6% were elected by state legislatures, and 15% reached the bench through other
methods. African-American Judges, supra note 452, at 1. As to women judges, 27% reached the
bench through gubernatorial appointments (without a nominating commission), 18% were elected
in nonpartisan elections, 11% were elected in partisan elections, 4% were elected by state
legislatures, and 6% reached the bench through other methods. Women Judges, supra note 452, at
I.
The debate regarding which judicial selection system is the best for enhancing diversity on
the bench continues to rage. See infra Part VLC (discussing the effect of Voting Rights Act
litigation on the question).
454. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 189, at 38.
455. Id. at 39.
456. See Beth M. Henschen et al., Judicial Nominating Commissioners: A National Profile, 73
JUDICATURE 328 (1990). The third and most recent study of nominating commissions by the ABA
Foundation in 1993 did not inquire into demographic composition. MARTIN, supra note 382.
457. Henschen et al., supra note 456, at 330.
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ethnic and gender diversity of the jurisdiction involved. Unfortu-
nately, in the absence of diversity the legitimacy of some commis-
sions may be called into question....
*.. [1]t must be recognized that the presence of demographically
balanced commissions will foster public confidence in the commis-
sions and enhance the credibility of their work.., and in doing so
assist in recruiting qualified applicants....
.* . We are not advocating mathematical representation on either
the commissions or the bench. However, we believe that recognition
of our multicultural society in commission membership will lead to a
richer judicial applicant pool and, inevitably, an even more distin-
guished bench.45
As noted previously,45 9 the AJS Model Provisions now contain a
requirement that appointing authorities under merit plans "make reason-
able efforts to ensure that the commission substantially reflects the gen-
der, ethnic, and racial diversity of the jurisdiction." The diversity
provisions promulgated by or for nominating commissions in twelve
states460 use similar language for the selection of commissioners, for the
nominees selected by nominating commissions, and for the final judicial
appointments.
As for commission membership, some states require a specified
number of minority commissioners. Florida requires that all nominating
commissions have at least one member of the state bar "who must be a
member of a racial or ethnic minority group or a woman," at least one
public member appointed by the governor who satisfies this criterion,
and at least one public member elected by a majority vote of six sitting
commissioners who satisfies this criterion.46' Other states simply
require appointing authorities to "ensure that the permanent members of
the commission include women and minorities."" 2
In Tennessee, the speakers of both legislative houses select some of
the commissioners from a list of nominees submitted by the state bar
and other groups. According to the provisions, "[i]f the nominees do not
reflect the diversity of the state's population, the speaker shall reject the
entire list of a group and require the group to resubmit its list of nomi-
nees.' '463 Maryland requires that "[t]o the fullest extent possible,* the
458. Editorial, Judicial Nominating Commissions-the Need for Demographic Diversity, 74
JUDICATURE 236 (1991).
459. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
460. Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. See infra Appendix A, Table 5.
461. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.29 (West 1991).
462. MiN. STAT. ANN. § 480B.01(2)(e) (West 1990).
463. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(b)(2) (1994). "Each Speaker in making the appointments
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composition of the members appointed by the Governor shall fairly and
appropriately reflect the minority and female population of the area from
which appointed.
'4 64
As for recruitment and selection of nominees by the nominating
commissions, the Arizona State Constitution states that the nominating
commissions for trial and appellate court appointments "shall consider
the diversity of the state's population, however, the primary considera-
tion shall be merit. 465 In Massachusetts, "judicial candidates should be
drawn from a cross-section of our community, representing not only
geographically diverse parts of the Commonwealth, but reflecting as
well a diversity of experience and background. ' '466 In Utah, the interest
in a diverse bench is expressed in this way:
When deciding among candidates whose qualifications appear in all
other respects to be equal, it is relevant to consider the background
and experience of the candidates in relation to the current composi-
tion of the bench for which the appointment is being made. The idea
is to promote a judiciary of sufficient diversity that it can most effec-
tively serve the needs of the community.4
67
As to the decision of the appointing authority, the Arizona Consti-
tution contains a diversity provision applicable to gubernatorial appoint-
ments: "In making the appointment, the governor shall consider the
diversity of the state's population for an appellate court appointment and
the diversity of the county's population for a trial court appointment,
however the primary consideration shall be merit. '4 68
It is too early to evaluate the effect of these recent changes in merit
plan selection criteria and procedures on diversity in the courts. Despite
the gains made by minorities and women in reaching judicial office
through merit plans, serious challenges to merit selection are now being
to the judicial selection commission shall appoint persons who approximate the population of the
state with respect to race, including the dominant ethnic minority population, and gender." Id.
§ 17-4-102(b)(3).
464. See Exec. Order 01.01.1991.os of Gov. William D. Schaefer at § B(l)(b)(iv) (1991).
465. See Aiuz. CONST. art. VI, §§ 36, 41. Concerns by minority groups in Arizona regarding
the composition of nominating commissions themselves led to the enactment of another
constitutional change. There is now a procedure for the selection of a nominating committee from
any county district in which there arises a nonattomey member vacancy on the nominating
commission. The constitution provides that "The make-up of the committee shall, to the extent
feasible, reflect the diversity of the population of the district." Id. § 41C. The governor then
receives nominations for the position on the county nominating commission from that committee
and makes the appointment to the commission, subject to legislative confirmation. In doing so,
the governor, the legislature, and the state bar "shall endeavor to see that the commission reflects
the diversity of the county's population." Id. § 41D.
466. See Exec. Order No. 355 of Gov. William F. Weld, 1 (May 24, 1993).
467. See Utah Manual of Procedures for Judicial Nominating Commissions 20 (revised 1991).
468. ARiz. CONST. art. VI, § 37C.
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heard from members of minority groups who are impatient with the per-
ceived pace of minority judicial appointments. They contend that their
best hope for achieving a diverse bench is not through merit selection,
but an elective system that has been purged of any racial impact by the
remedies afforded under the Voting Rights Act.
C. The Voting Rights Act
In 1965 Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act ("VA"),469
which prohibits state action that denies or abridges the right to vote and
guarantees equal participation in the political processes leading to elec-
tions. Before 1982, discriminatory intent was required to establish a
violation of Section 2 of the VRA.47° In 1982, Congress amended the
VRA to eliminate the requirement of discriminatory intent. Instead, a
violation can now be established by evidence that an election system
results in racial discrimination.
471
The VRA was originally used to challenge at-large elections47 2 and
discriminatory districting plans for elected positions in Congress, state
469. 42 U.S.C §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988):
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b)
of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this
section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to
office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
470. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
471. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988); see supra note 469.
472. See Brenda Wright, The Bench and the Ballot: Applying the Protections of the Voting
Rights Act to Judicial Elections, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. Ray. 669, 670 (1992).
The potentially discriminatory features of at-large election systems are readily
understood. When multiple officeholders are elected at large from a predominantly
white election district, a minority group within the district may be unable to elect its
preferred candidates to any positions. This occurs when voting is polarized along
racial lines. The white electorate's ability to control the outcome of all of the
elections under an at-large system creates a winner-take-all advantage for the




legislatures, city councils, and other public bodies and boards.473 Until
the mid-1980s, judicial elections had not been challenged under the
VRA.
4 74
A Section 2 violation of the VRA was first established in a Missis-
sippi case in 1986, when the federal court found racial discrimination in
the use of at-large elections for judges.47 The court remedied the situa-
tion by creating additional subdistricts in the state which would allow
some subdistricts to have a majority of black voters.476 A flurry of suits
followed, challenging both at-large voting schemes and judicial district
lines. 4 7 7  There were, however, still some lingering doubts about
whether Section 2 of the VRA applied to judicial elections.478
The question of the applicability of Section 2 was specifically
answered in the affirmative in 1991 when the United States Supreme
Court decided Chisom v. Roemer.479 That case held that the language in
the act stating that a violation could be established by proof that minori-
ties have unequal opportunities to elect "representatives of their
choice" 480 applied as equally to judges as to any other elected public
official. 48' A number of VRA cases have since been filed challenging
state judicial elections.482
These suits resulted in a variety of remedial plans to cure violations
of Section 2 of the VRA, either by agreement of the parties or by court
order. In determining whether to approve the state's remedial plan, the
federal court must defer to the state's policies as long as the plan cures
the dilution of minority voting strength. The state is given an opportu-
nity to propose a remedial plan48 3 before the federal court imposes
473. See Robert B. McDuff, Judicial Elections and the Voting Rights Act, 38 LOYOLA L. REV.
931, 934-35 (1993).
474. Id. "Because racial vote dilution lawsuits have typically been viewed as battles over the
fair allocation of political power, this notion that judges are removed from representative politics
at least partially accounts for the early absence of vote dilution challenges to judicial election
systems." Id. at 935.
475. See Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1194 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
476. See Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327, 349 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
477. See McDuff, supra note 473, at 938-39.
478. See League of United Latin Am. Citizen Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620,
621 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (overruling a panel decision, the court held that Section 2 of the
VRA was inapplicable to judicial elections).
479. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
480. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
481. Chisom, 11l S. Ct. at 2364. The United States Supreme Court also held in Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991), decided on the same day as Chisom,
that there are no differences between appellate and trial judges for purposes of the applicability of
the VRA.
482. See McDuff, supra note 473, at 945.
483. Some states, when proposing a plan to remedy a Section 2 violation, must also obtain
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one.48
4
[A] federal court hearing a judicial elections case has no power itself
to impose merit selection or some other form of judicial appointment
as a remedy. When a federal court is forced to fashion its own rem-
edy in a voting rights case, the court is required to adhere to state
policy as much as possible while still curing the violation. Because
state laws or the state constitution already prescribe the election of
judges as state policy in such a situation, abolishing competitive elec-
tions altogether in favor of some form of appointment would be much
too drastic surgery.485
The recent dismissal by commentators48 6 of merit selection as a
potential remedial measure under the VRA illustrates the challenge that
merit selection supporters face with the minority community. It is true
that the Supreme Court in Chisom v. Roemer said that, "Louisiana could,
of course, exclude its judiciary from the coverage of the Voting Rights
Act by changing to a system in which judges are appointed, 48 7 but com-
mentators suggest that the shift itself is subject to a Section 2 chal-
lenge. 488  "[T]here is something rather sinister about removing the
power to vote for judges at the very time litigation under the Voting
preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice if they were previously found to have histories
of electoral discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988); 28 C.F.R. § 55.
484. See Wright, supra note 472, at 683 (citing Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1982);
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973); Cook v. Luckett, 735 F.2d 912, 918 (5th Cir. 1984)).
485. See McDuff, supra note 473, at 978 (citation omitted).
486. See, e.g., id. McDuff's recent article described two sets of remedial measures under the
VRA, one that is "insufficient," and another that "can work." Id. at 977, 984. The "insufficient"
remedies include (i) appointive systems, including merit selection, (2) retaining electoral systems
but eliminating the majority vote requirement ("a plurality vote would be sufficient to win an
election, and no runoff would be necessary in those elections where the candidates failed to gamer
a majority"), and (3) pure at-large elections in which only the number of posts are modified (i.e.,
"all candidates run in a pool and the winners are determined based on the number of seats open for
election"; "[e]ach voter retains the same number of votes as there are seats available although
voters can vote for fewer candidates if they desire"). Id. at 977-83.
Remedies that "can work" include (1) subdistricting, (2) limited voting ("all candidates run in
a pool without designated divisions and the recipients of the top number of votes equivalent to the
number of vacant seats are the winners"; "voters have fewer votes than the number of seats
available"), (3) cumulative voting ("each voter has a number of votes equal to the number of seats
available for election and can cast all of them for one candidate or for any combination of
candidates"), and (4) realignment of existing district lines. Id. at 984-90.
487. See Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2367 (1991).
488. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 472, at 689 (noting that according to H.R. REP. No. 227,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1981), "shifts from elective to appointive office" were given as an
example of "practices or procedures in the electoral process" that may violate section 2 under the
"totality of circumstances test). Wright points out that the Court's statement in Chisom regarding
instituting appointive systems "may well have been made with reference to pure appointive
systems similar to those used for federal judges, not the merit retention systems often used by
states in selecting judges," which usually include retention elections. Wright, supra note 472, at
690. "Switching to retention elections in areas where there are few or no black judges would
effectively exclude minority candidates." Id.
MERIT SELECTION
Rights Act promises that minority citizens will finally have their fair
share of that power. '489 The United States Attorney General may also
refuse to grant a preclearance for such a change.490 Moreover, the VRA
is intended
to increase the opportunity of minority voters to elect candidates of
their choice, not the choice of Governor....
Even if the objective were [sic] conceived simply as increasing
the number of minority judges-rather than giving minority voters a
greater choice in the selection of judges-an appointive system in no
way guarantees a fair number of minority judges.... [A]n effective
remedy must be ensured by the court and not left to the discretion of
a single state official.49 '
Commentators have also considered using a nominating commis-
sion for each subdistrict when subdistricting is the remedy chosen to
correct past racial disparities in judicial elections; "[e]ven then, how-
ever, several variables could prevent the appointment of a reasonable
number of minority judges. '492 The fact that most merit proposals, as
part of a potential Section 2 remedial measure, would "grandfather-in"
the nearly all-white judiciaries, critics argue, would also "serve to per-
petuate, rather than eliminate, the vestiges of any Voting Rights Act
violations.
493
According to early evidence on the effect of judicial election sub-
districting as a remedial measure for Section 2 violations, minorities are
in fact achieving success in securing more judicial positions. One
researcher studying the effects of a voluntary subdistricting scheme that
was implemented in Cook County, Illinois, in response to a VRA suit,
wrote: "These results, although preliminary, must be heartening to those
who advocated for changes in the system of selecting judges in order to
dramatically increase minority representation on the bench. The 'demo-
graphic goal' of the Voting Rights Act appears on its way to being
489. McDuff, supra note 473, at 978.
490. See FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES CouNTrr 98 (1990); see also Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 570-71 (holding that a change from an elective to an appointive system
in a covered jurisdiction must be precleared under section 5 of the VRA).
Preclearance will be denied unless the jurisdiction meets the burden of
establishing that the submitted change does not have a racially discriminatory
purpose and will not have a racially discriminatory effect. If the election system is
eliminated in favor of an appointive system in response to litigation under section 2,
a jurisdiction will face the difficult task of explaining why such a change was made
just at the moment when the election system was about to be opened to meaningful
participation by minority voters.
Wright, supra note 472, at 689 (citations omitted).
491. See McDuff, supra note 473, at 979.
492. Id. at 980. No such "variables," however, were noted.
493. Id.
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met.
494
Thus, merit selection proponents are often frustrated by the rejec-
tion by minorities of merit plans in favor of the electoral process, with
all of its attendant problems. While the desire of minorities to achieve
faster gains in terms of diversity on the bench is understandable, it
should not be ignored that the popular election of judges, no matter how
representative, is problematic. The challenge, therefore, for some juris-
dictions is to design a judicial selection method that eradicates the dis-
criminatory effects of past judicial elections by increasing diversity on
the bench, while at the same time ensuring that both new and sitting
judges attain office because they are among the most qualified.
The proposed settlement in Brooks v. State Board of Elections495
was an attempt to strike that balance. The plaintiffs in Brooks com-
plained that certain changes made to Georgia's election law violated the
preclearance requirement of Section 5 of the VRA; the federal district
court consequently enjoined the filling of judicial positions that had not
been precleared.496 The injunction was continued until the parties sub-
mitted a settlement agreement to the court for approval.497
The state agreed that: (1) a merit plan coupled with retention elec-
tions would be substituted for judicial elections; (2) at least twenty-five
African-American judges would be on the Georgia bench by the end of
1994, through the creation of new judgeships and appointment of quali-
fied African-American candidates to unfilled positions; and (3) the
state's goal would be to achieve a diverse judiciary "reflective of the
population of the State as a whole. '4 98 The federal court's rejection of
the proposed settlement in this class action case, now on appeal, was
based primarily upon objections raised by intervenors who argued that
the agreement deprived them of their state and federal constitutional
right to vote.49 9 In addition, the federal court found that, to approve the
settlement, would
494. See Larry Golden, Voting Rights and the Judiciary: Assessing the Cook County, Illinois
Judicial Election Controversy 26 (June 1994) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting
of the Law & Society Association, Phoenix, Arizona). The researcher then states, recklessly, in
my judgment, and without citation of authority, that "[i]t is highly improbable, given past
appointment decisions, that there would be as significant an increase if selection were to be made
through a 'merit,' as compared to an electoral process." Id. The studies cited herein, supra part
VI(B), establish the incorrectness of this conclusion.
495. 848 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
496. 775 F. Supp. 1470, 1472-74, 1484 (S.D. Ga. 1989), modified on other grounds, 775 F.
Supp. 1490, 1491, aff'd, 498 U.S. 916 (1990).
497. Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 775 F. Supp. 1490, 1491 (S.D. Ga. 1990); Brooks v.
State Bd. of Elections, 790 F. Supp. 1156, 1159 (S.D. Ga. 1992).
498. 848 F. Supp. 1548, 1563-64.
499. Id. at 1564, 1569.
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violate both the language and spirit of the 1983 Georgia Constitution
and the laws promulgated thereunder. Specifically, the system cre-
ated under the consent decree would violate the Georgia Constitu-
tion's requirement that judges be elected, impermissibly alter the
structure of power currently embodied in the 1983 Georgia Constitu-
tion regarding the election of judges, and violate several fundamental
Georgia statutes. 5"
Merit selection proponents face opposition from minority groups
who are expectedly dissatisfied with the lack of progress being made in
increasing diversity on the bench. A combination of the aforementioned
commission rules of procedure that require objectivity, impartiality,
nonpolitical nominations and appointments, diversity, ethical conduct,
and disciplinary mechanisms for commissioners will help in achieving
greater diversity in the future. This is particularly so if merit selection is
"merged" with the VRA remedy of subdistricting, so as to replace at-
large elective systems with nominating commissions for each subdis-
trict, as was proposed in Brooks.5"'
Given that incumbent judges cannot be forced from office and are
usually retained in retention elections, 50 2 it is understandable for minori-
ties to rely upon the Voting Rights Act for a remedy to the situation.
This remedy, however, will result in short-term increases in minorities
on the bench without addressing the greater issue of judicial compe-
tence. As one commentator observed, "Years later, after a fair election
system has been instituted and a state's judiciary is well integrated, it
might make more sense to move to appointment of judges. ' 50 3 If this is
true, it is hoped that the time will come sooner rather than later.
500. Id. at 1564. The court also refused to find that the retention elections, made part of the
proposed settlement and consent decree, were "elections" under Georgia law. Id. at 1564-66; cf
Bradley v. Indiana State Election Bd., 797 F. Supp. 694, 697 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (holding that
retention elections were "elections" within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act).
501. This approach is not new, having been previously proposed during judicial selection
debates in Louisiana, Texas, and Illinois. See JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATEs 86, 111 (Anthony
Champagne & Judith Haydel eds. 1993); David Heckelman, House Reviews Bill for Merit
Selection, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 22, 1995, at 1, 18.
502. See Robert C. Luskin et al., How Minority Judges Fare in Retention Elections, 77
JUDICATURE 316, 321 (1994) (finding little correlation between whether a judge is White, African-
American or.Hispanic and the percentage of affirmative votes the judge received).
It takes an awful lot for a sitting judge to lose a retention election, and so far as we
can see this is roughly as tre of black and Hispanic as of white judges.... There is
no convincing evidence.., that the judge's race or ethnicity played any significant
part in his or her loss.
As far as retention elections themselves are concerned, the verdict seems clear:
The prospect of more judicial retention elections, per se, offers minorities little to
fear.
Id.
503. McDuff, supra note 473, at 981.
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D. Judicial Performance Evaluations
Just as merit selection was proposed as a means of addressing the
problem of the electorate's lack of knowledge about the background of
candidates and their abilities to hold judicial office, proponents of judi-
cial performance evaluations offer them as a means of generating infor-
mation about sitting judges for retention purposes. As stated in the AJS
position on the subject,
[h]ow is a voter to know what a particular judge's record is? In some
jurisdictions, bar associations conduct judicial evaluation polls of
their members, but the results are not always perceived as reliable
and usually are not widely disseminated. The uncontested nature of
retention elections, the ethical restraints on judges' campaign behav-
ior, and voters' lack of knowledge about the candidates all combine
to form an information vacuum.
5 °4
Judicial performance evaluations, adopted in five states,5 °5 use data
collected from a variety of sources for several purposes. In some
states,50 6 the data are used to educate voters before retention elections; in
Hawaii, the Judicial Selection Commission uses performance evalua-
tions in deciding the question of retention. In all states that have
adopted it, judicial performance evaluations are also used for develop-
mental purposes.50 7
A commission conducts the performance evaluations, as provided
for by constitutional provision,50 state statute, or rule of court. Like
nominating commissions, lawyers, nonlawyers, and judges sit on these
performance commissions.
Performance commissions obtain their data from a variety of
504. Editorial, The Need for Judicial Performance Evaluations for Retention Elections, 75
JUDICATURE 124, 124 (1991). That article also notes the consequences of this "information
vacuum": (1) voter apathy, (2) "uninformed voting %'ithout regard to an individual judge's
qualifications," and (3) "organized, well-funded opposition from interest groups who object to a
judge's decision or series of decisions on a particular issue, as happened last fall in the retention
election of the Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court," referring to a campaign against the
justice's retention by a pro-life group. Id.
505. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, and Utah.
506. Arizona, Colorado, and Utah.
507. See also SPECIAL Comm. ON EvALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, ABA GUIDELINES
FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, at ix (August, 1985) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES]. That report stated that the goal of performance evaluations should be
to improve the performance of individual judges and the judiciary as a whole. Self-
improvement should be the primary use of judicial performance evaluation.
Additional uses... include: (A) the effective assignment and use of judges within
the judiciary, (B) the improved design and content of continuing judicial education
programs, and (C) the retention or continuation of judges in office.
Id.
508. See, e.g., ALASKA CoNsT. art. IV, § 90.
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sources. These include surveys of bar members, law enforcement and
probation personnel, litigants, witnesses, jurors, judges or justices, and
other frequent court users, as well as the judges' self-evaluations,
health 09 and disciplinary records, and caseload evaluations. l°
As is the case for nominating commissions, performance commis-
sions are developing different policies regarding the confidentiality of
the performance data collected. 11 Thus, the deliberations of the com-
mission in some states are confidential, whereas the voting is made pub-
lic. 512  In other states, all proceedings are confidential, but the
information on the evaluated judges is publicly disseminated through a
voters' pamphlet 1 3 or a commission report.
51 4
Used in conjunction with a judicial selection commission, as in
Hawaii, or with a typical merit plan that requires appointed judges to
stand for an uncontested retention election, performance evaluations will
go far in providing information on which to base retention decisions.
While these evaluations and the procedures used for arriving at them
may, not unexpectedly, stir some controversy within the judiciary, no
longer will voters in states be forced to guess, use ethnic name recogni-
tion, or read bar polls in order to gain the information required to cast an
informed retention vote.
More states will adopt judicial performance evaluations as the
experiences of the first five states with such programs become known.51 5
The challenge to the jurisdictions with a merit plan is to adopt perform-
ance evaluation programs so that the same scrutiny, by lawyers and
nonlawyers, of an applicant's potential for holding judicial office is also
applied to the question of retention after the office is attained; a system
509. These data, now collected in Alaska, are probably unavailable under the ADA. See supra
notes 417-439 and accompanying text.
510. See ABA GUIDELrNES, supra note 507, at xiii ("Reliable sources of information should be
developed for judicial evaluation programs and multiple sources should be used whenever
feasible. Alternate sources from which to obtain information include but are not limited to
lawyers, other judges, public records, court personnel, litigants, and other appropriate sources.").
511. The ABA Guidelines recommend that "Provisions for confidentiality should be
established such that the source of particular information cannot be identified." ABA GuIDELINES,
supra note 507, at xiii.
512. See, e.g., Arizona.
513. See, e.g., Alaska.
514. See, e.g., Arizona. The ABA Guidelines recommend that "The dissemination of results
and data from the judicial evaluation program should be consistent with and conform to the uses
for the program. Except to the extent required by the particular program, the results and data
should be confidential." ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 507, at xiii.
515. See, e.g., Anne R. Mahoney, Citizen Evaluation of Judicial Performance: The Colorado
Experience, 72 JUDICATuIE 210, 216 (1989) (arguing that citizen evaluations of judges hold the
potential for increasing citizen involvement, interaction, and exchange with the courts).
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that uses both comes closer than any other method to assuring the high-
est quality of justice.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article provides a comprehensive review of the history and
current status of merit selection. The major shortcomings of the elective
system of judicial selection are eliminated under the merit plan. Politics
has not been eradicated under merit selection, but it has been greatly
minimized. The wide variety of rules of procedure described herein
reflect evolutionary refinements that address the concerns of critics
regarding politics, ethics, diversity, and other issues that have arisen in
conjunction with merit selection.
The issues raised by minority critics who argue that merit selection
is an inadequate remedy for addressing prior racial disparities in judicial
elections constitute the latest challenge to proponents of the merit plan.
Experimentation with new models of merit selection is needed, espe-
cially with models that enhance the diversity of commissions them-
selves, as well as the diversity of judicial nominees and appointees, and
with models that establish multiple commissions for subdistricts in lieu
of at-large elections. Most importantly, we should not "throw out the
baby with the bathwater" when proposing remedies to the unfair at-large
elections of the past.
To date, no state that has adopted a merit plan has opted to replace
it with an elective system. This fact alone, notwithstanding the empiri-
cal studies and anecdotal evidence cited herein in support of merit selec-





TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF MERIT SELECTION PLANS: SCOPE
OF THE PLANS
Lea
basis Number of Number of
State Year established Level of court of plan Type of vacancy commissions commiasioners
Alabama
Jefferson County 1951 Circuit C Interim I 5: 2L, 2N, IJ
Madison County 1974 Circuit C Interim 1 5: 2L, 2N, IJ
Mobile County 1982 Circuit, District C Interim I 5: 2L, 2N, 1J
Tuscaloosa County 1990 Circuit, District C Interim I 9: 5L, 3N, IJ
Alaska 1959 Supreme Court C Initial and Interim I 7: 3L, 3N, II
Superior Court C
Court of Appeals S
District Court S
Arizona 1974, amended 1992 Supreme Court C Initial and Interim I 16: 5L., ION, J
Court of Appeals
Pima & Maricopa 1974, amended 1992 Superior, in counties C Initial and Interim 2 16: 5L, ION, IJ'
Counties with population of
250.000 or more
Tucson 1978 Magistrate's Court CC Initial and Interim I 9: 4L, 5N, 0J
Phoenix 1975 Magistrate's Court CC Initial and Interim 1 7: 2L, 3N, 2J
Colorado 1966 Appellate C Initial and Interim 1 13: 6L, 7N, OJ




Connecticut 1986 Supreme Court C Initial and Interim I 12: 6L, 6N, OJ
Appellate Court Reappointment of
Superior Court Incumbent Judges
Delaware 1977; All, including EO Initial and Interim 1 9: 5L, 4N, 0J
revised 1978, 1985 Magistrates Court EO Initial and Interim I 9: 5L, 4N, 0J
D.C. 1973 Superior Court, HR Initial and Interim 1 7: 4L, 2N, II
Court of Appeals
Florida 1973 Supreme Court C Initial and Interim 6 9: 3L, 3N, OJ
Court of Appeals
1973, amended 1976, Circuit Court C Interim 20 9: 3L, 3N. O2
1984 & 1991 County Court
Georgia 1975, 1983, Appellate Court EO Interim 1 9: 5L, 4N
revised 1984. 1991 Superior Court
State Court
Hawaii 1979 All C Initial and Retention I 9: 4L, 5N, 0J
Idaho 1967; Supreme Court S Interim I 7: 2., 3N. 2J
amended 1985 Court of Appeals
District Coon
Indiana 1970; Supreme Court C Initial and Interim I 7: 3L, 3N, IJ
amended 1986, 1988 Court of Appeals
Lake County 1973 Superior Court S Initial and Interim I 7: 3L, 3N. I3
St. Joseph County 1973 Superior Court S Initial and Interim 1 7: 3L, 3N, IJ
Marion County 1971 Municipal Courts S Initial and.Interim 1 I1: 3L, 4N, 2J3
Allen County 1983 Superior Court S Initial and Interim 1 7: 3L, 3N, IJ
Iowa 1962 Supreme Court C Initial and Interim I 13: 6L, 6N, 1J
Court of Appeals
1962 District Court C Initial and Interim 14 II: 5L, 5N, IJ
1983; Amended District associate S Initial and Interim I per county 6: 2L, 3N, 1J
1986 judges (99 counties)
Kansas 1958 Supreme Court C Initial and Interim I II: 6L, 5N, 01
Court of Appeals
1974 District Courts C Initial and Interim 17 13: 6L, 6N, I3
(optional)
Kentucky 1975 Supreme Court C Interim 1 7: 2L, 4N, IJ
Coon of Appeals
Circuit Court C 56 7: 2L, 4N, IJ
District Court
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TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF MERIT SELECTION PLANS: SCOPE
OF THE PLANS (CONTINUED)
Legal
basis Number of Number of
State Year established Level of court of plan Type of vacancy commissions commissioners
Marylsnd 1970; Appellate Court EO Initial and Interim I 13: 61, 6N, 0P
revised 1974, 1979 Trial Courts EO Initial and Interim 15 13: 6L, 6N, 03'
1982, 1987, 1988,
1991
Massachusetts 1975; All EO Initial and Interim I 23'
revised 1979,
1983, 1987, 1991
Minnesota 1983; revised District Court S Interim 1 13'
1987, 1989, 1992
Missouri 1940 Supreme Court C Initial and Interim 1 7: 3L, 3N, IJ
Court of Appeals
1940 Jackson County C Initial and Interim 1 5: 2L, 2N. 1J
1940 St. Louis City C Initial and Interim 1 5: 2L, 2N, 13
1970 St. Louis County C Initial and Interim 1 5: 2L, 2N, IJ
1973 Clay & Platte C Initial and Interim 2 5: 2L, 2N, 13
Counties
Montana 1972 Supreme Court C Interim I 7: 2L, 4N, IJ
District Court
Nebraska 1962; All C Initial and Interim 53 9: 4L, 4N, IJ
amended 1972
Nevada 1976 Supreme Court C Interim 1 7: 3L, 3N, IJ
District Court Interim 9: 4L, 4N, I J'
New Mexico 1988 Appellate Courts C Initial and Interim 1 14: 8L, 3N, 31'
District Courts C Initial and Interim 13 14: 8L, 3N, 3J
Metropolitan Courts C Initial and Interim 1 14: 8L, 3N, 3J
New York 1977 Court of Appeals C, S Initial and Interim 1 12: 4L, 4N, 0J
1976, amended Appellate Div. of EO Initial/Appellate Div. 4 10:1"
1990 Supreme Court, of Supreme Court
1983 Court of Claims, EO Court of Claims. I 12 (appt'd by
Supreme. Surrogate, All others interim Governor)
County, Family only.
New York City 1978; amended 1990, Criminal Court EO Interim Civil Ct. 1 19:
1994 Family Court (Mayor) Others: Initial and
Civil Court Interim
North Dakota 1981 Supreme Court C Interim 1 9: 3L, 3N, 01"
District Court S
1983 County Court Interim 1 9: 3L, 3N, 0J"
Oklahoma 1967 Supreme Court C Initial and Interim 1 13: 6L, 7N, 0J
Court of Criminal
Appeals
Court of Appeals C Interim
District Court
Pennasylvania 1964; Appellate Courts EO Interim I 7: 4L, 3N, 0J
revised 1973,
1979, 1987
1964; Trial Courts EO Interim 59 5: 3L, 2N, 01
revised 1973,
1979, 1987
1988 Philadelphia Trial EO Interim 1 9: 5L, 4N, 0J
Courts
Rhode Island 1994 Supreme Court C* Initial and Interim 1 9: 4L. 4N, 03"






South Dakota 1980 Supreme Court C Initial and Interim I 7: 3L, 2N, 2J
Circuit Court Interim
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TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF MERIT SELECTION PLANS: SCOPE
OF THE PLANS (CONTINUED)
Legal
basis Number of Number of
State Year established Level of court of plan Type of vacancy commissions commissioners
Tennessee 1971; amended Supreme Court S Initial and Interim I 15: 12L, 3N, 0J
1986. 1994 Court of Appeals
Court of Criminal
Appeals
1994 Trial Courts S Interim
Utah 1984; Appellate Courts C Initial and Interim I 7:21., 4N, IJ
amended 1987, District Court 8"
1988; 1991; Circuit Court 8"
1994 Juvenile Court 8.
Vermont 1967, amended Supreme Court C Initial and Interim I 11: 5L, 6N, 0J
1969, 1971, 1975, Superior Court
1979, 1985 District Court
West Virginia 1981. 1989 - EO Interim 1 9: 51"
Wisconsin 1983 Supreme Court EO Interim I Nlsu'l7']
rev. 1987 Court of Appeals
Circuit Court




EO = Executive Order
S = Statutory
HR = Home Rule




CC = City Code
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TABLE 2. COMPOSITION OF NOMINATING COMMISSION
Chairman appointed/ Lawyers appointed/ Non-lawyers Judges appointed/
State Term of service elected by elected by appointed/elected by elected by




Tuscaloosa Cry. 6 years County Bar Legislature Presiding Judge
serves ex officio
Alaska Chief Justice 3 yrs. Chief Justice serves State Bar Governor with Chief Justice serves
Others 6 years ex-oflicio confirmation by ex-officio
legislature
Arizona 4 years Chief Justice serves State Bar, Governor Governor with Chief Justice serves
Appellate Courts with consent of Senate consent of Senate"
5
Superior Court
Magistrate's Court 1 year NI County Bar 3 appointed by -






Magistrate's Court 2 years NI State and County City Council Presiding Judge
(Phoenix) Bars Superior Court
Colorado 6 years Chairman is ex-officio Governor, Attorney Governor Supreme court
Supreme Court non-voting member General, Chief Justice justices serve
of supreme court ex-officio
All other courts 6 years Same as above Governor, Attorney Governor Same as above
of record except General, Chief Justice
appellate, municipal
and Denver Cry.










Delaware 3 years Governor Governor, State Bar Governor -
D.C. 6 years"
.  
Commission members See FN 22 See FN 22 See FN 22
Florida 4 years Commission members State Bar 3/Governor, -
Appellate Courts 3/Commission
Circuit Courts
Georgia At pleasure of Governor Governor (3)
'  
Governor (2)"' -
appointing authority; 2 serve ex-officio Lt. Governor (I)
(2 serve ex-officio)? Spkr. of House (I)
Hawaii 6 years Commission members Governor, Chief Justice, Governor, Chief -
State Bar, Legislative Justice, Legislative
Leaders leaders
Idaho 6 years Chief Justice serves State Bar with consent Governor with State Bar with
ex-officio of Senate consent of Senate consent of Senate
Indiana
Appellate Courts 3 years Chief Justice serves Peers Governor Chief Justice serves
ex-officio ex-officio
Lake County 4 years Chief Justice Lake County attorneys Governor Chief Justice
St. Joseph County 4 years Chief Justice St. Joseph County See FN 26 Chief Justice
attorneys
Marion County 2 years See FN 27 County Bar, Governor and See FN 28
Superior Court Mayor of largest
city in county
Allen County 4 years Chief Justice Allen Co. attorneys Governor Chief Justice
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TABLE 2. COMPOSITION OF NOMINATING COMMISSION (CONTINUED)
Chairman appointed/ Lawyers appointed/ Non-lawyers Judges appointed/
State Term of service elected by elected by appointed/elected by elected by
Iowa
Appellate Courts 6 years Senior Supreme State Bar Governor with Justice serves by
Court Justice (other consent of Senate virtue of his tenure
than Chief Justice)
serves ex-officio
District Courts 6 years Senior District Court District Bar Governor Judge serves by
Judge in district virtue of his tenure
District associate 6 years Designated by chief County Bar County Board of Chief judge of
judges judge of district Supervisors district
Kansas
Appellate Courts 5 years State Bar Lawyers in Governor -
congressional district
District Courts 4 years Chief Justice Lawyers in applicable County
district Commissioners
Kentucky 4 years Chief Justice serves State and local bars Governor Chief Justice serves
ex-officio ex-officio
Maryland Co-extensive with Governor Lawyers in applicable Governor -
Governor district
Massachusetts At Governor's Governor Governor Governor -
pleasure
Minnesota At Governor's Governor, Governor, Governor, Governor,
pleasure, some Supreme Court Supreme Court Surpemne Court Supreme Court
co-extensive Justices Justices Justices Justices
with Governor
Missouri
Appellate Courts 6 years Commission Lawymrs in each Governor Members of
members appellate district supreme court
Circuit Courts 6 years Commission Lawyers in each Govemnor Chief Judge serves
menbers circuit ex-officio
Montana 4 years Commission Supreme Court Governor District judges
members
Nebraska 4 years Supreme Court State Bar Governor Governor
Justices serve
ex-officio
Nevada 4 years Commission State Bar Governor Chief Justice
members
New Mexico
Appellate Courts Dean UNM Law State Bar President; Governor, Speaker Chief Justice; Chief
School serves Judges on committee of House; President Judge Court of
ex-officio (4); Governor, Speaker of Senate Appeals (2)
of House, President of
Senate (I app't each)
District Courts Dean UNM Law State Bar President; Governor, Speaker Chief Justice; Chief
School serves Judges on committee of House; President Judge Court of
ex-officio (4); Governor, Speaker of Senate Appeals; Chief
of House, President of Judge of
Senate (I app't each) District"
Metropolitan Courts Dean UNM Law State Bar President; Governor, Speaker Chief Justice; Chief
School serves Judges on committee of House; President Judge of District;
ex-officio (4); Governor, Speaker of Senate Chief Judge of
of House, President of Metropolitan
Senate (I app't each) Court"
New York
Court of Appeals 4 years Commission Govemor, Chief Judge, Governor; Chief -
members Court of Appeals Judge, Court
of Appeals
Appellate Division Co-extensive with Governor See FN 10, II See FN 10, II -
and Trial Courts Governor
outside N.Y. Cry.
New York Cty. 2-1 years Mayor See FN 12 Sen FN 12 -
North Dakota 3 years Governor See FN 13 See FN 13 See FN 13
Oklahoma Chairman-I year Commission members Attorneys in district Governor, but I -
Othrs-6 years member selected
At-large member- by commission
2 years
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TABLE 2. COMPOSITION OF NOMINATING COMMISSION (CONTINUED)
Chairman appointed/ Lawyers appointed/ Non-lawyers Judges appointed/
State Term of service elected by elected by appointed/elected by elected by
Pennsylvania
Trial and Appellate I year Governor Governor Governor -
Philadelphia 3-3 years Governor Governor Governor -
3.2 years
3.1 year
Rhode Island 4 years Governor Governor" Governor" -
South Dakota 4 years Commission State Bar President Governor Judicial Conference
members
Tennessee 6 years Commission Speakers of House Speakers of House
members and Senate '  and Senate
Utah 4 years Governor Governor Governor Chief Justice or
Assoc.
Appellate Courts Justice serves
ex-officio
District Court 4 years Governor Governor Governor Chief Justice
Circuit Court 4 yea Governor Governor Governor Same as above
Juvenile Court 4 years Governor Governor Governor Same as above
Vermont 2 years Commission See FN 32 See FN 32
members
West Virginia At Governor's Governor Governor See FN 33 See FN 33
pleasure
Wisconsin Pleasure of Governor Governor Governor
Governor
Wyoming 4 years Chief Justice serv s State Bar Governor Chief Justice serves
ex-officio ex-officio
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TABLE 3. RULES GOVERNING SUBMISSION OF LIST OF NOMINEES
Order Governor Legis.
Days allowed Number names names Addt'l lef. sent o bound by confirm Names
State to submit list submitted submitted apptg auth. reon. required made public




Tuscaloosa Cry. 4-5 3-5 NI NI Yes No NI
Alaska 90 2 or more Alpha Bar survey results, Yes No All appl.
AQ
Arizona
Appellate Courts 60 3 or more Alpha AQ, LOR, LNR Yes No All nor.
Superior Courts 60 3 or more Alpha AQ, LOR, LNR Yes No All
interviewees
Magistrate's Court 30 3 or more Rank Entire File City Council City All
interviewees
( on) Council




Supreme Court 30 3 Alpha AQ Yes No All nom.





Connecticut NI NI NI NI Yes See FN 34 NI
Delaware 60 3 or more Alpha AQ, AR Yes Yes Appt. only
D.C. 60 3 Alpha Investigative file* Yes (Pres.) Yes All non.
LOR
Florida
Appellate Courts 30" Not more than 3 Alpha AQ, Writing samples Yes No All nons.
financial and tax
statements
Circuit Court 3 or more
County Court 3 or more
Georgia NI Not more than 5 NSO AQ, Vote on No No No
nominees
Hawaii No limit 6 Alpha AQ Yes Yes No
Idaho No limit 2-4 Alpha AR. AQ, Rating Yes No All nor.
w/rating LNP, LOR
Indiana
Appellate Courts 70 3 Alpha Written eval. Yes No All appl.
& all noe.
Lake County 60
St. Joseph Cty. 60
Marion County 60
Allen County 60 3 NSO Written eval. Yes No
Iowa
Appellate Courts 120 3 Supreme Court Alpha AQ Yes No All appl.
5 Court of Appeals
District Courts NI 2 NSO AQ Yes No All appL.
Dist. assoc. judges 30 3 NI NI See FN 37 No NI
& magistrates
Kansas
Appellate Courts 60 2 or 3 NSO AQ, Written material Yes No All onso.
District Courts 30 2 or 3 NSO AQ, Written material Yes No All nor.
Kentucky NI 3 Alpha AQ Yes No All nom.
Maryland
Appellate 70 5-7 Alpha AR, AQ, LOR Yes" Yes All appl.
Trial 70 Not more than 7 Alpha AR, AQ, LOR Yes No All appl.
Massachusetts 15, extendable NI NSO AQ, Juris. and Yes See FN 39 Appt. only
to 30 history of ct.,
number of votes
rec'd., LOR
Minnesota 60 3-5 NSO AQ No No All nor.
Missouri 60 3 NSO AQ Yes No All nom.
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TABLE 3. RULES GOVERNING SUBMISSION OF LIST OF
NOMINEES (CONTINUED)
Order Governor Legis.
Days allowed Number names names Addt'l Inf. sent to bound by confirm Names
State to submit list submitted submitted apptg. auth. recom. required made public
Montana 30 3-5 Order of AQ Yes Yes All appl.
qualification
Nebraska 60 3 NSO All available Yes No All appl.
(minimum) information
Nevada No limit 3 Alpha AR, AQ Yes No All nors.
New Mexico 30 NI Alphabetical Application Form Yes' No NI
order
New York
Court of Appeals See FN 41 Chief Judge-7 Alpha Written report, Yes Yea All nom.
Associate-3-7 entire file
App. Div. and Trial NI NI NSO Written eval., Yes Yes Appt. only
Cts. outside N.Y. entire file
cy.
New York Cry. 90 3 NI NI No, but No Appt. only
Mayor is
bound
North Dakota 60 2-7 NSO None No No All nom.
Oklahoma NI 3 NSO None Yes 2  No All appl.
Pennsylvania
Appellate Courts 20 5 NSO None Yes No No
Trial Courts 30 5 NSO None Yes No No
Philadelphia Courts 30 5 NSO None Yes No No
Rhode Island 60-supreme 3-5 NI NI Yes Yes NI e
45-any other
state court





Tennessee 60 3 Alpha None See FN 44 No All nom.
Utah 3041 See FN 46 Alpha AR, AQ Yes Yes Appt. only
Vermont Open At least 3 NSO AQ Yes Yes Appt. only
West Virginia NI NI Alpha See FN 47 No" No NI
Wisconsin 6 weeks 3-5 NSO AR, AQ, LOR, LNR Yes No All nom.





All appl. = All applicants
Appt. only = Appointee only
AQ = Applicant questionnaire
AR = Applicant resume
LNR = Letters of non-recommendation
LOR = Letters of recommendation
NI = Not indicated
NSO = No specified order
. = If requested
1994] MERIT SELECTION 87
NOTES TO TABLES 1-3
I. Arizona. Pima and Maricopa Counties am each divided into 5 supervisory districts6 each ofwhich must be equally represented on the
superior cort nominating commissions. The two nonattorney members from a given district may not be of the same political party.
2. Florida. Each appointing authority must appoint at least one member from a racial or ethnic minority, or a woman. The 3
gubetnatorial appointees may or may not be attorneys.
3. Indiana (Marion County). Two additional members appointed by the mayor of the largest city in the county may or may not be
attorneys.
4. Kansas. Statutes indicate that each district commission may be composed of an equal number of lawyer and nonlawyer. Total
number of commissioners on each commission varies with the number of counties in each judicial district. The justice presiding is
nonvoting.
5. Maryland. The 13th trial court commissioner, or the 15th appellate court commissioner, each of whom is chairperson of the
respective commission, may or may not be an attorney.
6. Massachusetts. The commission is composed of 29 members. Ratio of lawyers o nonlawyers is not specified.
7. Minnesota. 9 commissioners are appointed by the governor. Of these, no more than 6 may be lawyers. Four commissioner are
appointed by the supreme court justices. No more than 2 may be lawyers.
8. Nevada. The district commission is the same as the supreme court commission, except that I lawyer and I nonlawyer from the
appropriate district are temporarily added.
9. New Mexico. The president of the state bar and judges on the committee shall make the minimum number of additional
appointments of members of the state bar as is necessary for equal representation on the committee of the two largest major political
parties. These figures exclude the chair, who votes only in the event of a tie.
10. New York. The commission is composed of 12 members. The governor and the chief judge each appoint two lawyers and two
nonlawyer. The speaker and minority lender of the assembly and the temporay president and minority leader of the senate each
appoint one member, who, in each case, may or may not be a lawyer.
I1. New York. Four members of each departmental committee are appointed by the governor, 2 by the chief judge of the State of New
York. and I is chosen by the presiding justice of the appellate division of each department and one by the president of the New York
State Bar Association. The remaining 2 members are selected jointly by the speaker and minority leader of the assembly and the
majority and minority leaders of the senate. The ratio of lawyers to nontawyers is not specified.
12. New York City. Mayor chooses 9 members, presiding justices of the appellate division for the first and second judicial departments
each choose 8 members, deans of 2 law schools appoint I each. Ratio of lawyers to nonlawyers not specified.
13. North Dakota. The governor, chief justice and president of the state bar each select 2 petmenent members of the commission, I
nonlawyer and I lawyer who may or may not be a judge. When a district or county court vacancy occurs, each selector appoints I
additional temporary member from the district or county in which the vacancy occurs. The statute does not specify whether
temporary members should be lawyer or nonlawyers.
14. Rhode Island. The ninth member may be either a lawyer or a nonlawyr.
15. Utah. The commission serves in each judicial district for all trial courts within that geographical area.
16. West Virginia. Executive order specifies only that "at least five" members must be licensed to practice law in the state. Number of
nonlawyer or judge members not specified.
17. Wisconsin. The commission consists of an unspecified number of permanent members. the lawyer/nonlawyer/judge composition is
not designated. To fill supreme court or court of appeals vacancies, 2 temporary members are added; in the case of a circuit court
vacancy, the commission chair appoints 2 temporary members from the appropriate circuit.
18. Wyoming. When a vacancy occurs ina local district court or county, and that district or county is not represented on the commission.
I lawyer and I nonlawyer from the district are appointed as temporary, nonvoting advisors to the commission.
19. Arizona. Pima & Maricopa counties are each divided into 5 supervisory districts. Each district has a 7-member nominating
committee for the purpose of recommending prospective nonattomey members of the superior court nominating commission to the
Governor. Actual appointment is made by the governor, with consent of the senate.
20. Connecticut. The chair must be elected by commission members from among those members appointed by the governor.
21. D.C. All terms am for 6 years except for one member, appointed by the president of the United States, whose term is for 5 years.
22. D.C. Two members are appointed by the Board of governors of the United Bar of the District of Columbia. One member who mast
be a sitting judge is appointed by the civil judge of the U.S. District Court for the D.C.: The mayor of the District appoints 2
members, one of whom must be a nonlawyer one nonlawyer member is appointed by the council of the District of Columbia, and one
member is appointed by the president of the United States.
23. Georgia. Seven commission members serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. The remaining two serve ex-officio.
24. Georgia. Three lawyer commissioners am appointed by the governor. Two of these serve ex-officio.
25. Georgia. Nonlawyer commission members are appointed as follows: Two by the governor, one by the lieutenant governor, and one
by the speaker of the house.
26. Indiana (St. Joseph County). Appointment of nonlawyer members is made by a selection commission composed of thejudges of the
St. Joseph County Circuit Court, the president of the Board of County Commissionem, and mayors of each of the 2 largest cities in
the county.
27. Indiana (Masrion County). Chair is a judge of the Indiana Court of Appeals who is a legal resident of the court of appeals district in
which the municipal court is located.
28. Indiana (Marion County). Circuit court judge serves by virtue of residency in county in which municipal court located.
29. New Mexico. The chief judges themselves may serve or may designate another judge from their respective couls.
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30. Rhode Island. The governor appoints three attorneys and one noulawyer of his or her choice. The governor also appoints five
additional commission members, one from each of the following lists: (I) a list of at least three persons who may be lawyers and/or
nonlawyers from the senate majority leader; (2) a list of three lawyers from the speaker of the house; (3) a joint list of four
nonlawyers from the majority leader and the speaker, (4) a list of three nonlawyers from the minority leader of the house; and (5) a
list of three nonlawyers from the minority leader of the senate.
31. Tennessee. Lawyers are appointed from lists submitted by the Tennessee Bar Association, Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association,
Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association, Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference and Tennessee Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers.
32. Vermont. The senate and house each appoint 3 members, I lawyer, and 2 nonlawyers Attorneys admitted to practice before the
supreme court elect 3 from their membership. Governor appoints 2 nonlawyers.
33. West Virginia. Executive order specifies that "at least five" member must be licensed to practice law. Governor appoints all
commissioners. See FN 18.
34. Connecticut. The governor selects a nominee from the commission's list, seeds the name to the general assembly, and the general
assembly makes the appointment. The governor may nominate only from the list submitted by the commission.
35. Delaware. The governor may refsse to appoint from the fint list and may require the commission to submit one supplementary list.
36. Florida. Time limit for submission of nominee list may be extended by the govesor.
37. Iowa. District judges appoint associate district judges from list of nominees recommended by the county magistrate appointing
commission. The county magistrate appointing commission appoints magistrates.
38. Maryland. The governor may also fill the vacancy by selecting a person from any list submitted by the appropriate commission for a
vacancy on the same comu, provided the previous list was submitted within one calendar year of the curret vacancy. and provided
information on the nominees is updated.
39. Massachusetts. Appointment requires advice and consent of Goveomor's Council.
40. New Mexico. The governor may make one request to the commission for additional names, and the commission shall do so if a
majority of the commission finds that additional persons would be qualified and recommends those person for appointment.
41. New York. For an expected vacancy, the commission has a fixed deadline which is in December of the year preceding the January I
date when the vacancy occurs, except that in nonelection years, the deadline is October 15. In case of an unexpected vacancy, the
commission is given 120 days to submit its recommendations.
42. Oklahoma. Except regarding the appellate court, where the governor may consider the commission's recommendations.
43. Rhode Island. However, the senate, as part of the confirmation process, conducts a public hearing on the qualifications of nominees
for trial court judgeships. If the constitutional amendment for a merit plan for the supreme court is adopted in 11/94, the judiciary
committees of the house and senate will separately conduct such a hearing.
44. Tennessee. The governor may request an additional list of three names, but must give reasons for rejecting the initial list. However,
he must appoint from a commission list.
45. Utah. May be extended an additional 30 days if there are fewer than 9 applicants.
46. Utah. For appellate court commission, 5-7 names are submitted. For trial court commissions, 3-5 names am submitted.
47. West Virginia. Written evaluation of each nominee as to his/her professional competence. experience and reputation; personal
integrity; impartiality and faimes; tempersment; commitment to public service; and capacity to work.
48. West Virginia. Executive order states "The committee's report shall be advisory only, but the Governor shall give it full
consideration."
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TABLE 4. RULES OF CONFIDENTIALITY
External Communications
Identity of Communications Deliberations with Appointing Identity of
State Applicants Records Interviews to Commissioners* (Voting) Authority Nominees
Alabama no
Alaska no no yea no
Arizona no yes no yes no
2  
yes no




Delaware yes yes yes yes yes
DC yes yes yes yes yes no
Florida
s
' no no no no yes no
Georgia no See FN 6 yes yes yes
Hawaii yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Idaho ye yes yes yes'
Indiana no no yes no
Iowa no yes yes yes no
Kansas' no no' no'




Massachusetts yes yes yes yes
Minnesota no
Missouri yes yes" no
Montana 10
2  
an" 002 no" no"
Nebraska no See FN 13 yes no
Nevada no yes yes yes
New Mexico
New York" yes yesas yess yes yes nos
North Dakota no
Oklahoma no




Tennessee no no See FN 18 yes no
Utah yes yes yes yes yes yes"$
Vermont yes yes yes yes
West Virginia yeae yes yeaw yes0
Wisconsin yes yes yes yes no
Wyoming yes noiI
Included under this heading are regulations coneeming communications to one or more commissioners from outside the
commission.
KEY: No = data/procedure not confidential; yes = data/procedure confidential; no entry = no information on this issue exists in
commission rules.
1. In Alaska interviews are conducted in executive session unless the applicant requests an interview in public session.
2. In Arizona, all voting is held in public session, but deliberations may be confidential (held in executive session) upon a two-thirds
vote of commission members.
3. These data are drawn from the rules of the Ist District and Supreme Court Nominating Commissions.
4. These data are drawn from the rules of the Ist District Court Nominating Commission. The Supreme Court Nominating
Commission contains no reference to this subject.
5. These data are drawn from the rules of the District, Circuit, and Supreme Court Nominating Commissions. The Circuit Court
Nominating Commission is utilized only in the case of a gubernatorial appointment for interim judicial vacancies.
6. While most information is not confidential, the Supreme Court Nominating Commission reserves the right to keep information
confidential.
7. While the identity of the applicants are considered confidential, the rles provide that after the deadline for submitting applications
for the judicial vacancy the names of the applicants may be disclosed.
g. These data are drawn from the state statutes of the Supreme, District, and Appellate Court Nominating Commissions.
9. These data are drawn from the state statutes of the District Court Nominating Commission. The Supreme and Appellate Court
Nominating Commissions contain no reference to this subject.
10. These data are drawn from the rules of the Appellate and Trial Court Nominating Commissions.
11. The information resulting from communication must be summarized in writing and provided to the members of the nominating
commission.
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12. All meetings, documents, and proceedings may. however, be kept confidential upon a majority vote of the commissioners that the
interest in individual privacy exceeds that of public disclosure.
13. Private interviews are encouraged.
14. These data am drawn from rules of procedure established pursuant to Governor Mario Cuomo's Executive Order No. 134.2
(September 10, 1994), which applies to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Court of Claims, Supreme Surrogate,
County, and Family Courts, and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's Executive Order No. 10 (July 20, 1994), for which no rules of
procedure have been promulgated. For the Court of Appeals, this information is drawn from New York Judiciary Law, Sec. 83.
15. These data are drawn from Governor Cuomo's Executive Order No. 134.2 and the procedural rules of the state's nominating
commission. Mayor Giuliani's Executive Order No. 10 contains no reference to this subject. For all courts except the Court of
Appeals, only the appointee's names are made public.
16. Legislation establishing merit selection for general and limited jurisdiction trial courts was enacted on June 2, 1994. Legislation
providing for submission to the electorate of the question of whether to adopt merit selection for the state supreme court was
enacted on June 2, 1994. The question will be decided at the next statewide general election and will take effect upon ratification
of a constitutional amendment. Provisions regarding the future merit selection commission's composition and procedures are
taken from that Legislation (i.e. Public Law Chapter 94-041:2346ab and 2348ab).
17. In South Dakota, nominees' names may be made public only if agreed upon by the Governor and the nominee.
18. In Tennessee, after one public hearing where any member of the public may suggest possible nominees or oppose or support
possible nominees, the commission may hold such additional private or public meetings as it deems necessary.
19. In Utah, only the name of the appointee is made public.
20. West Virginia Executive Order 20-89 states, "all proceedings, materials, and reports of the Committee shall remain confidential,
except upon agreement of the Governor and the Committee."
21. The identity of the nominees may be made public at the discretion of the commission.
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TABLE 5. NOMINATING COMMISSION PROCEDURES
Judicial performance
Oath Political External evaluation available
Disqualification Ethics of Activity Recruitment Diversity Rule Against to nominating
State Provision Provisions Office Prohibition Provision Provision for Discrimination commission
Alabama x
Alaska





Delaware x x, x
DC x
Florida' x x x applicants
commissioners
Georgia
Hawaii x x6  x x x
Idaho
Indiana x x x
Iowa x commissioners
Kansas' k' X7  X7  x
Kentucky x
Maryland' xa x commissioners"
Massachusetts x applicants x
Minnesota x applicants'
conunissioners
Missouri x x applicants
Montana
Nebraska xW x x x










Rhode Island" x x applicants'
commissioners'
South Dakota
Tennessee x x x x commissioners"
Utah x x x X7 applicants'
Vermont
West Virginia x commissioners
Wisconsin x
Wyoming x x
1. Diversity is a factor to be considered, but not a requirement.
2. These data reflect the rules of the Iet District and Supreme Court Nominating Commissions. There are 2 district nominating
commissions in Colorado, one for each judicial district: these have been examined and generally follow the rules of the Ist
District Nominating Commission.
3. These data are drawn from the rules of the Itt District Nominating Commission. The Supreme Court Nominating Commission
contains no reference to this subject.
4. These data reflect the rules of the District, Circuit, and Supreme Court Nominating Commissions. The Circuit Court
Nominating Commission is utilized only in the case of gubersatorial appointments for interim judicial vacancies.
5. These data are drawn form the state statutes of the Supreme, District, and Appellate Court Nominating Commissions.
6. These data are drawn from the state statutes of the Supreme and District Court Nominating Commissions. The Appellate Court
Nominating Commission contains no reference to this subject.
7. These data are drawn from the state statutes of the District Court Nominating Commission. The Supreme and Appellate Court
Nominating Commissions contain no reference to this subject.
8. These data are drawn from the rules of the Appellate and Trial Court Nominating Commissions.
9. These data are drawn from the rules of the Appellate Court Nominating Commission. The Trial Court Nominating
Commission contains no reference to this subject.
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10. For disqualification purposes, the third degree relationship test is applied.
II. These data are drawn from rules of procedure established pursuant to Governor Mario Cuomo's Executive Order No. 134.2
(September 10, 1994), which applies to the judges of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Court of Claims, Supreme,
Surrogate, County, and Family Courts, and Mayor Rudolph Guiliani's Executive Order No. 10 (July 20, 1994), for which no
roles of procedure have been promulgated.
12. These data are drawn from Governor Cuomo's Executive Order No. 134.2 and the procedural rules of the state's nominating
commission. Mayor Giuliani's Executive Order No. 10 contains no reference to this subject.
13. Legislation establishing merit selection for general and limited jurisdiction trial courts was enacted on June 2, 1994.
Legislation providing for submission to the electorate of the question of whether to adopt merit selection for the state supreme
court was enacted on June 2, 1994. The question will be decided at the next statewide general election and will take effect
upon ratification of a constitutional amendmeunt. Provisions regarding the future merit selection commission's composition and
procedures are taken from that legislation (i.e. Public Law Chapter 94-042; 234sb and 23488b).
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PREFACE TO THE 1994 REVISED MODEL PROVISIONS
In 1984 the American Judicature Society first published ModelJudicial Selection Provisions,
which reflected the accumulated experience of state merit selection plans across the country.
Ten years later, this revised version of the model provisions reflects the changing experience
of those states.
Two major changes appear. The first is language promoting demographic diversity on the
judicial nominating commission. The other adds judicial performance evaluation programs
to provide information to voters as a component of retention elections.
Over the past few years several states have mandated that their nominating commissions
include women and minority members. In an editorial in Judicature, the Society endorsed
this development and encouraged all states to adopt this requirement (Vol. 74, No. 5, 1991).
The editorial noted that a diverse nominating commission (1) will tend to recruit a more
broadly representative pool of applicants, and (2) will send the implicit message that the
nominating-commission process is an open one. The result should be a more representative
bench, which will help enhance public trust and confidence in the courts. For language on
commission diversity, see Article 2, page 2, "Judicial Nominating Commission," and all
subsequent provisions establishing the commission.
The second major change in the model provisions mirrors an emerging trend in the merit
plan states-evaluating judges standing for retention and providing credible and meaning-
ful information to voters in retention elections. This trend also was endorsed in an editorial
inJudicature(Vol. 75, No. 3, 1991).
In a few merit-plan states judges either are reappointed or serve until retirement. However,
in the majority of merit-plan states judges run for subsequent terms in nonpartisan,
uncontested elections where the voter answers yes or no to the question, "Shall Judge X be
retained as a [judge] [justice] of the __ court?" Experience has shown, however, that voters
have limited information to guide them in making informed choices in retention elections.
Insufficient information, in turn, can leave judges vulnerable to opposition from interest
groups who disagree with certain judicial decisions. Furthermore, there often is significant
voter falloff in judicial elections compared with the top of the ballot.
As was done in the earlier version, the 1994 model provisions still offer retention elections
or retention by commission as alternatives. However, to allow voters to make more informed
decisions and to reflect actual practice in some merit-plan states, new language has been
added to establish a performance-evaluation program as an adjunct to retention elections.




evaluation program begins on page 21, and model procedural rules for retention-evaluation
commissions begin on page 27.
The changes and additions to the AJS Modl Judicial Selection ftovisions were developed by
a special committee chaired by AJS president Guy A. Zoghby and consisting of two judges
(B. Michael Dann of the Maricopa County Superior Court, Phoenix, and Leander J. Shaw,
Jr., ofthe Florida Supreme Court), two attorneys (RobertT. Grimit ofNebraska and Stephen
S. Dunham of Colorado), and a layperson (Sara B. Davies of Indiana). For more than a year,
they reviewed the demographic diversity statutes and retention-evaluation program govern-
ing provisions and rules, and adapted and modified the best elements of each.
Members of the Society's board of directors reviewed a draft of the revised provisions at the
AJS midyear meeting in March 1994, and the committee made several changes as a result
of their comments. In June 1994, the Society's executive committee approved the model
provisions as they appear here.
vi MJSP
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Since its founding in 1913, the American Judicature Society has been dedicated to
improving the quality of the judiciary. Improving the judiciary meant improving judicial
selection methods that often were confusing or controlled by political party organizations.
These methods of selection often required electioneering by judicial candidates and led to
appointments based on political obligations rather than objective qualifications.
The Society developed what has been termed a judicial "merit" selection plan. The plan
establishes a nonpartisan commission composed ofboth lawyers and nonlawyers who recruit
and screen applicants and ultimately submit names of the most qualified candidates to an
appointing authority. The appointing authority then makes the final selection after
conducting further investigative proceedings. These elements are present in each of34 states
currently having some form of "merit" or "commission" plan for judicial selection.
Apart from these fundamental characteristics, the legal bases and forms of commission plans
vary. Some states have established their plans by constitutional provisions with accompany-
ing implementing court rules or legislation. Other states based their plans on legislation or
executive orders. Executive orders are also used where the mayor of a city has appointing
powers for that city's judicial offices. Some states have one commission for all vacancies in
the state while others have one commission for each judicial district in the state. Commis-
sion plans can be statewide, or exist in only certain districts or municipalities. Some
commission plans encompass all vacancies, while others fill vacancies on certain courts and
still others exist to fill only interim vacancies.
The model provisions that follow are a product of the experience with judicial selection over
the past few decades. These provisions incorporate existing constitutional and statutory
provisions, executive orders, earlier efforts to develop selection plans, and recent experiences
of judicial nominating commissioners across the country.
Because one goal of the commission method for selecting judges is to shelter the commission
as much as possible from outside political pressures, this selection method ideally should be
established by the state constitution. In any event, constitutional provisions will be required
whenever commission plan legislation would conflict with existing constitutional provi-
sions. An opportune time for adopting the provisions is during a state constitutional
convention. If the constitution is not under revision, amendment is often possible by
referendum or act of the state legislature. Because these latter alternatives are often difficult
to achieve, commission plan legislation can be used whenever the constitution allows the
legislature to determine how judges are selected. Executive orders may be used whenever the




The model judicial selection provisions outline the essential components of a nominating
commission including commission membership and basic procedures. Each article, section,
or rule that has been subject to debate is followed by suggested alternate provisions.
Provisions that do not appear to be self-explanatory have been supplemented with brief
commentary.
The merit plan as proposed by the American Judicature Society and the American Bar
Association and in existence in many states includes some form of retention review.
Jurisdictions differ, however, as to the form that a retention review should take. In some
states judges reapply to the nominating commission and may or may not be renominated
for appointment. In others, there is no retention review because merit-appointed judges
serve until retirement.
The revised model provisions now include suggested language for establishing and imple-
menting a process to review judges standing for retention. See Article 7 on page seven, and
Parts Four and Five, beginning on page 21.
For further information and publications on merit selection and judicial performance
evaluation programs for retention review and their implementation in the various states,
please contact the American Judicature Society, 25 East Washington Street, Suite 1600,
Chicago, Illinois 60602, telephone 312/558-6900.
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PART 1
Establishing a Commission Plan Through
Constitutional Provisions
Art. _§1
Section 1. Nomination and Appointment.
The governor shall fill any vacancy in an office of__ court justice or - court judge by
appointing one person nominated by the judicial nominating commission [for the district
where the vacancy occurs]. The judicial nominating commission shall nominate no more
than five nor less than two most highly qualified persons for each vacancy. If the governor
fails to fill a vacancy within 30 days from the day the names are submitted, the [chiefjustice]
[presiding judge for that district] shall appoint one of the nominated persons.
Alternative A
Providing onlyfor interim appointments
Art. _§1
Section 1. Nomination and.Appointment.
The governor shall fill any vacancy occurring between elections in an office of__ court
justice or - court judge by appointing one person nominated by the judicial nominating
commission [for the district where the vacancy occurs]. The judicial nominating commis-
sion shall nominate no more than five nor less than two most highly qualified persons for
each vacancy. If the governor fails to fill a vacancy within 30 days from the day the names
are submitted, the [chief jutice] (presiding judge for that district] shall appoint one of the
nominated persons.
Commensary:
Although the number of names submitted to the governor need not be fixed at five, the
number should be sufficiently low so that the commission nominates only the most highly
qualified candidates. Five names appears to be the optimum because it gives the governor
a real choice while limiting the governor's appointing power. Commissions in less populated
areas may have difficulty finding five most highly qualified nominees and should therefore
be allowed the flexibility to submit fewer names. In some states, the names submitted to the




preference. Thirty days is allowed as a reasonable amount of time for the governor to conduct
an investigation of the nominees. In the event that the governor fails to act within that
reasonable time period, a judicial officer may appoint from the commission's list. This
provision ensures that the final appointment will be made within a reasonable time and from
the list of nominees. The separation of functions allows for independent and nonpartisan
evaluations and nominations by a responsible commission and final appointment by a
governor who is politically accountable.
Art. _§2
Section 2. Judicial Nominating Commission.
[The] [Each] judicial nominating commission shall consist of seven members. Three
attorney members shall be selected for [six-year] [four-year] terms by the bar of the [state]
[judicial district] except as provided by Art. -0§3. Four lay members shall be appointed
[from among the residents of the same area] for [six-year] [four-year] terms, except as
provided in Art. ._§3, by the governor [subject to confirmation by a majority of the
members of the senate]. Appointments and elections to the commission[s] shall be made
with due consideration to geographic representation and without regard to political
affiliation. All appointing authorities shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
commission substantially reflects the gender, ethnic and racial diversity of the jurisdiction.
Vacancies shall be filled for an unexpired term in like manner. No member of [the] [a]
nominating commission may hold any other office under the United States, the State or
other governmenal entity for which monetary compensation is received. No member shall
be cligib.'e for appointment to a state judicial office so long as he or she is a commission
meriber and for [four] [three] years thereafter nor serve for more than two full terms as a
member of the nominating commission.
Alternative A
Providing for a majority of lawyer members
Art. _§2
Section 2. Judicial Nominating Commission.
[The] [Each] judicial nominating commission shall consist ofseven members. Four attorney
members shall be selected for [six-year] [four-year] terms by the bar of the [state] [judicial
district] except as provided by Art. _S3. Three lay members shall be appointed [from
among the residents of the same area] for [six-year] [four-year] terms, except as provided in
Art. _S3, by the governor [subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the
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senate]. Appointments and elections to the commission[s] shall be made with due consid-
eration to geographic representation and without regard to political affiliation. All appoint-
ing authorities shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the commission substantially
reflects the gender, ethnic and racial diversity of the jurisdiction. Vacancies shall be filled for
an unexpired term in like manner. No member of (the] [a] nominating commission may
hold any other office under the United States, the State or other governmental entity for
which monetary compensation is received. No member shall be eligible for appointment to
a state judicial office so long as he or she is a commission member and for [four] [three] years
thereafter nor serve for more than two full terms as a member of the nominating
commission.
Alternative B
Providing for judge as ex-officio chair
Art. _§2
Section 2. Judicial Nominating Commission.
[The] [Each] judicial nominating commission shall consist of seven members. Three
attorney members shall be selected for [six-year] [four-year] terms by the bar of the [state]
[judicial district] except as provided by Art. _S§3. Three lay members shall be appointed
[from among the residents of the same area] for [six-year] [four-year] terms, except as
provided in Art. -.§3, by the governor [subject to confirmation by a majority of the
members of the senate]. The [chiefjustice] [presiding judge] shall act as ex-officio chair over
the commission but shall only vote when to do so would change the result. Appointments
and elections to the commission[s] shall be made with due consideration to geographic
representation and without regard to political affiliation. All appointing authorities shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the commission substantially reflects the gender,
ethnic and racial diversity of the jurisdiction. Vacancies shall be filled for an unexpired term
in like manner. No member of [the] [a] nominating commission may hold any other office
under the United States, the State or other governmental entity for which monetary
compensation is received. No member shall be eligible for appointment to a state judicial
office so long as he or she is a commission member and for [four] [three] years thereafter,
nor serve for more than two full terms as a member of the nominating commission.
Commentary:
In a democratic society it is important that public bodies such as judicial nominating
commissions be broadly representative of the communities they serve. Care should be taken
to ensure that the composition of the commission be reflective of the demographic makeup
of the state or district. If a judge is a member of the commission, the judge should have




method for selecting the attorney members has not been specified since bar organizations
vary significantly from state to state. Many states hold elections to select the attorney
members, while in other states bar leaders handle the appointments. Members should serve
for a period long enough to enable them to develop selection skills. No member of a
commission should seek judicial office until a sufficient amount of time has passed to ensure
a commission's objectivity and preserve public confidence. Commission members should be
limited to two terms to ensure that the commission continues to be representative and vital.
Art. _§3
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (six-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three attorney members for two, four, and six years respectively, and the four lay
members for two, three, five and six years respectively.
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (four-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three lay members for one, two, and three years respectively, and the four
attorney members for one, two, three and four years respectively.
Alternative A
Providing for a majority of lawyer members
Art. _§3
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (six-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three lay members for two, four, and six years respectively, and the four attorney
members for two, three, five and six years respectively.
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (four-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three lay members for one, two, and three years respectively, and the four
attorney members for one, two, three and four years respectively.
4 MJSP
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Alternative B
Providing for judge as ex-officio chair
Art. _§3
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (six-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three attorney members for two, four, and six years respectively, and the three
lay members for two, three, five and six years respectively, and the judge, as chair, for six years
or until the [judge] [justice] leaves his/her judicial position, whichever occurs first.
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (four-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three attorney members for one, two, and four years respectively, and the three
lay members for two, three and four years respectively, and the judge, as chair, for four years
or until the [judge] [justice] leaves his/her judicial position, whichever occurs first.
Commentary:
The terms of the commission members should be staggered to encourage an independent
commission and to provide some continuity.
Art. _§4
Section 4. Reimbursement and Administrative Assistance.
(a) Members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall be reimbursed for all
expenses incurred in the carrying out of their official duties. Additional compensation may
be prescribed by law.
(b) The State Administrative Office of the Courts shall make staff, equipment and
materials available to assist [the] [each] commission in carrying out its official duties.
Commentary:
To foster an effective commission, certain minimal services should be made available. These
services should include typists, copying facilities, stationery and postage and be provided to





Section 5. Powers of the Judicial Nominating Commission.
[The] [Each] judicial nominating commission shall have the power to adopt any rules and
procedures which aid in its selection of the most qualified nominees for judicial office.
Alternative retention provisions:
Art. _§6
Section 6. Retention Elections.
Any judge who seeks additional terms for the same judicial office shall be retained in office
by vote of the electorate. The retention election shall be nonpartisan, shall require the
affirmative vote of [a majority] [60%] of those voting on the question to retain the judge,
and shall be coupled with a retention-evaluation program that will provide information to
voters in retention elections. (See Article 7 below.)
Art. _§6
Section 6. Retention by Commission.
Any judge who seeks additional terms for the same judicial office shall be retained in office
by a finding of the judicial nominating commission that the judge has served competently
and with integrity.
Commentary:
The competence of all judges should be periodically reviewed although appropriate forms
of retention may vary. In some jurisdictions it may be preferable to hold retention elections,
in others to delegate the responsiblity to ajudicial nominating commission familiar with the
task of evaluating judicial ability. Combinations of these procedures are also possible. For
example, the nominating commission or a separate evaluation committee could rate the
judges up for retention, publicize the rating, and allow the public to then vote in a retention
election. One criterion to consider in choosing a procedure is the number of judges to be
evaluated. Regardless of the form it takes, judicial retention should be designed to ensure
that only qualified judges remain on the bench.
6 MJSP
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Art. -§7
Section 7. Retention Evaluation of Justices and Judges
The (supreme court) (judicial council) shall establish, after public hearings, a process for
evaluating judicial performance for all justices and judges who file a declaration to be
retained in office, (and shall provide a recommendation to the public at a time reasonably
prior to the election, but in no event less than 60 days before the election) (and shall provide
information gathered in the evaluation process to the entity responsible for the justices' and
judges' reappointment). The rules governing the evaluation process shall include written
performance standards and performance reviews that survey opinions of persons who have
knowledge of the justice's or judge's performance. The public shall have a full and fair





Implementing a Commission Plan:
Model Court Rules (or Legislation)
Rule -. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION
Rule -. 01. Vacancy.
The commission shall meet and submit a list names of no more than five nor less than two
persons qualified for the judicial office to the governor within 60 days of the occurrence of
a vacancy.
Rule .02. Quorum.
The commission cannot act unless a quorum exists. A quorum consists of a majority of the
commission plus one.
In the absence of a constitutionally mandated chair:
Rule -..03. Chair.
The commission shall choose one of its members as chair and establish the chair's term. The
chair shall preside at all meetings. When the chair is absent, the commission shall choose a
member to act as temporary chair.
Commentary:
The role of the chair is to call commission meetings, keep commission members notified of
commission business, and act as a spokesperson for the commission.
Rule .04. Publicity.
When a judicial vacancy occurs or when it is known that a vacancy will occur at a definite
date, the chair shall publicize the vacancy and solicit the submission of names of qualified
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Commentary:
These requirements are minimal and should be supplemented with active recruitment
techniques.
Rule -. 05. Open meetings.
(a) All organizational meetings of the judicial nominating commission shall be open to
the public. A notice outlining the topics to be discussed should be given to the public 72
hours prior to the meeting. Public participation should be encouraged at each organizational
meeting. An "organizational meeting" is an initial meeting to discuss the commission's
procedures and requirements for the vacancy.
(b) All final deliberations of the judicial nominating commission shall be secret and
confidential.
(c) The confidentiality of other proceedings of the judicial nominating commission shall
be determined by commission rule.
Commentary:
Commission proceedings should be as open as possible. Commissions might want to
consider, for example, holding open interviews or releasing the names of all applicants, both
of which are done in some jurisdictions. The final deliberations and selection of nominees
should remain confidential to encourage free and open discussion of the candidates'
qualifications. To preserve confidentiality of these proceedings, some states may need to
exempt the final deliberations from the state Open Meetings Act.
Rule .06. Submitting names of nominees to the governor.
(a) The names of nominees shall be submitted to the governor in alphabetical order.
(b) A confidential memorandum may accompany the list of nominees and may state facts
concerning each of the nominees listed.
(c) Upon submission of the names to the governor, the governor shall make the names
public and public comment should be encouraged.
Commentary:
Once the names of nominees are submitted to the governor, the commission may provide
additional information only on request of the governor. If the commission would like to
provide supplemental background information on the nominees, it may do so in a
confidential memo without indicating any commission preference. A great majority ofstates
also allow for public comment at this point in the selection process. This is the point at which
public preferences are appropriately voiced. By providing the opportunity for public




Rule -. 07. Candidacy and selection of commission members.
(a) Any individual wishing to serve on the judicial nominating commission can declare
his or her candidacy as follows:
Any person may be considered for an attorney position by declaring his or
her candidacy in writing to the __ at __, if that person has been a
resident of this state for 3 years and is licensed to practice law in this state.
Any person may be considered for a lay position by declaring his or her
candidacy in writing to the governor's office at -, if that person has been
a resident of this state for 3 years.
(b) Declarations of candidacy must be submitted within 30 days after publication of
notice of the vacancy and should be accompanied by descriptions of the candidates'
qualifications for service on the commission.
(c) A commission member's term shall commence on -, the day of appointment. A
commissioner may remain on the commission until his/her replacement has actually been
appointed.
Commentary:
The process for declaring an interest in serving on the judicial nominating commission
should be open and accessible. A residency requirement of three years' duration has been
included to ensure that commissioners have knowledge ofthe state and the corn munity. This
knowledge is particularly necessary in judicial nominating commissioners who must sit in
place of the electorate when selecting public officials. In addition, virtually every state has
durational residency requirements for some or all of its public officials.
For those states using retention elections add:
Rule -. 08. Judicial retention ballot.
A separate nonpartisan judicial ballot shall be designed for each judical district in which a
justice or judge is seeking an additional term. The ballot shall be divided into - parts
corresponding to the court to which the candidate is seeking to be retained. Within each part
the ballot shall read:
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PART3
Establishing a Commission Plan by
Executive Order (or Legislation)
I, -, [Governor] [Mayor] of the [State] [City] of _, desiring to maintain the highest
quality of justice in this [state] [city], establish a Judicial Nominating Commission to
nominate most highly qualified lawyers through a fair and open process that does not create
barriers to ethnic or racial minorities or women.
Section 1. Nomination and Appointment.
The [governor] [mayor] shall fill any vacancy in an office of - court justice or - court
judge by appointing one person nominated by the judicial nominating commission [for the
district where the vacancy occurs]. The judicial nominating commission shall nominate no
more than five nor less than two most qualified persons for each vacancy.
Alternative A
Providing only for interim appointments
Section 1. Nomination and Appointment.
The [governor] [mayor] shall fill an interim vacancy in an office of__ court justice or
court judge by appointing one person nominated by the judicial nominating commission
[for the district where the vacancy occurs]. The judicial nominating commission shall
nominate no more than five nor less than two most highly qualified persons for each vacancy.
Commentary:
Although the number of names submitted to the appointing authority need not be fixed at
five, the number should be sufficiently low so that the commission nominates only the most
highly qualified candidates. Five names appears to be the optimum because it gives the
appointing authority a real choice while limiting that person's appointing power. Commis-
sions in less populated areas may have difficulty finding five most highly qualified nominees
and should therefore be allowed the flexibility to submit fewer names. In some jurisdictions,
the names submitted to the appointing authority are listed in alphabetical order to avoid any
indication of a commission's preference. The separation of functions allows for independent
and nonpartisan evaluations and nominations by a responsible commission and final




Section 2. Judicial Nominating Commission.
(a) [The] [Each] judicial nominating commission shall consist of seven members. Three
attorney members shall be selected for [six-year] (four-year] terms by the bar of the (state]
(municipality] except as provided by Section 3. Four lay members shall be appointed [from
among the residents of the same area] for [six-year] [four-year] terms, except as provided in
Section 3, by the [governor] [mayor] [subject to confirmation by a majority of the members
of the (senate) (city council)]. Appointments and elections to the commission[s] shall be
made with due consideration to [geographic] [community] representation and without
regard to political affiliation. All appointing authorities shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the commission substantially reflects the gender, ethnic and racial diversity of
the jurisdiction. Vacancies shall be filled for an unexpired term in like manner. No member
of (the] (a] nominating commission may hold any other office under the United States, the
State or other governmental entity for which monetary compensation is received. No
member shall be eligible for appointment to a state judicial office so long as he or she is a
commission member and for [four] [three] years thereafter, nor serve for more than two full
terms as a member of the nominating commission.
(b) Any individual wishing to serve on the judicial nominating commission can declare
his or her candidacy as follows:
Any person may be considered for an attorney position by declaring his or
her candidacy in writing to the [governor's] [mayor's] office at _, if that
person has been a resident of this (state] [city] for 3 years and is licensed
to practice law in this state.
Any person may be considered for a lay position by declaring his or her
candidacy :n writing to the [governor's (mayor's] office at _, if that
person has been a resident of this [state] [city] for 3 years.
(c) Declarations of candidacy must be submitted within 30 days after publication of
notice of the vacancy and should be accompanied by descriptions of the candidates'
qualifications for service on the commission.
Alternative A
Providing for a majority of lauyer members
Section 2. Judicial Nominating Commission.
(a) [The] (Each] judicial nominating commission shall consist of seven members. Four
attorney members shall be selected for [six-year] [four-year] terms by the bar of the [state]
(municipality] except as provided by Section 3. Three lay members shall be appointed [from
among the residents of the same area] for [six-year] [four-year] terms, except as provided in
Section 3, by the [governor] (mayor] [subject to confirmation by a majority of the members
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of the (senate) (city council)]. Appointments and elections to the commission[s] shall be
made with due consideration to (geographic] [community] representation and without
regard to political affiliation. All appointing authorities shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the commission substantially reflects the gender, ethnic and racial diversity of
the jurisdiction. Vacancies shall be filled for an unexpired term in like manner. No member
of [the] [a] nominating commission may hold any other office under the United States, the
State or other governmental entity for which monetary compensation is received. No
member shall be eligible for appointment to a state judicial office so long as he or she is a
commission member and for [four] [three] years thereafter, nor serve for more than two full
terms as a member of the nominating commission.
(b) Any individual wishing to serve on the judicial nominating commission can declare
his or her candidacy as follows:
Any person may be considered for an attorney position by declaring his or
her candidacy in writing to the (governor's] [mayor's] office at _ , if that
person has been a resident of this [state] [city] for 3 years and is licensed
to practice law in this state.
Any person may be considered for a lay position by declaring his or her
candidacy in writing to the [governor's] [mayor's] office at -, if that
person has been a resident of this (state] (city] for 3 years.
(c) Declarations of candidacy must be submitted within 30 days after publication of
notice of the vacancy and should be accompanied by descriptions of the candidates'
qualifications for service on the commission.
Alternative B
Providing for judge as ex-officio chair.
Section 2. Judicial Nominating Commission.
(a) [The] [Each] judicial nominating commission shall consist of seven members. Three
attorney members shall be selected for (six-year] [four-year] terms by the bar of the [state]
[municipality] except as provided by Section 3. Three lay members shall be appointed [from
among the residents of the same area] for [six-year] [four-year] terms, except as provided in
Section 3, by the [governor] [mayor] (subject to confirmation by a majority of the members
of the (senate) (city council)]. The [chiefjustice] [presiding judge] shall act as ex-officio chair
over the commission but shall only vote when to do so would change the result. Appoint-
ments and elections to the commission(s] shall be made with due consideration to
[geographic] (community] representation and without regard to political affiliation. All
appointing authorities shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the commission substan-




filled for an unexpired term in like manner. No member of [the] [a] nominating commission
may hold any other office under the United States, the State or other governmental entity
for which monetary compensation is received. No member shall be eligible for appointment
to a state judicial office so long as he or she is a commission member and for [four] [three]
years thereafter nor serve for more than two full terms as a member of the nominating
commission.
(b) Any individual wishing to serve on the judicial nominating commission can declare
his or her candidacy as follows:
Any person may be considered for an attorney position by declaring his or
her candidacy in writing to the [governor's] [mayor's] office at -, if that
person has been a resident of this [state] [city] for 3 years and is licensed
to practice law in this state.
Any person may be considered for a lay position by declaring his or her
candidacy in writing to the [governor's] [mayor's] office at _, if that
person has been a resident of this [state] [city] for 3 years.
(c) Declarations of candidacy must be submitted within 30 days after publication of
notice of the vacancy and should be accompanied by descriptions of the candidates'
qualifications for service on the commission.
Commentary:
In a democratic society it is important that public bodies such as judicial nominating
commissions be broadly representative of the communities they serve. Care should be taken
ro ensure that the composition of the commission be reflective of the demographic makeup
of th! s.. te or €'istrict. If a judge is a member of the commission, the judge should have
limited power so as to avoid exercising undue influence over other commission members. A
method for selecting the attorney members has not been specified since bar organizations
vary significantly from state to state. Many states hold elections to select the attorney
members, while in other states bar leaders handle the appointments. Members should serve
for a period long enough to enable them to develop selection skills. No member of a
commission should seek judicial office until a sufficient amount of time has passed to ensure
a commission's objectivity and preserve public confidence. Commission members should be
limited to two terms to ensure that the commission continues to be representative and vital.
The process for declaring an interest in serving on the judicial nominating commission
should be open and accessible. A residency requirement of three years' duration has been
included to assure that commissioners have knowledge ofthe state and the community. This
knowledge is particularly necessary in judicial nominating commissioners who must sit in
place of the electorate when selecting public officials. In addition, virtually every state has
durational residency requirements for some or all of its public officials.
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Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (six-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three attorney members for two, four, and six years respectively, and the four lay
members for two, three, five and six years respectively.
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (four-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three attorney members for one, two, and three years respectively, and the four
lay members for one, two, three and four years respectively.
Alternative A
Providing for a majority of lawyer members
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (six-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three lay members for two, four, and six years respectively, and the four attorney
members for two, three, five and six years respectively.
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (four-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three lay members for one, two, and three years respectively, and the four
attorney members for one, two, three and four years respectively.
Alternative B
Providing for judge as ex-officio chair
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (six-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as
follows: the three attorney members for two, four, and six years respectively, and the three
lay members for two, three and five years respectively, and the judge, as chair, for six years
or until the [judge] [justice] leaves his/her judicial position, whichever occurs first.
Section 3. Terms of Initial Commission Members. (four-year term)
The initial members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall serve for terms as




lay members for two, three and four years respectively, and the judge, as chairfor six years
of until the [judge] [justice] leaves his/her judicial position, whichever occurs first.
Commentary:
The terms of the commission members should be staggered to encourage an independent
commission and to provide some continuity.
Section 4. Reimbursement and Administrative Assistance.
(a) Members of [the] [each] judicial nominating commission shall be reimbursed for all
expenses incurred in the carrying out of their official duties.
(b) [The State Administrative Office of the Courts] [The Office of the Clerk of the
Municipal Court] shall make staff, equipment and materials available to assist [the] [each]
commission in carrying out its official duties.
Commentary:
To foster an effective commission, certain minimal services should be made available. These
services should include typists, copying facilities, stationery and postage, and be provided
to the commission promptly upon request.
Section 5. Powers of the Judicial Nominating'Commission.
[The] [Each] judicial nominating commission shall have the power to adopt any rules and
procedures which aid in its selection of the most qualified nominees for judicial office.
Section 6. Vacancies.
Within 60 days of the occurrence of a vacancy, the judicial nominating commission shall
meet and submit a list of no more than five nor less than two persons qualified for the judicial
office.
Section 7. Quorum.
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In the absence ofan ex-officlo chair:
Section 8. Chair.
The commission shall choose one of its members as chair and establish the chair's term. The
chair shall preside at all meetings. When the chair is absent, the commission shall choose a
member to act as temporary chair.
Commentary:
The role of the chair is to order commission meetings, keep commission members notified
of commission business, and act as a spokesperson for the commission.
Section 9. Publicity.
When a judicial vacancy occurs or when it is known that a vacancy will occur at a definite
date, the chair shall publicize the vacancy and solicit the submission of qualified individuals
by press release to the media and posting in the courthouse[s] of the [state] [district].
Commentary:
These requirements are minimal and should be supplemented with active recruitment
techniques.
Section 10. Open Meetings.
(a) All organizational meetings of the judicial nominating commission shall be open to
the public. A notice outlining the topics to be discussed should be given to the public 72
hours prior to the meeting. Public participation should be encouraged at each organizational
meeting. An "organizational meeting" is an initial meeting to discuss the commission's
procedures and requirements for the vacancy.
(b) All final deliberations of the judicial nominating commission shall be secret and
confidential.
(c) The confidentiality of other proceedings of the judicial nominating commission shall
be determined by commission rule.
Commentary:
Commission proceedings should be as open as possible. Commissions might want to
consider, for example, holding open interviews or releasing the names of all applicants, both
of which are done in some jurisdictions. The final deliberations and selection of nominees
should remain confidential to encourage free and open discussion of the candidates'
qualifications. To preserve confidentiality of these proceedings, some states may need to




Section 11. Submitting Names of Nominees to the [Governor] (Mayor].
(a) The names of nominees shall be submitted to the [governor] [mayor] in alphabetical
order.
(b) A confidential memorandum may accompany the list of nominees and may state
objective facts concerning each of the nominees listed.
(c) Upon submission ofthe names to the [governor] [mayor], the [governor] [mayor] shall
make the names public and public comment should be encouraged.
Commentary:
Once the names of nominees are submitted to the appointing authority the commission
should provide additional information only on request of the appointing authority. If the
commission would like to provide supplemental background information on the nominees,
it may do so in a confidential memo without indicating any commission preference. A great
majority of states also allow for public comment at this point in the selection process. By
providing the opportunity for public participation, the appointing authority can foster
public trust in the final appointment.
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PART 4
Implementing a Retention Evaluation Program:
Model Legislation (or Court Rules)
Section _ . Judicial Performance Evaluation for Retention in Office
Section -. 01 Purposes
This legislation is (these rules are) intended to establish a judicial performance evaluation
program that will (1) provide persons voting on the retention ofjustices and judges with fair,
responsible and constructive information about judicial performance; (2) facilitate self-
improvement of all such justices and judges; (3) promote appropriate judicial assignments;
(4) identify the need for and improve the content of judicial education programs; and (5)
increase public awareness of the work of the judiciary. Any commission established under
this legislation (these court rules) also may conduct midterm evaluations of judges not then
standing for retention.
Section .02 Appellate Commission on Judicial Performance Evaluation.
The periodic evaluation of appellate judges subject to retention shall be conducted by the
Appellate Commission on Judicial Performance Evaluation. The appointment of commis-
sioners and activities and operations of the commission shall be governed by the following
provisions:
Alternative A
Providingfor various appointing authorities and
either a lay or attorney/judge majority
(a) Appointment of Commissioners:. The commission shall consist of eleven (11) mem-
bers appointed as follows: six (five) lay members appointed by the governor; three (four)
attorney members (in states with integrated bars: appointed by the supreme court from a list
provided by the state bar board of governors) (in states with voluntary bars: elected or
appointed by members of the bar); and two judge members consisting of the chief justice
or his or her designee and one court of appeals judge appointed by the chief justice. All
appointing authorities shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the commission substan-





Adding legislative appointing authorities and providing for
either a lay or attorney/judge majority
(a) Appointment ofCommissioners. The commission shall consist ofeleven (11) members
appointed as follows: six (five) lay members: two appointed by legislative leaders, one each
by the leader of each house if there are two houses; two (one) appointed by the chief justice;
and two appointed by the governor; three (four) attorney members elected or appointed by
the state bar; and two judge members consisting of the chief justice or his or her designee
and one court of appeals judge appointed by the chiefjustice. All appointing authorities shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the commission substantially reflects the gender,
ethnic and racial diversity of the jurisdiction.
(b) Terms. All members of the commission shall serve terms of four years except that, of
those first appointed, three lay members and two attorneys shall serve for a term of three
years. No member may serve more than two terms. Vacancies on the commission shall be
filled by the original appointing authority.
Alternative A
Providing for an elected chair and vice-chair
(c) Chair and Vice-Chair. Commission members shall elect a chair and a vice-chair every
two years. The chair shall preside at all meetings of the commission and shall be the
designated spokesperson for the commission. In the absence of the chair, the vice-chair shall
pres:dt.
Alternative B
P,ovidingfor an ex officio judge chair and an elected or appointed vice-chair
(c) Chair and Vice-Chair. The chief justice or his or her designee shall chair the
commission. The chair shall preside at all meetings of the commission and shall be the
designated spokesperson for the commission. The chair may appoint [commission members
may elect] a vice-chair, who shall preside in the absence of the chair.
(d) Powers andDuties ofthe Commission. The powers and duties ofthe commission shall
be as follows:
(1) To develop techniques for evaluating all justices and judges subject to retention on
relevant performance criteria, which include, but are not limited to: integrity;
impartiality; judicial temperament; knowledge and understanding of substantive and
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procedural law; communication skills; preparation; attentiveness and control over
judicial proceedings; docket management and prompt case disposition; administrative
skills; punctuality; and effectiveness working with other participants in the judicial
process.
(2) To develop performance evaluation surveys of lawyers, jurors, peers, chief judges,
court personnel and others who have direct and continuing contact with justices and
judges;
(3) To develop uniform statewide evaluation criteria, forms and procedures;
(4) To consult with trial court commissions on evaluation criteria, techniques and sources;
(5) To subpoena witnesses and hire agents;
(6) To request public comment and hold public hearings on the performance of appellate
justices and judges;
(7) To produce and distribute to the public (to the entity responsible for retention) no
later than 60 days before the election (no later than (90] [120] days before the judge's
term expires) pertinent information concerning each appellate justice or judge subject
to retention.
(8) To promulgate, subject to approval by the supreme court (judicial council) rules
necessary to implement the provisions of this legislation.
Optional provision for midterm evaluations
(9) To conduct confidential midterm evaluations of the performance of appellate judges
not then standing for retention. The results shall be shared only with the reviewed
judge and an appropriate supervising judge or justice as determined by the commis-
sion.
Section -. 03 Trial Court Commissions on Judicial Performance Evaluation
Akernative A
Providing for various appointing authorities and
either a lay or attorney/judge majority
(a) Appointment ofCommitsioner. There is hereby established in each judicial district a
trial court commission on judicial performance evaluation. Each such commission shall
consist of eleven (11) members appointed as follows: six (five) lay members to be appointed




a list submitted by the state bar board of governors) (to be elected or appointed by members
of the bar); and the chief judge of the appropriate court of appeals district or his or her
designee. All appointing authorities shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
commission substantially reflects the gender, ethnic and racial diversity of the jurisdiction.
Alternative B
Adding legislative appointing authorities and providingfor
either a lay or attorney/judge majority
(a) Appointment of Commissioners. There is hereby established in each judicial district a
commission on judicial performance evaluation. The commission shall consist of eleven
(11) members appointed as follows: six (five) lay members: two (one) appointed by the chief
justice; two appointed by the governor; and two appointed by the legislative leaders, one
each by the leader of each house if there are two houses; four (five) attorney members
appointed or elected by members ofthe state bar; and the chiefjudge ofthe appropriate court
of appeals division or his or her designee. All appointing authorities shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the commission substantially reflects the gender, ethnic and racial
diversity of the jurisdiction.
(b) Terms. All members of the commission shall serve terms of four years except that, of
those first appointed, three public members and two attorneys shall serve for a term of three
years. No member may serve more than two terms. Vacancies on the commission shall be
filled by the original appointing authority.
Alternative A
Providing fr an elected chair and vice-chair
(c) Chair and Vice-Chair. Commission members shall elect a chair and a vice-chair every
two years. The chair shall preside at all meetings of the commission and shall be the
designated spokesperson for the commission. In the absence of the chair, the vice-chair shall
preside.
Alternative B
Providingfor an ex officio judge chair and an elected or appointed vice-chair
(c) Chair and Vice-Chair. The chiefjudge of the appropriate court of appeals division or
his or her designee shall be commission chair. The chair shall preside at all meetings of the
commission and shall be the designated spokesperson for the commission. The chair may
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appoint [commission members may elect] a vice-chair, who shall preside in the absence of
the chair.
(d) Powers and Duties of the Commission. In addition to other powers and duties
conferred on the trial court commissions by this legislation, a trial court commission has the
following powers and duties:
(1) To distribute questionnaires and interview judges under the state commission's
direction;
(2) To produce and distribute to the public no later than 60 days before the election (to
the entity responsible for retention no later than [90] [120] days before the judge's
term expires) pertinent information concerning each district judge subject to reten-
tion.
Optional provision for midterm evaluations
(3) To conduct confidential midterm evaluations of the performance of trial court judges
not then standing for retention. The results shall be shared only with the reviewed
judge and an appropriate supervising judge or justice as determined by the commis-
sion.
Section_ .04 Recommendations on Retention of Justices and Judges.
(a) The state appellate commission and each trial court commission shall conduct an
evaluation of each justice of the supreme court and each judge of the court of appeals and
the district court who is subject to retention. Evaluations shall be completed and a narrative
profile prepared for communication to the justice or judge no later than thirty days prior to
the last day on which a justice or judge can declare his or her intent to stand for retention.
The appellate justice or judge shall have the opportunity to meet with the appropriate
commission or otherwise respond to the evaluation no later than ten days following receipt
of such evaluation. If such a meeting is held or response is made, the commission may revise
its evaluation.
Alternative A
Providing for a factual summary of evaluation findings to be released to the
public
(b) After the requirement in paragraph (a) is met, a factual report concerning each justice
or judge subject to retention shall be released to the public (given to the entity responsible
for retention). The report shall include a narrative summary of the evaluation findings, and





Providing for a recommendation regarding the judge or justice subject to reten-
tion
(b) After the requirement in paragraph (a) is met, the relevant commission shall compile
a narrative summary of the evaluation findings, and shall make a recommendation to the
public (to the entity responsible for retention) regarding the justice or judge subject to
retention. The recommendation shall be stated as retain, do not retain, or no opinion. A no
opinion recommendation shall be made only when the commission concludes that there is
insufficient reliable information to make a firm recommendation, and shall be accompanied
by a detailed explanation.
Section -. 05 Administrative Assistance.
(a) The State Court Administrative Office shall staff and provide other assistance to the
state appellate commission in carrying out its duties. The district administrator of each
judicial district shall provide similar assistance.
(b) Commission members shall receive no compensation, but shall be reimbursed for all
• caqonable oxpenses incurred in carrying out their official duties.
Section -. 06 Privilege and Immunity.
All documents and information obtained by or submitted to the committee and all results
of judicial evaluations are absolutely privileged and no lawsuit predicated thereon may be
o-cugit. Statements made to the commission are absolutely privileged, provided, however,
that this absolute privilege does not apply to statements made in any other forum. Members
oXhe comraittee and staff'shall be immune from suit and liability for any conduct in the
coLrse of their duties.
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PART5
Model Procedural Rules For
Retention-Evaluation Commissions
Rule 1. Meetings, Quorum, Majority, Minutes.
The commission shall meet at the call of the chair and shall conduct no business except upon
the attendance of at least six members. Members shall be permitted to attend and participate
in meetings by telephone or videoconference. All meetings shall be open to the public except
as provided in Rule 3 below. All actions shall require a majority vote of those present, except
for the meeting when the commission determines its retention recommendation. That
meeting shall require a majority vote of the commission. Except for the requirements of Rule
3, minutes of meetings of the commission shall be considered public documents.
Rule 2. Public Comment and Hearings.
In each election year (Prior to a justice's or judges retention by reappointment) the
commission shall request written public comment and hold one or more public hearings
with respect to justices or judges subject to retention. The public shall be notified of the
hearing(s) through newspaper advertisements and public service announcements on radio
and television. Public hearings shall be tape recorded and public comments shall be
considered by the commission when formulating its retention recommendation(s).
Rule 3. Executive Session.
The commission shall meet in executive session at the time of (1) presentation and
discussion of a judge's written response or the results of any interview with a justice or judge
concerning the commission's draft evaluation; (2) discussion of the commission's recom-
mendations to the voters (discussion of whether a justice or judge meets, exceeds or fails to
meet performance standards); and (3) voting on the retention recommendation (voting on
whether the factual report shall say the justice or judge meets, exceeds or fails to meet
performance standards). The commission may meet in executive session at any other time
upon two-thirds vote of commission members then in attendance. The substance of
deliberations in executive session shall be confidential.
Rule 4. Removal of Commissioners.
Any member may be removed from the commission by the (chief justice) (judicial council)





Rule 5. Commissioner Impartiality and Disqualification.
(a) A commissioner shall perform his or her duties in an impartial and objective manner.
(b) A commissioner is disqualified from taking any action with respect to a judge who is
a family member within the third degree of consanguinity, or a judge who was a com-
missioners business associate, attorney or client within the preceding (three) (five) years.
(c) A commissioner shall disclose to the full commission any relationship with a reviewed
justice or judge, whether business, personal, or attorney-client, or any other cause for
conflict of interest, and the commission shall determine whether a commissioner shall be
disqualified.
(d) A commissioner shall promptly report to the full commission any information
conveyed to him or her concerning any judicial officer under review. The commissioner also
shall promptly report to the full commission any attempt by any person or organization to
influence him or her other than by fact or opinion.
Rule 6. Data Collection.
(a) The commission shall (may) employ a qualified contractor whose duty it shall be to
prepare the survey forms referred to herein, process the survey responses, and compile the
statistical reports of the survey results in manner that will ensure the confidentiality and
accuracy of the process.
(b) The commission also may formulate a judge's self-evaluation questionnaire, contact
the state's judicial conduct commission, interview the reviewed judge's colleagues on the
b :nch, and seek other relevant information that will ensure a full and fair evaluation process.
Rule 7. Confidentiality and Disclosure of Records.
(a) All information, completed survey forms, letters, notes, memoranda, and other data
obtained -ind used in the course of any judicial performance evaluation shall be strictly
confidential and shall not be disclosed by any commissioner, staff person or agent except as
provided herein. All survey forms and other evaluation information shall be anonymous.
(b) Under no circumstances shall the data collected or the results of the evaluation be used
to discipline an individual judge or justice or be disclosed to authorities charged with
disciplinary responsibility, unless required by law or by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, information disclosinga criminal act maybe provided
to law enforcement authorities at the direction of the supreme court. Requests for such
information in the possession of a commission shall be made by written petition setting forth
the specific information needed. All information and data provided to law enforcement
authorities pursuant to this paragraph shall no longer be deemed confidential.
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